The Chinese Navy's Hidden European Past

My friends James Rogers and Luis Simon at European Geostrategy, an excellent blog devoted to European strategic culture and planning, just published my latest policy paper entitled "The Chinese Navy's Hidden European Past: How the Study of European History is Key to Understanding China's Naval Rise."

The paper looks at the history of three European powers – Ancient Rome, Post-Revolutionary France and Petrine Russia – before asking what their pasts can tell us about China’s maritime future. It argues that European history offers examples for Beijing’s sea-based future trajectory, and shows how a potentially more assertive Chinese naval capability in the decades ahead might be constrained. It also counsels that Europeans must not neglect their own naval power, lest they fade away like the European powers of the past.

India's Aspirational Naval Doctrine

Ashgate has just published "The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges", an anthology of articles/chapters edited by King's College Professor Harsh V. Pant, and pertaining to various facets of India's rise.

 http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409430872

It provides a rich kaleidoscope of contributions, with fascinating chapters by, for instance, Uday Bhaskar, Walter Ladwig III, and Jim Holmes.

I provided the section on India's naval doctrine, which can be accessed via the Carnegie website at :

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/15/india-s-aspirational-naval-doctrine/e178

Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean.

The US Naval War College Review has published my latest long article, which engages in a detailed study of the ramifications of naval nuclearization in the Indian Ocean. Drawing on the classical literature of deterrence, it argues that the shifting of India and Pakistan's nuclear deterrent from land to sea will have an adverse impact on regional stability and give birth to dangerously escalatory dynamics. Amongst the sub-themes cross-examined feature a survey of the current state of Sino-Pakistani naval cooperation, as well as an examination of the impact of a future forward deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines in the Arabian Sea.

The article can be accessed here.

Exploring Europe's Role in the South China Sea: Interview of James Rogers

James Rogers is an academic specializing in international relations, strategic studies and European security and a faculty member at the Baltic Defense College. His responses are made here strictly in a personal capacity. He has also worked on reports for RAND Europe, the Egmont Institute, the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defense and the European Union Institute for Security Studies. He co-edits the blog European Geostrategy. 

• Three years ago, in a seminal report, you urged the European Union to look beyond its traditional backyard and towards the wider waters of the Asia-Pacific. You most notably identify “the coastal region stretching from the Suez Canal to the city of Shanghai-and perhaps as far as Seoul-as being the most likely region to experience great power competition and general disorder over the coming decades”. Could you tell our readers how you came to this prognosis and why, in your view, Asian stability is closely intertwined with that of Europe? 

 Thank you for your kind comments about my 2009 report! I came to the conclusion that the Suez-to-Shanghai zone would matter to Europeans for two reasons. Firstly, because trade flows along the ‘Royal Route’ (i.e. the maritime communication line from Europe to East Asia) were rapidly accelerating in the post-Cold War economic boom, while East Asians were growing ever more important as European trade partners. Secondly, I became alarmed, after reading Nicholas Spykman’s work from the 1930s and 1940s, over the similarities between Americans then and Europeans now: Spykman deploys an extremely sophisticated geopolitical analysis to show how and why an isolationist foreign policy is short-sighted and dangerous, particularly in the ‘rimland’ of Eurasia. To make his theories accessible, he likened world politics to a ‘magnetic field’ where a strengthening of one of the magnets within the field would alter the surrounding lines of force, scattering any nearby metal fragments all over the place. With China and India’s rise – and Russia’s resurgence – I realised that their interests would intersect increasingly from Suez to Shanghai (the ‘rimland’), pressing, progressively, into areas of formerly exclusive American and European concern. Using Spykman’s teachings on geography and isolationism, as well as his magnetic metaphor, I came to the conclusion that unless Europeans became more assertively involved in the Indo-Pacific zone over the coming years (an area where their own economic interests are in any case drawing them), their own interests would eventually be thrust aside, similarly to the metal fragments.

 

• How do you respond to the dissenting voices of European isolationists who argue that it is not in Europe’s interests – nor is it within its means – to get involved in Asian disputes? More specifically, will the drastic budgetary cuts currently looming over many European nations’ militaries impact on their capacity to project power and influence in Asia? 

 I think European isolationists are naïve and mistaken. On the face of it, they seem articulate, moderate and considered, but on closer inspection it becomes clear that their approach is based on hot air. I think many of these people have lost their ability to analyze global affairs from a dynamic geopolitical perspective that focuses on the great powers and their interests. They are trapped in a ‘Brussels bubble’; that is to say, they see global politics through the lens of the ‘post-modern’ European condition. Slightly high-handedly, they see geopolitics as distasteful and passé; rather, they hope the world can be tamed through ‘dialogue’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘global governance’. They fail to realize that their precious bubble – post-modern Europe – only exists because of the military and nuclear might of the Western triumvirate (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). Further, as many of these European isolationists come from countries whose strategic cultures are primarily terrestrial, they do not see the world in the same way as the British or French (let alone the Americans) do. With a few notable exceptions – for example, Poland, Norway, Denmark and the Baltic States – they tend towards reactive rather than pro-active policies; they have come to accept being shaped, rather than learning to shape others themselves. So when China or Russia adopt confrontational policies, or when countries like Libya become problematic, they tend to throw up their arms in despair, proclaim the situation ‘too complex’, and shrink into their shells. Unfortunately, much like a bird whose eye is on a juicy snail, the shell only holds out for so long, should the bird be determined to get inside.

