This is a piece I just wrote for an Indian think tank. It will appear on this website in the next day or two:
From Sporadic Cooperation to an Enduring Partnership: The Evolution in Franco-Indian Ties.On the 14th of July, a contingent comprised of more than 400 Indian troops, drawn from the Army, Navy and Air Force will march down Paris’s Champs Elysées, in order to take part in France’s annual commemoration of the French storming of the Bastille on July the 14th 1789. They will be watched by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. While it is clear that Mr. Sarkozy is returning a favour (he was India’s guest of honour during the Republic Day Parade in January 2008); the presence of Indian troops on the Champs Elysées is also indicative of a more profound trend in Franco-Indian ties, which have been steadily growing over the past decade or so.
During much of the Cold War, relations in-between the two republics were cordial but relatively distant. Neither country loomed large on their counterpart’s strategic radar screen , and their relationship over those long decades has been variously described as “not bad but lethargic”, “cordial but stagnant”, or “lacking dynamism”.
The relative lack of tensions between both states during the Cold War can largely be explained by France’s quest for a degree of strategic autonomy from the rest of its NATO allies, and the US in particular. This aspiration for a certain degree of strategic flexibility in its dealings with the rest of the world most notably led to France’s decision to develop its own military nuclear capacity or “force de frappe” in 1958, and President Charles De Gaulle’s unilateral decision to pull out of NATO’s integrated military command structure in 1966 (this decision has just been reversed by Sarkozy). France’s refusal to consistently toe to Washington’s line meant that it often harboured a slightly more sympathetic attitude towards India than its allies.
For example, during the first decades following independence, Western countries almost invariably sided with Pakistan rather than India over the Kashmiri dispute. This was due, in part, to the fact that Pakistan, by joining the Baghdad Pact, had become an important ally in the region. Paris, although allied with the West, frequently took a more measured attitude, refusing to systematically side with Islamabad. France was one of the first western countries, for example, to lift the arms embargo that hit both India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1965 conflict. Similarly, during the 1971 war, Paris was one of the only Western capitals to comment on the legitimacy of India’s concerns vis-à-vis of the refugee crisis in its border regions with Bangladesh. Such gestures were duly noted and appreciated in Delhi.
This is not to say, however, that both countries’ relations were completely devoid of tension. France remained entrenched in its five minute colonial dominions in India until 1954, and when, in 1947, the French government asked for a ten year extension of the 1945 agreement allowing military cargo planes to fly over Indian airspace, Prime Minister Nehru, while agreeing, did not hesitate to voice his disapproval of French “imperialism” in the strongest possible terms. After the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Delhi, by virtue of necessity, remained avowedly “non-aligned” while drifting ever closer to the Soviet Union, signing a treaty of Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This was viewed with concern by French officials, as was De Gaulle’s decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China in 1964 by their Indian counterparts. Overall, however, both countries’ ties lacked the degree of acrimony and mistrust that characterized Indo-US relations for so long.
In fact, the Indo-French relationship during much of this period can best be defined by its very lack of sentimentality. Their rapport was business like and mainly restricted to arms sales. Indeed, India and France have a long history of defence cooperation. Few people know, for example, that in-between 1950 and 1962, France’s total arms sales to India, at 794 million dollars, ranked second after those of Great Britain (far ahead at more than 4.5 billion).
France was subsequently overtaken by Russia, and the US, but remained a major arms supplier to India, supplying it over the years with reliable, high-tech equipment such as Bréguet Alizés and Mirage 2000 aircraft, AS-30 air-to-surface missiles, Milans anti-tank missiles, and Cheetak and Alouette combat helicopters.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, France took a few years to realize that India, with its growing and liberalised economy, vibrant democracy and increasingly capable armed forces was a major rising power. When it did, however, things began to move very fast.
1998 is generally recognized as being the ‘watershed year’ in Franco-Indian relations. With President Jacques Chirac’s state visit to India in January 1998 and PM Vajpayee’s visit to Paris in September of the same year, the relationship changed from one that was politely indifferent to one of a genuine strategic partnership. A broad and wide ranging Indo-French strategic dialogue was established, and France publicly came out in support of India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC. The growing warmth in Franco-Indian ties was further revealed in the course of that year when Paris remained silent after the BJP’s government decision to go ahead with the Pokhran nuclear testings, which were almost universally condemned at the time. Since the late 1990s, France has been a steadfast and unwavering supporter of Delhi’s nuclear energy needs. Even before the India-US nuclear deal was validated by the NSG and ratified by the American Congress, French and Indian officials were busy fine-tuning a bilateral nuclear agreement, which, amongst other things, institutionalises cooperation in-between India’s Department of Atomic Energy and its French equivalent. The French flagship company Areva, which is one of the world leaders in the field of civilian nuclear technology, has been visiting India and engaging in preliminary talks on the development of Jules Horowitz nuclear reactors.
