BBC World: Franco-Vietnamese Relations.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2009/11/091118_france_vietnam_ties.shtml

A Long-standing History:

France’s relationship with Vietnam is both long and complex.
Long, because one could argue that Franco-Vietnamese relations begun as early as the 17th century, with the mission of the renowned Jesuit scholar Alexandre de Rhodes, who took it upon himself to publish the first Portuguese-Latin-Vietnamese dictionary. This dictionary later served as a template for Vietnamese scholars when they decided to create the new Vietnamese writing system, Quoc Ngu, which is still used to this day. French forces were also involved in Vietnamese political disputes as early as the 18th century, when Pigneau de Behaine’s French troops intervened in favour of the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty in 1787.

The relationship is also complex, as it still bears the legacy of 150 years of ruthless colonial exploitation, as well as the memory of one of the most catastrophic defeats of a Western army at the hands of a third world army, at Dien Bien Phu, which subsequently led to Vietnam’s proclamation of independence in 1954. Franco-Vietnamese ties did not remain acrimonious for long, however, despite their bloodstained history. Indeed, when communism caved in on itself in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Vietnamese leadership discovered that France was the one of the few Western states with whom it had maintained diplomatic channels. Throughout much of the Cold War, successive French governments served as mediators in-between Vietnam and the Western bloc, playing host to the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973 and to the negotiations to bring the American-led war in Vietnam to a close. Paris was also where the peace talks destined to bring the Cambodia war to an end unfurled in 1991.




Waning Economic and Cultural Ties:


Since the end of World War II and the loss of most of its overseas territories, France has struggled to safeguard its position on the global stage, largely by attempting to maintain a degree of economic and cultural influence over its ex colonies. In Vietnam, as in other countries, this has taken the shape of hefty aid packages, as well as zealous attempts by a government-funded organization, the “Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie” to revive target populations’ flagging interest in French language and culture. France, which has donated more than 2 billion euros or 3 billion dollars for local Vietnamese programs, has thus become over the years the second largest aid donor to Vietnam after Japan. In 1993, it was a French bank that organised the bridging loan at advantageous rates that helped repay Vietnam’s crippling debt. France is also the European Union’s number one investor in Vietnam, and over 180, 000 French tourists visit Vietnam every year.

Despite all this, there are signs that French influence in Vietnam is waning. This is most visible on the cultural front-where France’s ongoing struggle to promote “francophonie” has become something of a lost battle. From 1996 to 2006 vast sums of money were injected into the creation of French language courses and bilingual study groups. It soon became apparent that Vietnamese students and officials tended to view such initiatives as mere opportunities for career advancement-unless grants and scholarships were attached to the French courses they would immediately abandon them in favour of languages deemed to be more useful in today’s world, such as English or Chinese. As a result, today only a minute minority of Vietnamese speak French.

France’s economic presence in Vietnam is also on the decline. American investment and trade has surged past that of the French over the past few years, with the French embassy in Hanoi reporting a 4% decrease in Franco-Vietnamese general trade figures for 2008. France’s exports to Vietnam in 2008, estimated at 392 million euros, were 14.6% lower than in 2007.


A renewed emphasis on economic cooperation:


It is in this light that one must view the French Prime Minister’s visit to Vietnam last week. Accompanied by 45 representatives of France’s most high profile companies, as well as three government ministers, Francois Fillon declared on several occasions that the main purpose of his visit was to inject a new vigour into Franco-Vietnamese ties by stymieing the ongoing decline in bilateral trade. French companies and investors have been ogling Vietnam’s almost insolent rate of growth (5.5% in 2009, 6.5% projected for 2010) at a time when France, as well as most of its Western trading partners, are floundering in the wake of the global financial turndown. Several major business deals were thus clinched during the French Prime Minister’s three day visit.



Most notable amongst these were the announcements that Vietnam Airlines had decided to purchase four A-380s each estimated at approximately 300 million euros each (the deal should be finalized by the first trimester of 2010) and the awarding of a 200 million euro contract to the French engineering firm Vinci, which will be entrusted with the construction of Ho Chi Minh’s projected state of the art tramway system, which should spread out over 12 to 15km.

The single most significant result of Prime Minister Fillon’s visit, however, was undoubtedly the signing of a landmark nuclear cooperation pact between both countries. With an electricity growth rate expected to be more than double that of its GDP growth rate over the next decade, Vietnam has been contemplating the construction of a nuclear power plant for years. During this period, French nuclear energy firms such as Areva have been lurking in the background, biding their time, discreetly providing expertise in nuclear energy related matters, and lobbying in favour of a nuclear law. The French Nuclear Energy Research Agency has also undertaken cooperation programmes with the Vietnam Nuclear Energy Institute since 2002.