 As for cuts in European military power, there are only two warrior nations left in Europe now: France and the United Kingdom. Some countries, such as Poland, Estonia, Norway and Denmark, continue to take strategy seriously, but are not big enough to have comprehensive armed forces or project power autonomously. According to NATO’s latest figures – except for the United Kingdom and a destitute Greece – all remaining European countries now spend less than 2% of their GDP on their armed forces (France, Turkey, Poland and Estonia come close to that figure). Contrary to the popular mantra, it is important to point out that European military cuts are not a consequence of the financial crisis – although this has not helped – but are instead related to a political problem, namely an unwillingness or inability amongst many European countries to give military power the attention it deserves as a guardian of their prosperity. This fact has not been lost on many Asian, South American and Middle Eastern states, who have been ramping up their naval spending, not only in absolute terms, but also relative to their GDP, and in some cases, quite substantially. As Paul Kennedy said of Europeans a few years back, ‘can that be wise?’

• The Council of the European Union recently released its updated guidelines on The EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia. The document reveals growing concerns in Europe over the potential for increasingly “competitive nationalism” within the South China Sea and over the deleterious effect this could have over EU trade and investment interests in the broader region. It falls short, however, of providing any concrete recommendations over how Europe can help stabilize the region, merely exhorting China to display greater transparency and extolling the virtues of effective multilateralism. Certain strategic thinkers, such as Jim Holmes of the US Naval War College, have suggested that European vessels should show the flag with greater frequency in contested waters, thereby signaling to China the wider world’s attachment to the basic tenets of freedom of navigation. Do you agree with this proposal? What other beneficial role could Europe potentially play in the South China Sea?   

I agree wholeheartedly with Jim Holmes’ proposal, which is not so different to one of the recommendations I made in my Suez-to-Shanghai report in early 2009. I argued that Europeans should set up a ‘go-anywhere’ coast guard, eventually of purpose-built armed cutters, under the European Union’s aegis (or a British-French force), to maintain a constant sovereign presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as undertaking disaster relief operations, repressing piracy and preventing forms of organized crime, including terrorism. This would free up European naval forces to concentrate on proper military and strategic issues closer to home, not least as the United States ‘pivots’ East. It would also provide a reserve of European warships to operate East-of-Suez or augment the coast guard should larger and more powerful vessels be required. European cutters could show the European flag (or the White Ensign and Tricolore) to demonstrate a European willingness to remain active in the Indian Ocean, while British and French warships could be deployed into more volatile areas, to show that certain nations’ illegitimate claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea, for example, will not be recognized by Europeans. 

 

• What leverage or strategic advantage, if any, can be derived from certain European nation’s historical-and continued-presence in Asian waters? Does the fact that France, for example, remains an Indo-Pacific power render it more capable of shaping events in the region than other European nations? On a somewhat tangential note, does the United Kingdom’s involvement in the Five Powers Defense Arrangements still hold much strategic relevance today?

  I think a great deal of leverage can be derived, not only for France and the United Kingdom, but also for the United States. Both Britain and France remain trans-continental powers, not least because they have territories in or adjacent to almost every continent, particularly the Indian Ocean – territories which must be protected. These territories provide London and Paris (and the United States) with naval and air facilities, which can be used to station warships and aircraft, that can then be used in support of European interests. British and French military or logistics facilities in third countries, like Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Brunei, further enhance the European presence. Gibraltar, Cyprus, Diego Garcia and Sembawang dockyard could all be used by the British to reach and support the members of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements, for example, should the need arise.

Given the United Kingdom’s close economic and political relations with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia; its history and cultural affinity with them; the fact that over a million Britons live in them; and that Queen Elizabeth II is Head of State of two of them; means that London’s commitment to the Five Powers Defense Arrangements will likely continue, and perhaps even grow as new threats arise and new assets become available to the British Naval Service (i.e. bigger warships and auxiliary vessels, better submarines, and ‘pocket super-carriers’). As such, perhaps Paris and London (and Washington) should begin to think harder about how they can co-operate and reinforce one another in the ‘Asian Mediterranean’, including how they might assist if one was called on to intervene in a future crisis.

•  Several commentators have drawn attention to the potentially destabilizing consequences of a growing naval arms race in Asia. Several of the more offensive- and potentially strategically disruptive-platforms currently joining Asian inventories are, in fact, European in origin. Should the European Union engage in a greater effort to regulate high-end conventional arms exports to certain Asian nations in order to not inadvertently disturb the regional balance and exacerbate preexisting security dilemmas? Or will mercantilistic pressures override any possibilities of a significant shift in attitudes?

