WATERS ROILED BY TENSION:
The past year has seen the waters of the South China Sea increasingly roiled by tension, as both China and Vietnam , spurred on in part by the nationalist fervour of their ever more numerous “netizens”, have sought to consolidate their claims over the long disputed archipelagoes of the Spratlys and Paracels.
Close to 200 Vietnamese fishermen were rounded up by Chinese vessels off the Paracels last year, and the PLAN’s patrols circling the Spratlys have more than doubled. Beijing recently announced, much to Hanoi’s ire, that it would begin developing luxury tourism on several of the disputed Paracel islands. Tourism development has in fact seemed to have become the latest not-so-subtle strategy employed by several countries in the region, not only China, but also Malaysia and Vietnam, to render their sovereignty over the jagged outcrops a fait accompli.
Vietnam, for its part, has been attempting to garner support for its claims by internationalizing the conflict; one of the most recent examples being the controversial holding in November 2009 of a conference in Hanoi, where 150 officials and academics from all over Asia were invited to mull over the thorniest and most intractable aspects of the South China Sea disputes.
In reality however, China’s growing maritime frictions with Vietnam over the Paracels and the Spratlys are all part of a far larger pattern,one which reflects a growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, and which has led to naval sparring not only with Hanoi, but also with Washington in the spring of 2009 and, more recently, with Tokyo.
As China’s economic and military clout grows, so too do its power projection aspirations. For Beijing’s increasingly vocal strategic community, control over the area circumscribed by “the first island chain”, (a natural boundary formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan's archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo); and over the offshore gas and oil deposits, strategic waterways, and straits it encompasses is considered an absolute prerequisite for the PLAN’s gradual transition from “off-shore defense” to “far-seas operations”, and , in so doing, from regional influence to global reach.
There has also been speculation in certain quarters that the PLAN wishes to establish a ring of defended maritime watch towers or bastions near Hainan in order to ensure the protection of its “second-strike” nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet newly based at Sanya. Absolute control over the strategically placed Paracels and Spratly islands would facilitate this defensive configuration.
CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PLANS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM :
China’s rising maritime assertiveness has been undergirded by an unremitting expansion of its naval inventory over the past decade, which is now said to comprise at least 260 vessels, including 75 principal combatants and more than 60 submarines. The Navy has come to receive more than a third of the overall Chinese defence budget, which has also been undergoing a double-digit increase for the past decade.
Since 2007, when a PLA lieutenant general stated to the press that China’s aircraft carrier project was proceeding smoothly, there have been a number of statements from Chinese military or political officials confirming China’s long suspected intention to acquire aircraft carriers.
Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, two preeminent analysts at the US Naval War College, recently intimated their belief that Beijing will “acquire medium-sized aircraft carriers in the medium term for near seas missions and for gaining operational experience, so that it can acquire large carriers for far seas operations in the long term”.
These carriers, they pursue, would probably be conventionally powered vessels, equipped with STOBAR or “short takeoff but arrested recovery systems”. They would also most likely host Russian STOBAR capable Su-33 combat aircraft, which Beijing has show much interest in acquiring of late.
What would be the immediate implications for Vietnam if China begun to deploy such ships?
First of all, there is a high chance that if a conflict situation arose involving the carriers, it would be around the Spratlys. Already in the late 1980s, Admiral Liu Huaqing, then head of the PLAN, had postulated that the Spratlys was the area most likely to warrant the deployment of a Chinese carrier group, stating that the latter would provide “the best tool to resolve the Nansha (Spratlys) Archipelago dispute.”
This is due to the fact that if a war were to erupt overTaiwan, China could rely on the presence of a plethora of mainland-based aircraft; and an aircraft carrier would be deemed largely unnecessary. If a naval skirmish were to flare up in-between Vietnam and China over the Paracels, PLAN vessels could be provided relatively rapidly with strong air cover from neighbouring Hainan. During the 1974 battle for the Paracel islands, for example, Chinese jet fighters and ground attack aircraft were rushed from Hainan to carpet bomb Vietnamese positions.