In June 2008, the Vietnamese Communist Party legalized civilian nuclear energy and declared its intention to erect by 2020 a 2 000 MW nuclear plant capable of generating at least 14 to 15 billion kWh of power a year. Feasibility plans are scheduled to commence next year, and the Ninh Phuoc District in southern Ninh Thuan has been cited as its most likely location. Areva stated immediately after the signing of the cooperation deal that the latter would most likely pave the way for a French-built reactor, in the face of strong Japanese and Chinese competition. Vietnamese lawmakers will then have to validate the decision to award the juicy 3.4 billion dollar contract in the course of 2010.


The outlining of a future strategic partnership?


The strategic aspect of Franco-Vietnamese ties has traditionally been neglected in favour of economic cooperation. A strategic dialogue, rather vaguely described as “sessions in which the participants can discuss diverse regional and international matters in an informal manner” has been in place for the past four years but seems singularly lacking in substance-there have been no bilateral exercises or joint training programmes for example. This is largely due to the fact that for Paris, Southeast Asia and East Asia do not loom large on its strategic radar. Unlike India or Singapore, who have considerably upped their defence ties with Vietnam over the past few years, there is no resurgent China pushing at France's borders. Vietnam has also traditionally relied on Russian and Chinese weapon systems when it comes to arms acquisitions, and there is therefore no history of Franco-Vietnamese arms trade and defence cooperation to build upon.





Recent developments, however, show that this may be about to change. Both countries pledged to enhance the scope and ambit of their strategic partnership, and on the 13th of November, the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST) signed an agreement with Astrium (EADS Space) to acquire a microsatellite worth 56 million euros in order to keep a closer eye on its coastline and Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ. The satellite should be put into orbit via Ariane, France’s launching site in Guyana, and came in the wake of an intergovernmental space-cooperation accord signed in Hanoi. Another maritime surveillance protocol, worth approximately 14 million euros, could also well be awarded to the French satellite company CLS in the not-too-distant future.

In private, French arms dealers do not hide that they hope that the deepening of Paris and Hanoi’s strategic ties will lead to the eventual acquisition by Vietnam of French weapons system. An individual working at the French weapons firm Thales recently confided to me in Paris that it was hoped that Vietnam’s recent efforts in acquiring a conventional submarine arm in the face of increasingly assertive Chinese claims over the Spratly Islands would lead it to consider certain hi-tech submarine and anti-submarine warfare systems in which the French are known to be at the cutting edge; such as passive ranging sonars, obstacle avoidance navigation sonars, lightweight torpedoes and torpedo countermeasure systems. The acquisition of such systems could act as a great boon to Vietnam’s strategy of sea denial vis a vis China’s growing flotilla of both conventional and nuclear submarines.


All in all, the French Prime Minister’s visit can be viewed as a positive development in Franco-Vietnamese ties. Taking into consideration the depth of both countries’ historical and cultural ties over the centuries, it would be regrettable if their current bilateral relationship reduced itself to little more than an impersonal and large-scale business meeting taking place every two to three years.

India's Naval Ambitions: Interview of Vice Admiral Premvir Das

While in Delhi last month, I had the good fortune to meet Vice Admiral Premvir Das (retd.), and seized the opportunity ask him a few questions pertaining to India's growing naval prowess, as well as to its ambitious maritime strategy. Here is the transcript of our conversation, held at his private residence in Noida, on the 12th of October.

One could argue that overall, historically, India's strategic thought has been largely under the sway of a continental or himalayan mindset. over the past ten to fifteen years however, India has been slowly but surely building up its blue-water navy. The Navy's share of the defense budget has steadily risen from 11.2% in 1992-1993 to 18.3% in 2007-2008. What in your opinion, has prompted the shift in Indian strategic thought towards seapower?

I agree with you when you say that throughout history India's strategic mindset has been mostly continental. I would disagree, however, when you state the focus on maritime power as being a relatively recent evolution. If one looks at the history of India's Navy since independence, one can see that the strategic conceptualisation of a blue-water navy has been there from the get-go, and this was undoubtedly a direct heritage from the traditional British emphasis on seapower.
The Indian Navy was already a blue-water force in many regards in the late 50s. In 1961, the Indian Navy could deploy its first aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, as well as a dozen destroyers and two cruisers.



Yes but the overall share of the defence budget remained low.

Yes, granted, at about 10 %, but one still cannot deny that the IN already had an expeditionary capability.

So what happened in the 1960s? How can one explain the subsequent neglect of seapower?

After its humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, India's main priorities were to strengthen its land borders, and build up its army and airforce, which were the primary actors in the event of a conflict with China or Pakistan along the Himalayas. The Indian Navy, no longer considered as strategically relevant, was relegated to the backseat and its share in the defence budget plummeted to about 3%. Nevertheless the strategic 'blueprint' for a blue-water navy remained, which explains the regain of activity in terms of procurement and funding later on during the Indira Gandhi era, when the budget rose once again to about 10%.
I'd say that the main difference now is that the IN has grown in self-confidence after the success of such high profile operations as Operation Sukoon or the 2004 tsunami relief effort.