  

I am not concerned with European arms sales to Asian powers per se. It may even be strategically as well as economically advantageous to sell weaponry to the Indo-Pacific powers, particularly to countries such as Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Japan and India, which have well-established constitutional governments; have close relations with Europeans; and act responsibly. Sales to such countries would also help balance the growing power of China and Russia, as well as, potentially, countries like Iran and Pakistan. That said, the strategic situation should be monitored constantly and Europeans should never do anything to harm the United States’ role and position as the ultimate security guarantor in the region, for this could also harm their own interests, particularly in the longer term.

Wading out to Sea: The Evolution of India and Indonesia's Naval Mindsets Towards Multilateralism

This issue brief,  produced by my fiancee, Jennifer McArdle, is a must-read-it scrutinizes both India and Indonesia's turn towards naval multilateralism from a comparative perspective. Considering the dearth of good literature on Indonesia's Navy, I'm sure I am not the only one to find this to be a fascinating read:


http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/attachments/op_34_1342006228215.pdf

India's Soft Power Advantage in the South China Sea: Interview of Professor James R. Holmes

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and senior fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former US Navy surface warfare officer, he served as military professor at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education, and as director of a steam engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command. On sea duty he served as an engineering and gunnery officer on board the battleship Wisconsin. He is a combat veteran of the first Gulf War.

Jim is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University (B.A., mathematics and German) and earned graduate degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (M.A.L.D. and Ph.D., international relations), Providence College (M.A., mathematics), and Salve Regina University (M.A., international relations). 

Jim's most recent book is Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (with Toshi Yoshihara), an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010 and a US Naval Institute Notable Naval Book for 2010. It has been translated into German and Korean and is under contract to be translated and published by the China Social Sciences Press, an arm of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Forthcoming is Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Georgetown University Press). Under contract is Asiatic Fleets, Then and Now. He is the author or co-author of 20 book chapters and over 100 journal articles, as well as over 300 opinion columns for such outlets as the Providence Journal, Taipei Times, Global Times, Asia Times, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, and Athens (Ga.) Banner-Herald, where he was a staff columnist from 2001-2007. He is a defense analyst and weekly columnist for The Diplomat, a Real Clear World Top 5 World News Site for 2010 and 2011.

 (The Interview will feature in the July Issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor) 

• In a recent article for Strategic Analysis, you discuss the considerable logistical hurdles India faces as an “exterior line” power in the South China Sea. You note that “it may take an almost Copernican revolution” in India’s strategic thinking in order for it to successfully negotiate the challenges inherent to such operations. What strategic disadvantages does China face in the South China Sea? Could India exploit these “chinks” in times of conflict, and if so, how?

China is making a real mess for itself in the South China Sea. As my friend Toshi Yoshihara and I pointed out last year, Beijing has taken on an enormous number of military commitments all around the Asian periphery, and it has done so before the People’s Liberation Army force structure matures enough in size and capability to supply forces to each of those commitments. We used Carl von Clausewitz’s simple formula for when to open “secondary” theaters or operations as a device to analyze China’s capacity to uphold a “core interest” in the South China Sea. We found that Chinese leaders have failed to prioritize among commitments or allocate forces wisely. A mismatch among policy, strategy, and forces has opened.

At the same time, Chinese leaders have taken actions guaranteed to antagonize their neighbors, and they seem unable to fathom that this will generate long-lasting suspicions and resentments in places like Southeast Asia. For a country that forever—and understandably—laments its “century of humiliation,” China seems to have a hard time empathizing with weak states that confront strong ones today. They don’t appear to comprehend this role reversal.

Whatever the case, China’s imprudence could be India’s opportunity. India could, and I believe will, find welcoming audiences in Southeast Asia, just as the United States has in the past couple of years. It should continue pursuing its Look East policy confidently, and refuse to look cowed, defensive, or overly worried when things like the “escorting” incident from earlier this month take place. An Indian presence in the region should be a matter of course, and that’s how New Delhi should portray it.

• You have questioned the veracity of certain elements of the alleged encounter in-between the INS Arivat, an Indian amphibious vessel, and a Chinese Navy unit, first reported in the Financial Times in July 2011. Nevertheless, you add, such reports only underscore the growing unease lurking under the surface of Sino-Indian maritime relations. What are your thoughts on both rising powers’ future naval interactions in the South China Sea and beyond? How can both parties work towards diluting future tensions?

I questioned the Arivat story because there was no evidence that it was true. Anyone with a bridge-to-bridge radio—and that covers just about anyone plying the briny deep—can dial up Channel 16 and claim to be the Chinese Navy.

