While in Delhi last month, I had the good fortune to meet Vice Admiral Premvir Das (retd.), and seized the opportunity ask him a few questions pertaining to India's growing naval prowess, as well as to its ambitious maritime strategy. Here is the transcript of our conversation, held at his private residence in Noida, on the 12th of October.
One could argue that overall, historically, India's strategic thought has been largely under the sway of a continental or himalayan mindset. over the past ten to fifteen years however, India has been slowly but surely building up its blue-water navy. The Navy's share of the defense budget has steadily risen from 11.2% in 1992-1993 to 18.3% in 2007-2008. What in your opinion, has prompted the shift in Indian strategic thought towards seapower?
I agree with you when you say that throughout history India's strategic mindset has been mostly continental. I would disagree, however, when you state the focus on maritime power as being a relatively recent evolution. If one looks at the history of India's Navy since independence, one can see that the strategic conceptualisation of a blue-water navy has been there from the get-go, and this was undoubtedly a direct heritage from the traditional British emphasis on seapower.
The Indian Navy was already a blue-water force in many regards in the late 50s. In 1961, the Indian Navy could deploy its first aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, as well as a dozen destroyers and two cruisers.
Yes but the overall share of the defence budget remained low.
Yes, granted, at about 10 %, but one still cannot deny that the IN already had an expeditionary capability.
So what happened in the 1960s? How can one explain the subsequent neglect of seapower?
After its humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, India's main priorities were to strengthen its land borders, and build up its army and airforce, which were the primary actors in the event of a conflict with China or Pakistan along the Himalayas. The Indian Navy, no longer considered as strategically relevant, was relegated to the backseat and its share in the defence budget plummeted to about 3%. Nevertheless the strategic 'blueprint' for a blue-water navy remained, which explains the regain of activity in terms of procurement and funding later on during the Indira Gandhi era, when the budget rose once again to about 10%.
I'd say that the main difference now is that the IN has grown in self-confidence after the success of such high profile operations as Operation Sukoon or the 2004 tsunami relief effort.
Do you think that the Indian Navy's share of the defence budget will continue to rise in years to come?
Yes, I think that there are high chances that it will rise to about 20%.
Don't you think that there's a risk however that in the wake of the spate of terrorist attacks last year and when confronted with the growing Naxal insurgency, the government will be compelled to focus more on issues of domestic and internal security rather than on power projection and on its corollaries such as naval power?
There is always that risk, of course, but I doubt it. The IN has become very adept at arguing its case-it is no longer considered just as a branch of the military-it has become a vital diplomatic tool in India's attempts to project its soft power in the region and beyond. Also, the attacks you refer to have sometimes directly benefitted the Navy. After the Mumbai attacks for example, the Coast Guard underwent a massive restructuring.
(Indian Marine Commandos in action during the Mumbai terrorist attacks)James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, two professors at the US Naval War College, have given three possible 'models' of what the future IN may look like: the Free Rider Navy, the Constable Navy, and finally the Strongman Navy. The Free Rider Navy would contain one deployable carrier task force, the Constable two or more, and the Strongman three or more. For them "the fitful progress of Indian shipbuilding and acquisition efforts casts doubts on the navy's chances of assembling a Constable fleet by 2022, the national date by which Admiral Mehta's 160 ship fleets should be at sea".
They believe that the most realistic model is the Free Rider model, with New Delhi accepting, for the time being, American maritime power as an outside guarantor of security in Asia, and as a temporary expedient that serves India's current purposes, while posing little threat to its immediate interests. The only thing that could move India towards a Constable model would be a sustained forward deployment of Chinese naval forces in the Indian Ocean- do you agree?
There have of course been some frustrating delays in India's most recent naval acquistions. It is in the nature of things, however, for ships to get laid off faster than they are inducted. If you look at the American fleet, for example, it has declined over the past few years from 279 combatant ships to 260. Even though the pace of India's naval expansion and modernization hasn't always been as fast as people would like it to be, by 2020 India should have at least two to three aircraft carriers, as well as 16 to 20 destroyers and frigates.
America is, for the time being at least, the only other really credible naval presence in the region. India will not be happy if any other country establishes a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
I suppose that you are referring to China and to its so-called String of Pearls Strategy?
Yes, although, I can't help thinking that the String of Pearls has been overhyped by the press. Gwadar is the only port whose infrastructure is anywhere close to completion. And even the stationing of Chinese submarines in Gwadar could reveal itself complicated for Beijing-the Americans and other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia will be watching from across the Persian Gulf.
Now for a more technical question: how does India's most recent class of Kolkata destroyers compare with its Chinese Sovremenny design counterpart?
When it comes to destroyers and frigates China still suffers the consequences of the arms embargo. Whereas India can have access to high-tech Israeli, American and French equipment, China can only really rely on Russia. I would say that in terms of weapons sensors, the Kolkata destroyers are 25 to 30% more sophisticated.
(The design for the latest Kolkata class of guided missile destroyer)
In terms of Air Defence systems for example?
Yes, for example.
Moving onto the Pakistani Navy: I am finding it somewhat arduous to obtain any detailed studies on the matter. It would seem though that Pakistan, with the acquisition of Agosta class submarines and maritime surveillance planes fitted with anti-ship missiles, is moving towards a sea denial strategy with regard to India. Would you say that this is the case?
Yes, Pakistan's entire maritime doctrine revolves around the use of submarines in order to effect sea denial.
Pakistan just inducted the first of four Chinese-designed Sword-class (F-22P) frigates. What role do these ships hold in Pakistan's strategic calculus?
I still believe that Pakistan's primary goal is sea denial. These new ships have more of a peacetime role, and are there for prestige purposes. They will be probably be used for naval diplomacy via port calls, joint naval exercices etc.
Final question: what strategy should India adopt in order to counter Chinese naval expansion? Should India focus more on ASW (Anti-submarine warfare) rather than on carrier-based force projection? Isn't there a risk that Indian carriers will become increasingly vulnerable to China's anti-ship ballistic missiles and ASCMs?
Carriers bring an essential element to the table in the event of a high-seas conflict in the form of airpower. As for anti-ship missiles, one has to hope that the IN's anti-missile and air-defence systems will be up to the task.
When it comes to China, it is inevitable that the PLAN will extend its presence into the Indian Ocean region in order to secure their energy supplies and the sea lanes of communication. This can be viewed as legitimate in many regards. India must thus enter into a two-pronged strategy vis-a-vis China- more must be done in terms of maritime cooperation versus non-conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism in order to build up trust in-between the two navies. At the same time, the Indian Navy must continue to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as its capabilites, and must remain watchful.
My thanks to the Vice Admiral for his time.
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