Do you think that the Indian Navy's share of the defence budget will continue to rise in years to come?

Yes, I think that there are high chances that it will rise to about 20%.

Don't you think that there's a risk however that in the wake of the spate of terrorist attacks last year and when confronted with the growing Naxal insurgency, the government will be compelled to focus more on issues of domestic and internal security rather than on power projection and on its corollaries such as naval power?

There is always that risk, of course, but I doubt it. The IN has become very adept at arguing its case-it is no longer considered just as a branch of the military-it has become a vital diplomatic tool in India's attempts to project its soft power in the region and beyond. Also, the attacks you refer to have sometimes directly benefitted the Navy. After the Mumbai attacks for example, the Coast Guard underwent a massive restructuring.

(Indian Marine Commandos in action during the Mumbai terrorist attacks)

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, two professors at the US Naval War College, have given three possible 'models' of what the future IN may look like: the Free Rider Navy, the Constable Navy, and finally the Strongman Navy. The Free Rider Navy would contain one deployable carrier task force, the Constable two or more, and the Strongman three or more. For them "the fitful progress of Indian shipbuilding and acquisition efforts casts doubts on the navy's chances of assembling a Constable fleet by 2022, the national date by which Admiral Mehta's 160 ship fleets should be at sea".
They believe that the most realistic model is the Free Rider model, with New Delhi accepting, for the time being, American maritime power as an outside guarantor of security in Asia, and as a temporary expedient that serves India's current purposes, while posing little threat to its immediate interests. The only thing that could move India towards a Constable model would be a sustained forward deployment of Chinese naval forces in the Indian Ocean- do you agree?

There have of course been some frustrating delays in India's most recent naval acquistions. It is in the nature of things, however, for ships to get laid off faster than they are inducted. If you look at the American fleet, for example, it has declined over the past few years from 279 combatant ships to 260. Even though the pace of India's naval expansion and modernization hasn't always been as fast as people would like it to be, by 2020 India should have at least two to three aircraft carriers, as well as 16 to 20 destroyers and frigates.
America is, for the time being at least, the only other really credible naval presence in the region. India will not be happy if any other country establishes a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean.



I suppose that you are referring to China and to its so-called String of Pearls Strategy?

Yes, although, I can't help thinking that the String of Pearls has been overhyped by the press. Gwadar is the only port whose infrastructure is anywhere close to completion. And even the stationing of Chinese submarines in Gwadar could reveal itself complicated for Beijing-the Americans and other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia will be watching from across the Persian Gulf.


Now for a more technical question: how does India's most recent class of Kolkata destroyers compare with its Chinese Sovremenny design counterpart?

When it comes to destroyers and frigates China still suffers the consequences of the arms embargo. Whereas India can have access to high-tech Israeli, American and French equipment, China can only really rely on Russia. I would say that in terms of weapons sensors, the Kolkata destroyers are 25 to 30% more sophisticated.


(The design for the latest Kolkata class of guided missile destroyer)

In terms of Air Defence systems for example?

Yes, for example.

Moving onto the Pakistani Navy: I am finding it somewhat arduous to obtain any detailed studies on the matter. It would seem though that Pakistan, with the acquisition of Agosta class submarines and maritime surveillance planes fitted with anti-ship missiles, is moving towards a sea denial strategy with regard to India. Would you say that this is the case?

Yes, Pakistan's entire maritime doctrine revolves around the use of submarines in order to effect sea denial.

Pakistan just inducted the first of four Chinese-designed Sword-class (F-22P) frigates. What role do these ships hold in Pakistan's strategic calculus?

I still believe that Pakistan's primary goal is sea denial. These new ships have more of a peacetime role, and are there for prestige purposes. They will be probably be used for naval diplomacy via port calls, joint naval exercices etc.

Final question: what strategy should India adopt in order to counter Chinese naval expansion? Should India focus more on ASW (Anti-submarine warfare) rather than on carrier-based force projection? Isn't there a risk that Indian carriers will become increasingly vulnerable to China's anti-ship ballistic missiles and ASCMs?

Carriers bring an essential element to the table in the event of a high-seas conflict in the form of airpower. As for anti-ship missiles, one has to hope that the IN's anti-missile and air-defence systems will be up to the task.
When it comes to China, it is inevitable that the PLAN will extend its presence into the Indian Ocean region in order to secure their energy supplies and the sea lanes of communication. This can be viewed as legitimate in many regards. India must thus enter into a two-pronged strategy vis-a-vis China- more must be done in terms of maritime cooperation versus non-conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism in order to build up trust in-between the two navies. At the same time, the Indian Navy must continue to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as its capabilites, and must remain watchful.

My thanks to the Vice Admiral for his time.