As far as defusing future tensions, I guess we all have a choice. If India or other Southeast Asian powers defer to China’s claims to “indisputable sovereignty” over most of the South China Sea, then tensions will abate—but at the price of compromising fundamental principles underlying freedom of the seas. Both Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal lie well within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, despite news reports that spin this as Manila’s “saying” those features lie within the EEZ. Look at the map. They do lie within the Philippine EEZ. I frankly am not sure whether Washington can have it both ways, although I sympathize with administration officials. Can we really refuse to take sides on clearly excessive maritime claims without gutting the law of the sea? I can think of some really bad nonviolent settlements to these controversies.

Or, China can give up its claim to indisputable sovereignty. But having depicted the dispute as a matter of sovereignty, Beijing has probably painted itself into a corner with the populace. If China backs down now, then by its own terms it will have surrendered a core interest and sovereign territory. Chinese leaders overtly back down at their peril.

The other alternative is what I’ve called “small-stick diplomacy,” whereby Beijing relies on unarmed surveillance and law-enforcement ships to solidify its claims. By treating Scarborough Shoal as a matter of routine law enforcement within sovereign Chinese waters, China creates facts on the ground. It need not send the fleet, simply because weak sea powers like the Philippines know the fleet exists, is overpoweringly strong, and will be sent if they defy China’s will. This is an excruciatingly tough problem for Manila, Washington, or for that matter New Delhi. Beijing has proved very adept at staying below the threshold that would provoke more vigorous intervention in these controversies. What would the US Navy do—station a guided-missile destroyer at Scarborough Shoal on picket duty?

•  You draw attention to the salience of maritime soft power, suggesting that New Delhi, through its peacetime forays into the Southeast Asian maritime and littoral expanse, may be able to shape regional perceptions to its advantage. In your mind, how can the Indian Navy best leverage its soft power potential in Asia?

India can tap its soft-power potential by being who it is—a big country with a history of not trampling its neighbors’ rights and prerogatives. Soft power is a power of attraction that stems from an admirable culture, traditions, institutions, what have you. India and the United States are in much the same boat in Southeast Asia in that respect. We can speak softly and deploy forces without affronting states in the region (except of course for China). Few fear us, no matter how strong we are. Now, where India has fallen short to date is in fielding a Big Stick, to use Teddy Roosevelt’s famous metaphor. Hard power underlies soft-power diplomacy. Much depends on how India’s naval buildup unfolds. Displaying the ability to deploy big, impressive task forces outside the Indian Ocean will enhance Indian soft power immensely, letting New Delhi speak softly while carrying a Big Stick.

•  Both India and China have been laboring to craft a strong maritime narrative in order to provide the ideational underpinnings to their naval expansion. In the past, you have described India’s search for a “usable” maritime past as being somewhat impressionistic and lacking in specifics. China’s historical maritime narrative, on the other hand, has been greatly bolstered by the state-sanctioned lionization of the naval exploits of figures such as the Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He. What can be done in order to better acquaint India’s political leadership and chattering classes with the more sea-drenched chapters of their nation’s past? And how could the savvy instrumentalization of certain aspects of the subcontinent’s maritime legacy help supplement New Delhi’s soft power initiatives in regions such as Southeast Asia? 

That’s an excellent question to which I have no excellent answer. Unfortunately for India, its narrative of maritime greatness would be more like the Serbian national legend—a legend of glorious defeat at Ottoman hands—than like China’s Zheng He narrative. Indian mariners did once command South Asian waters, but that was very long ago, and there’s no historical figure of Zheng He’s allure attached to that seafaring age. Indian sailors did stage a series of rousing tactical victories in the decades after Vasco da Gama’s arrival, but they were never able to command the Indian Ocean the way the Ming fleet intermittently did. Theirs was a losing cause. So, alas, India’s seagoing past is not a focus for national pride and dignity to the degree that the Ming treasure voyages are for China. The onus is on Indian leaders today to start creating a usable past for future generations.

On the other hand, I have never been too sure how much buy-in Beijing got from its Zheng He diplomacy. A lot of Asians politely smiled and nodded, but did that translate into desired outcomes for China? And in any event, Beijing has largely demolished the central tenet of its Zheng He narrative over the past three years—namely that China is an intrinsically benevolent sea power. Soft power can be more like perfume, or more like pheromones. But if you have body odor—bad pheromones--people will eventually smell it, no matter how much perfume you dab on to cover it up. India smells rather sweet by default. Never underestimate the value of a self-defeating competitor.

• China’s truculent behavior within its immediate maritime environs has resulted in the alienation of its smaller neighbors, and has strengthened their desire for an external balancing presence. You observe that other maritime nations such as Japan and the United States already play such a role, and urge India to augment its influence “by consulting with fellow exterior-line powers”. What ultimate structure or compact do you see emerging from such interactions? Can India engage in such actions without adding succor to China’s reflexive sense of embattlement?

I think you characterize China’s response to outside activities in its environs perfectly, as a “reflexive sense of embattlement.” I’m not sure there’s much we can do to ease this reflex aside from evacuating the region and giving Beijing its way. That’s a non-starter. So we should expect to keep hearing protests about encirclement, containment, etc. Still, we don’t have to get up in China’s face. If maritime security is the reason for our being in the South China Sea, then let’s tailor forces to that mission. That means light forces.