The area in which Franco-Indian ties have made the most progress however, remains that of defence cooperation, moving from the short term tactical relations of the Cold War, to the more long term and genuinely strategic. France has now become one of India’s most trusted Western defence partners, and Franco-Indian defence cooperation has been described by French officials as ‘discreet but wide-ranging and efficient’, both countries regularly trading information on terrorism, security in Asia and the Middle-East, and maritime piracy, amongst a host of other issues. There has also been talk in some quarters of a ‘Status of Force Agreement’, which governs the stationing of troops in mutual territory.
Annual bilateral military exercises are held, and whether they involve both countries’ airforces ( as is the case in the Garuda exercises) or both countries’ navies (the Varuna exercises), have gradually increased in scale and complexity. Indo-French naval cooperation is particularly intense. This is due to the fact that France, which still holds sway over a dozen islands and more than two million square kilometres of territory in the Indian Ocean, is a major naval power in the region, and views the Indian Navy as a vital partner in the preservation of local maritime security. Both navies are currently deployed in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia, and the latest Varuna exercises, which took place just a few weeks ago off the coasts of Britanny, and which involved Indian and French destroyers and frigates, various French aircraft, and a French SNA, were the most complex yet. All this shows that France no longer considers India solely as a defence client, put as a bona fide defence partner.
Much remains to be done, however, to further amplify the depth of Franco-Indian relations. Economic exchanges, for example, at only 6.5 billion euros per annum, remain remarkably low, considering the size of both countries’ economies. Acutely aware of this, French and Indian officials have fixed a target of 12 billion euros by 2012. Progress also needs to be made in the field of educational and cultural exchanges. Only 1300 Indians are currently studying in France, which is minute compared to other Western countries such as the US, the UK or Germany. In order to address this and facilitate student mobility in-between both countries, a CIFU or Consortium of Indo-French Universities was set up in 2008.
The future of the Franco-Indian arms trade is another cloud over the horizon.
Indeed, while France remains one of India’s top defence suppliers, winning in 2005 a multibillion dollar contract for the purchase and co-manufacturing of six highly advanced diesel electric Scorpene submarines, it is also increasingly threatened by the ferocity of American, Israeli and Russian competition. In 2007, the Indian Air Force issued a Request for Proposal for 126 new medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA). Estimated at at least 10 billion dollars, the deal is one of the biggest since the early 1990s. It is also one of the most competitive, with more than six global firms competing for the deal. Dassault’s Rafale is thus facing competition from Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Saab’s Gripen NG, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, and Mikoyan’s MiG-35. Most analysts believe that France’s Rafale, which has already been temporarily excluded for failing to meet certain qualitative parameters, has little chance of winning the deal, and will most likely lose out to the Russian MiG-35.
France not only has to deal with India’s growing diversification in terms of arms procurements, but also with the growing multifariousness of its strategic ties. Indeed, whereas in 1998, France retained relatively privileged and rarefied position as India’s strategic partner, Delhi now holds high-level strategic dialogues with a wide range of foreign powers, whether it be Israel, the US or Singapore. Indo-US ties, in particular, have taken quantum leaps over the past few years, and far exceed Indo-French relations in terms of scope and ambit.
Paris, does, however, hold a sizeable advantage over the US. Indeed, many in India’s strategic community, while recognizing the strategic import of the recent Indo-Us rapprochement, fret over Washington’s real motives, worrying if India is destined to become America’s Asian proxy in its containment strategy of Beijing. There is also a fiercely anti-American streak amongst the more left leaning elements of India’s political intelligentsia. Indian policy makers’ vision of France remain bereft of such lingering suspicions. This mutual trust, a rare thing in the oft convoluted world of diplomacy, is something that both Indian and French officials should choose to build upon in their efforts to bring the burgeoning Indo-French partnership to a whole new level.
