I recently interviewed a Japanese naval strategist for the forthcoming issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor. As soon as the Monitor is officially released I'll provide the proper link.
Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and lecturer at Hosei University. His research focuses on the strategic implications of the forward deployment of U.S. aircraft carrier groups in Japan. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and maritime security. He is preparing his first book on maritime security.
Maritime strategies for nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are inevitably different. Since China is a nuclear weapon state, one of the priorities for Chinese strategic thinkers is to possess a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent, namely strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To protect and command this insurance force, the Soviet Union needed to deploy it in home waters, or the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. For China, the South China Sea needs to be safe waters for the SSBNs. China seeks to establish sea control in the waters to deny US surveillance operations to detect Chinese submarines. The Impeccable incident in March 2009 was part of those efforts. It is not clear how much Chinese strategy reflects Soviet naval thinking, but the Soviet naval strategists understood the importance of freedom of navigation. This is why Moscow agreed with Washington on the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972. Moscow and Washington also closely worked together in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to maintain freedom of navigation in international waters such as strategic straits and exclusive economic zones. China needs to learn that SSBN operation requires freedom of navigation.
In your writings you draw attention to the gradual decline of American naval power and urge Japan to take on a more proactive attitude in ensuring the stability of its own maritime neighborhood . You also point out that the Japanese fleet presents certain key strengths- in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)- for example. In the future do you see a form of division of labor emerging in-between the US and certain of its key allies in the Asia-Pacific? Should Japan work towards taking on a more clearly defined role under the aegis of an AirSea Battle framework? And if so, what kind of mission could the JMSDF take on in a in the event of an open conflict in-between the United States and China over Taiwan, for instance?
The essence of Japan’s maritime strategy is to protect US Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific by providing sophisticated ISR and ASW capabilities so that this formidable force can enjoy freedom of action. US-Japan naval cooperation can be a model for division of labor between US and its key partners, namely ROK, Australia, and India. Japan is now taking measures to reinforce defense posture in the Ryukyu island chain and the concept of Air-Sea Battle provides the basis for it. Japanese naval thinkers are looking at the Tokyo-Guam-Taiwan (TGT) Triangle as key operational areas for Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). In a Taiwan contingency, JMSDF will conduct support operations, including ASW and ISR, in the TGT Triangle.
In June 2011, Tokyo and Washington revised their common strategic objectives and called for a deepening of cooperation with countries such as South Korea, Australia, and, most notably, India. What is your perception of the current state of Indo-Japanese naval cooperation? What can be done to further strengthen both nations’ maritime security ties? Do you see both countries playing a positive role as “external balancers” in a troubled region such as South China Sea?
Although they are natural partners, the relationship between JMSDF and Indian Navy are still in an early stage. The first bilateral exercise is expected within few months, while JMSDF have participated in Exercise Malabar several times. I don’t think the two navies share a common vision on concrete areas of cooperation. Of course, China’s naval expansion is a common concern but that is not the end of the list. Piracy, Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc.—the two navies need to discuss those issues as well to deepen their strategic relations. In the South China Sea, Japan and India are important users and players. Japan’s priority is to maintain freedom of navigation in the sea for both merchant and naval ships, and Tokyo proposed a East Asian Maritime Forum to discuss this issue. But there is some concern among Japanese maritime experts about Indian interpretation of freedom of navigation in EEZs, especially surveillance activities by foreign military. Some Indian maritime experts take the same interpretation as China and deny surveillance by foreign military in EEZs. Without coordinating this difference, it will be difficult for Japan and India to play a positive role in the South China Sea together.
I noted with interest that you have referred to China’s so-called “String of Pearls Strategy” in the Indian Ocean as “acting against the strategic interests of Tokyo” as well as those of India, by “pressing on both sides of the Malacca Straits”. Could you tell us a bit more about the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for Japan?
First of all, the string of pearls is not Chinese strategy. It is not a reality but just a perception. China is building up commercial access points along its sea lanes but those points cannot be used as military bases. If it wants to be a naval power in the Indian Ocean, China first of all needs to respect freedom of navigation and to have reliable naval partners. Maintaining air power in the Indian Ocean region is another challenge for China. That said, however, perception is often more important than reality in real world. The Indian Ocean region is a critical area for Japan as the source of energy, and Japan could depend on the United States for security of energy transportation from the Indian Ocean. But the United States is too much busy with various global security concerns, and Japan is now considering how it can contribute more to the security in the region. Counter piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden is part of the efforts. The security in the Strait of Hormuz is an urgent challenge for Japan now.
Which countries in Southeast Asia do you see emerging as key security partners for Tokyo in the next ten to twenty years? And last but not least, does Japan need to come up with its own, distinct “South China Sea Strategy”?
All ASEAN members, both South China Sea claimants and non-claimants, are important players because ASEAN makes decision by consensus. Japan should not regard any ASEAN country as natural partner but should keep engaging with and reassuring ASEAN members so that China cannot increase its influence on those countries too much with its economic and military might. On the other hand, Japan is finding a way to contribute to capacity building of ASEAN maritime forces. Japan recently relaxed its arms export ban and now can provide arms to friendly countries so that they can increase capabilities for good order at sea. The South China Sea is a critical area for Japan, and I think Japan should announce a clear South China Sea strategy.