I have argued (here, and here, for example) that the United States has a small-stick option of its own in the South China Sea, embodied in its forward deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. It can keep light forces in Southeast Asia with heavy forces (preferably stationed nearby, in Australia) as a backstop. I could see India and Japan sending light squadrons of their own to the region while holding their main fleets in reserve. This would probably be a rather loose arrangement, not a “structure” or “compact.” India’s reluctance to work too closely with others would probably apply to Southeast Asia as well as the Gulf of Aden. While there, external ships should go about their business under the international system as it currently stands—forging partnerships with coastal states, battling pirates, interdicting proliferation, whatever. If China wants to escalate against routine maritime-security operations, let it pick up the Big Stick first—and look like a regional bully. Which loops back around to our discussion of soft power and self-defeating Chinese behavior.

The Wider Front: The Indian Ocean and AirSea Battle

GMF just released my latest short policy brief: http://www.gmfus.org/archives/the-wider-front-the-indian-ocean-and-airsea-battle

Does the Indian Navy have a China Strategy?

My most recent article, which can be read here:

http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/05/17/should-india-fear-chinas-navy/

Washington, Manila and the South China Sea: Interview of Jim Thomas.

Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He oversees CSBA’s research programs and directs the Strategic and Budget Studies staff. Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before that, Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development of the Defense Strategy, conventional force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. He spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of the QDR report to Congress. Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 for his work at NATO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the department’s highest civilian award, in 2006 for his work in the field of strategy.

Shortly after the tense standoff in-between the Philippines and China in the disputed lagoon of Scarborough Shoal, you co-wrote an article with Harry Foster entitled “The Geostrategic Return of the Philippines”, in which you argued that the United States needed to do more to help the Philippines defend itself. The best way, you argued, to forestall a creeping finlandization of the Philippines would be to discreetly provide it with the wherewithal to develop its own A2/AD capabilities; thus enabling Manila, in a manner of speaking, to do a China on China. Could you explain to our readers how you would envision such a strategy being implemented? What advantages would it hold over other more conventional military alliance strengthening mechanisms? 

The difficulties that China’s A2/AD capabilities pose for the US military are well understood.  They have the potential to erode over time the ability of the United States to project power (P2) in the familiar ways it has for many decades.  What is less appreciated is that with the proliferation of precision-guided weaponry and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, the “A2 versus P2” dynamic will likely become more universal – this isn’t just a problem for the United States, but for almost any country contemplating force projection beyond its borders.  Countries with inferior conventional militaries could use systems we associate with A2/AD, such as anti-ship cruise missiles and mines, to constrain the power projection gambits of regional hegemonic aspirants.  In the case of the Philippines, constructing a local A2/AD posture in the face of potential Chinese naval expansion would place a premium on improved maritime domain awareness.  The Philippines needs to be able to continuously monitor its territorial waters, detect foreign intrusions both on the surface and undersea, and locate such threats with precision so that they can be engaged.  Complementing such ISR capabilities, the Philippines might also benefit from land-based, mobile coastal defense systems like the Bastion anti-ship cruise missile system Vietnam has fielded.   The advantage of this approach would be that by encouraging the Philippine Armed Forces to look more like China’s and less like America’s, they would be better suited to defend their own sovereignty and counter any aggression or coercion.  

Since the shuttering of Subic Bay in 1992, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly made it clear that the revival of permanent large-scale US bases is not in the offing. In light of recent events, do you think that this position will change? Or is it in both nations’ interests for United States to pursue a strategy of “places rather than bases” in Asia? The latest iteration of the US National Security Strategy, for example, places much emphasis on the value of “rotational deployments” and of a “light footprint” over permanent bases.  Is this indicative of the future form of America’s “pivot” to Asia, or will the United States have to seriously contemplate erecting additional large bases in the region?

 It is in the mutual interests of the Philippines and the US to cooperate militarily on a closer basis in the future.  At the same time, the kind of large-scale, permanent US bases that America maintained at Clark and Subic during the Cold War might not make sense in the future – either politically or militarily.  The Philippines doesn’t want a large, permanent US footprint, and such a footprint might be an enormous vulnerability for the US militarily, given the ease with which potential adversaries might target fixed bases within the reach of their missiles.  A better approach might be frequent rotational deployments of US forces to train and exercise with their Philippine counterparts.  Perhaps the most important step the Philippines could take in this regard would be to conduct occasional exercises in which US military aircraft are launched from and/or recovered on airfields on Luzon and Palawan.  This would send a strong signal to others in the region of allies’ strategic solidarity and complicate the designs of any potential aggressor.  Such exercises might be replicated with other regional states. 