The Spratlys, however, form a more remote area of operations for Beijing, where, in the absence of an aircraft carrier, immediate air dominance is far from certain.
HURDLES FACING CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM:
There are a significant number of obstacles, however, facing China’s successful future deployment of aircraft carriers.
To start with, aircraft carries do not roam the seas as lone wolves; they require escorts in order to ensure their survival in the midst of a high-intensity conflict. Such an escort force, which would typically consist of submarines, supply ships, guided missile destroyers and frigates, as well as anti-submarine helicopters and patrol aircraft would cost several billion dollars and take time to assemble.
Secondly, while China’s latest surface combatants have managed to remedy some of their shortcomings in terms of anti-air and anti-surface capabilities, most analysts concur in saying that PLAN’s anti-submarine warfare, or ASW capabilities, are still subpar.
Beijing is acutely conscious of this weakness and whereas before the PLAN tended to rely mainly on mine warfare as a sort of “poor man’s ASW”, it is now investing heavily in anti-submarine helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft. A new class of destroyers, with improved submarine detection abilities, is also underway.
Nevertheless, for the time being at least, Chinese vessels still remain vulnerable to submarine-launched attacks.
VIETNAM RISES TO THE CHALLENGE THROUGH A NEWLY AMBITIOUS SEA DENIAL STRATEGY:
Vietnam is aware of the dangers embodied by the unremitting pace of Chinese maritime expansion and has embarked on a newly ambitious strategy of sea denial, largely embodied by its decision to considerably beef up its own naval strength.
Much has been said regarding Vietnam’s 1.8 billion dollar deal with Russia for six state of the art Kilo Class submarines. With an annual defense budget estimated by Jane’s Intelligence Review to be at barely 3.6 billion dollars, the purchase of the flotilla is a substantial investment, and is a clear sign to Beijing that Hanoi is intent on developing an effective sea denial strategy in order to protect its maritime territorial claims. Nick-named ‘Black Holes’ by Nato forces for their ability to avoid detection; the Kilos, which are expected to roll out of Rosoboronexport’s shipyards at a rate of one a year, should present a sizeable challenge to any fledgling Chinese Aircraft carrier group still deprived of adequate ASW capabilities.
In addition to this landmark acquisition, the VPAN will launch 2 Gepard Class frigates by the end of the year. These 2, 000 ton ships are equipped with, amongst other weapon systems, Uran-E anti-ship missiles and Ka-28 helicopters. Along with the Russian built Tarantul missile corvettes that Vietnam has been gradually acquiring since the late 90s, these modern frigates will help reduce the widening gap in-between Vietnam’s small, somewhat antiquated Soviet-era fleet and China’s ever growing inventory of increasingly modern surface combatants.
Hanoi also recently finalized a deal with Russia for the purchase of 20 Su-30MK2 Flanker-C Multirole aircraft, which could provide a much needed air cover for the surface fleet.
All this means that any Chinese aircraft carrier group approaching Vietnamese controlled Spratlys would not emerge from a prolonged naval battle unscathed. Furthermore, in order to wrest control of the 30 or so islands under Vietnamese control, the carrier group would have to be accompanied by a significant amphibious assault element, as Hanoi has been slowly but surely fortifying its rocky outcrops over the past few years with offshore garrisons. These regular troops should be supplemented in the coming years by a newly created marine militia, whose mission is limited in peace time to search and rescue and surveillance missions, but who are also expected to take on a combat role in the event of war.
These latest trends in Vietnam’s defence acquisitions reveal that as China’s naval power projection capabilities balloon over the next decades, Hanoi will be compelled to adopt an ever more stringent sea denial strategy. Otherwise its fishermen may well find themselves floundering, boats upturned, in the frothy wake of Chinese aircraft carrier groups ploughing their way towards the Spratlys.
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