The South China Sea has been described as the “throat of maritime commerce”, forming the vital connective tissue linking the Western Pacific to the wider Indian Ocean. Over the past year or so the term “Indo-Pacific” , which argues for a more holistic perception of the Asian maritime sphere, has become something of a strategic leitmotiv within the Washington beltway. How central do you think the South China Sea will become in American naval strategy?  Will the South China Sea emerge as Asia’s epicenter of conflict? And if so, should the US begin to devise a coherent South China Sea Strategy? 

The term “Indo-Pacific” better captures what should be focus of future US military activities, and the intertwining challenges and opportunities between the two oceans.  The South China Sea is the hinge between the two through which more than half the world’s shipping passes, and most of the oil demanded by China, Japan and South Korea.  It has become the carotid artery of East Asia.  Current disputes, however, revolve around what lies under the sea, rather than what transits through it.  The problem is that no one yet knows with any degree of certainty how much oil and natural gas wealth may lies under the South China Sea, so there is little appetite to compromise over maritime claims.  In some ways it is reminiscent of the era of discovery in the 15^th and 16^th centuries as European states staked claims in the New World despite the lack of complete information.  If the past four hundred years were the era of cartography in which conflict stemmed from the definition of land frontiers drawn on a map, the next several centuries may be an era of oceanography and geology defining nations’ claims in three dimensional space, particularly at sea.  For the US military, this means a return to regions of the world such as the South China Sea that it has neglected in recent decades to ensure a stable security balance, resolution free from coercion of maritime disputes, and continued freedom of navigation in international waters.  Central to any new US regional strategy should be the importance of building up the security capacity of friendly states in the region to defend their sovereignty in the face of external “high end” maritime threats. 

 Chinese military theorists frequently portray their maritime environment as being bounded by “island chains”, with the first so-called island chain encompassing the region composed of its more immediate waterways, extending from the Kurile islands to Borneo, and the second island chain stretching all the way from the Philippines Sea to the Marianas islands. Owen R. Cote. Jr. from MIT has described the island chains construct as being largely inadequate and prefers to divide the South China Sea into two different operating environments-the first being closer to China’s littoral and extending along China’s continental shelf; and the second being further out in the deeper, southern portion of the South China Sea. It is in the latter maritime expanse, he argues, that China’s lack of capabilities in terms of sustained air support and open-ocean anti-submarine warfare would play to its disadvantage in  the unhappy event of a conflict with the United States. Do you agree with this assessment? What role do you see submarine warfare playing in the South China Sea within an AirSea Battle framework, for example?  

China is building a sizable submarine force but faces two significant problems: its diesel-powered submarines are quiet but lack speed and endurance.  Its nuclear submarines have far greater endurance but lack sufficient stealth.  Only its nuclear submarines would have the endurance to operate in the southern South China Sea, but would be vulnerable running up against the anti-submarine capabilities of the US Navy and allied navies in the deeper waters.  Closer to its own shores, the PLA’s ASW capabilities are rudimentary.  US submarines would be able to operate with relative impunity near Chinese submarine pens in shallower waters. Submarines may factor heavily in Air-Sea Battle because they have the greatest potential to penetrate contested A2/AD zones prior to a conflict or in the early stages of a conflict, and can hold ships as well as land targets disproportionately at risk. China’s navy would be particularly vulnerable to US submarines as they exited or returned to their ports. 

 

Finally, and as a follow-up question to the previous one, what is your opinion on the potential for cooperation with the Philippines in the field of anti-submarine warfare? CSBA’s AirSea Battle Concept, for instance, advocates the establishment of anti-submarine barriers along certain critical chokepoints, such as the Luzon Strait. Should the joint establishment of a cable-based undersea surveillance array in the Philippine Sea figure highly on both Washington and Manila’s agendas? What comparisons can be drawn with the strategic dynamics leading up to the establishment of the famous GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK) system, which monitored Soviet submarine deployments in the Northern Hemisphere throughout much of the Cold War?

Geographically, the Philippines are ideally situated to play an important role in maritime domain awareness, including undersea detection and surveillance, either unilaterally or with external support and/or cooperation.  The Philippines sits astride China’s two widest approaches to the open sea: the Luzon Strait in the north and the South China Sea.  As Owen Cote has noted, both are no wider than the GIUK Gap.  Both could be instrumented with undersea surveillance arrays with shore terminals in the Philippines. The Philippines could also host anti-submarine warfare aircraft conducting patrols over both the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait.  It is potential contributions such as these that underscore the strategic value of the Philippines.

The South China Sea in Japanese Naval Strategy: Interview of Tetsuo Kotani

I recently interviewed a Japanese naval strategist for the forthcoming issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor. As soon as the Monitor is officially released I'll provide the proper link.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and lecturer at Hosei University. His research focuses on the strategic implications of the forward deployment of U.S. aircraft carrier groups in Japan. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and maritime security. He is preparing his first book on maritime security.

In a previous article written for the Diplomat you drew a parallel in-between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War in the Sea of Okhotsk. Could you explain to our readers the reasoning behind this comparison? What role, in your mind, does nuclear submarine strategy play in China’s attitude towards the South China Sea? Do you see a legacy of Soviet naval thinking in China’s current strategy?

Maritime strategies for nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are inevitably different. Since China is a nuclear weapon state, one of the priorities for Chinese strategic thinkers is to possess a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent, namely strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To protect and command this insurance force, the Soviet Union needed to deploy it in home waters, or the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. For China, the South China Sea needs to be safe waters for the SSBNs. China seeks to establish sea control in the waters to deny US surveillance operations to detect Chinese submarines. The Impeccable incident in March 2009 was part of those efforts. It is not clear how much Chinese strategy reflects Soviet naval thinking, but the Soviet naval strategists understood the importance of freedom of navigation. This is why Moscow agreed with Washington on the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972. Moscow and Washington also closely worked together in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to maintain freedom of navigation in international waters such as strategic straits and exclusive economic zones. China needs to learn that SSBN operation requires freedom of navigation.

In your writings you draw attention to the gradual decline of American naval power and urge Japan to take on a more proactive attitude in ensuring the stability of its own maritime neighborhood . You also point out that the Japanese fleet presents certain key strengths- in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)- for example. In the future do you see a form of division of labor emerging in-between the US and certain of its key allies in the Asia-Pacific? Should Japan work towards taking on a more clearly defined role under the aegis of an AirSea Battle framework? And if so, what kind of mission could the JMSDF take on in a in the event of an open conflict in-between the United States and China over Taiwan, for instance?

The essence of Japan’s maritime strategy is to protect US Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific by providing sophisticated ISR and ASW capabilities so that this formidable force can enjoy freedom of action. US-Japan naval cooperation can be a model for division of labor between US and its key partners, namely ROK, Australia, and India. Japan is now taking measures to reinforce defense posture in the Ryukyu island chain and the concept of Air-Sea Battle provides the basis for it. Japanese naval thinkers are looking at the Tokyo-Guam-Taiwan (TGT) Triangle as key operational areas for Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). In a Taiwan contingency, JMSDF will conduct support operations, including ASW and ISR, in the TGT Triangle.

In June 2011, Tokyo and Washington revised their common strategic objectives and called for a deepening of cooperation with countries such as South Korea, Australia, and, most notably, India. What is your perception of the current state of Indo-Japanese naval cooperation? What can be done to further strengthen both nations’ maritime security ties? Do you see both countries playing a positive role as “external balancers” in a troubled region such as South China Sea?

Although they are natural partners, the relationship between JMSDF and Indian Navy are still in an early stage. The first bilateral exercise is expected within few months, while JMSDF have participated in Exercise Malabar several times. I don’t think the two navies share a common vision on concrete areas of cooperation. Of course, China’s naval expansion is a common concern but that is not the end of the list. Piracy, Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc.—the two navies need to discuss those issues as well to deepen their strategic relations. In the South China Sea, Japan and India are important users and players. Japan’s priority is to maintain freedom of navigation in the sea for both merchant and naval ships, and Tokyo proposed a East Asian Maritime Forum to discuss this issue. But there is some concern among Japanese maritime experts about Indian interpretation of freedom of navigation in EEZs, especially surveillance activities by foreign military. Some Indian maritime experts take the same interpretation as China and deny surveillance by foreign military in EEZs. Without coordinating this difference, it will be difficult for Japan and India to play a positive role in the South China Sea together.

I noted with interest that you have referred to China’s so-called “String of Pearls Strategy” in the Indian Ocean as “acting against the strategic interests of Tokyo” as well as those of India, by “pressing on both sides of the Malacca Straits”. Could you tell us a bit more about the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for Japan?

First of all, the string of pearls is not Chinese strategy. It is not a reality but just a perception. China is building up commercial access points along its sea lanes but those points cannot be used as military bases. If it wants to be a naval power in the Indian Ocean, China first of all needs to respect freedom of navigation and to have reliable naval partners. Maintaining air power in the Indian Ocean region is another challenge for China. That said, however, perception is often more important than reality in real world. The Indian Ocean region is a critical area for Japan as the source of energy, and Japan could depend on the United States for security of energy transportation from the Indian Ocean. But the United States is too much busy with various global security concerns, and Japan is now considering how it can contribute more to the security in the region. Counter piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden is part of the efforts. The security in the Strait of Hormuz is an urgent challenge for Japan now.


Which countries in Southeast Asia do you see emerging as key security partners for Tokyo in the next ten to twenty years? And last but not least, does Japan need to come up with its own, distinct “South China Sea Strategy”?

All ASEAN members, both South China Sea claimants and non-claimants, are important players because ASEAN makes decision by consensus. Japan should not regard any ASEAN country as natural partner but should keep engaging with and reassuring ASEAN members so that China cannot increase its influence on those countries too much with its economic and military might. On the other hand, Japan is finding a way to contribute to capacity building of ASEAN maritime forces. Japan recently relaxed its arms export ban and now can provide arms to friendly countries so that they can increase capabilities for good order at sea. The South China Sea is a critical area for Japan, and I think Japan should announce a clear South China Sea strategy.



Interview of Professor Toshi Yoshihara

Last month, I interviewed  US Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara for the March issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor (link soon to be up). He discussed China's perceptions of India's naval power and presence in the South China sea.

Dr. Toshi Yoshihara is Professor of Strategy and John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.  He is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the war college.   He is co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2010), Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Routledge, 2009), and Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century: The Turn to Mahan (Routledge, 2008).  He is also co-editor of Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Praeger, 2008).  Dr. Yoshihara holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

You recently penned a highly informative study of Chinese scholarly writings pertaining to India’s role in the Indian Ocean[1]. One of your key conclusions is that the Chinese strategic community has an overwhelming tendency to view India’s naval ambitions in starkly realist terms, and as being permeated by a desire for regional hegemony. Why do you think this is?

The realists I document in my new study represent one of many schools of strategic thought in China.  What we are witnessing in China is the rise of an “intellectual-military complex” composed of academics, senior military officers, and policy analysts who openly debate Beijing’s long-term choices.  Within this complex is an outspoken group of realists and seapower advocates from topflight research and academic institutions across China.  While this semi-official community does not necessarily speak for Beijing, it is clearly vying for a place in the policy-making process.  These realists are grappling with an unprecedented historical phenomenon in maritime Asia: the entry of India and China into the same oceanic spaces at nearly the same time.  It is therefore not surprising that the realists forecast an emerging zero-sum competition in the Indian Ocean.     

2)       How do Chinese analysts view the maritime components of India’s Look East Policy? You notably quote some Chinese scholars as stating that India is increasingly seeking to make forays into the South China Sea as a “diversionary strategy”. Could you explain to our readers the reasoning behind such assertions?

Some Chinese analysts evince the belief that offense is the best form defense.  Chinese views of Indian’s Look East Policy thus conform to China’s strategic and operational traditions that emphasize offensive stratagems.  The logic goes like this: If India reaches into China’s own maritime backyard, Beijing would be compelled to divert its unwelcome attention from the Indian Ocean to a nautical theater much closer to home.  Indian advances in Southeast Asia would, in the words of one Chinese strategist, “generate a southward gravitational pull on China’s maritime strategy, thus preventing China, in its search for diversified strategy pathways, from entering the Indian Ocean.”  In essence, keeping China tied down in the South China Sea would keep China out of the Indian Ocean.    

3)       Indian Chief of Naval Staff Nirmal Verma has stated that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands form one the nation’s foremost “strategic outposts”.  Located at only 45 km from Mynamar’s Coco Islands, and 160 km from the Indonesian province of Aceh, the islands are closer to Southeast Asia than to the Indian mainland. How do Chinese analysts view India’s military presence in these islands?

Intriguingly, Chinese strategists have transposed the Sinocentric concept of the “first island chain”—an archipelago that stretches from the Japanese islands to Indonesia—to the Indian Ocean.  The Chinese perceive the first island chain, home to major U.S. military bases in the western Pacific, as the geographical expression of a sustained American effort to balk Beijing’s maritime ambitions.  They similarly describe the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as an “iron chain” with which India could close off Chinese access to the Indian Ocean.  Sitting astride the sea lanes west of the Malacca Strait, the islands enclose the Andaman Sea as menacingly as the first island chain bounds China’s “near seas.”  This parallel is thus persuasive to many Chinese strategists.  To some, India’s military command in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands could be used to monitor China’s seaborne traffic and, in wartime, to interdict Chinese naval and commercial vessels.  Others even see it as the future staging area for projecting Indian naval power into the South China Sea.   

4)       China’s strategic pessimism appears to be echoed to a certain degree within India’s own chattering classes, with much talk over a hypothetical Chinese “string of pearls” being woven in India’s own maritime backyard. Both rising powers see nefarious designs behind their alter ego’s naval modernization and deployments. Is this a form of complex mirror imaging, or can it be attributed to a simple lack of mutual understanding?  Or, to the contrary, does it adequately reflect an emerging zero-sum game? In your opinion, what does this augur for the future stability of Maritime Asia?

My short answer to your questions about the sources of Chinese and Indian threat perceptions would be “all of the above.”  However, I think it would be a mistake to think that enhanced bilateral engagements and greater mutual understanding would “cure” China’s starkly realist outlook.  Beijing’s sense of energy insecurity, epitomized by the so-called “Malacca dilemma,” is real enough.  My reading of the Chinese literature also suggests that China takes India’s great power ambitions very seriously.  To the Chinese, venerable strategic traditions—evidenced by the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar—will continue to underwrite India’s long-term aspirations.  In my view, the potential interactions between two ambitious great powers that possess proprietary attitudes about their respective nautical spheres of influence are more likely to generate competitive rather than cooperative dynamics in maritime Asia. 

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[1] The article, entitled “Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective”, will be published in a forthcoming issue of the journal Strategic Analysis.