Interview of Former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash

 This blog has been in dire need of an update for some time now. I have been pretty busy over the past few months, working as a Visiting Fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, while laboring on my dissertation and several co-related publication projects.

Over the next few weeks I will be attempting to breathe new life into this blog with various bits and bobs.

First of all, here is an interview  which I recently conducted for the Observer Research Foundation's monthly South China Sea Monitor.

http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/southchina/attachments/fissue_1328857322394.pdf 


Admiral Arun Prakash, the former head of the Indian Navy, gives his take on India's role in the South China Sea.

Admiral Arun Prakash served as India’s 20th Chief of Naval Staff and also held the post of Chairman of the Chief of Staffs Committee; retiring in 2006. Previously, he has served as the Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation and currently is a member of the National Security Advisory Board. He now lives in Goa, and has been writing and speaking on issues of strategic and maritime interest.

Shortly after the Financial Times reported an alleged incident involving an encounter in-between Indian and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea (the circumstances of which remain somewhat murky) http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/09/20/india-looking-east/  you penned an article warning the Indian Government and Navy of the dangers of strategic overreach, stating, for example, that “a distant location like the South China is hardly an ideal setting to demonstrate India’s maritime or other strengths”.

 http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-india-must-pause-before-venturing-into-choppy-waters/20110926.htm

Could you go into greater depth and tell our readers what precise risks you were alluding to?

An assertive stance of the kind conveyed by the External Affairs Minister following the alleged South China Sea encounter (whose veracity remained doubtful) is uncharacteristic of Indian policy-making so far. To my mind, such a posture, although overdue and welcome, needs to be underpinned by a carefully thought-through diplomatic/military strategy which takes into account various, “what-if” scenarios which could arise as a consequence of India’s actions. Of these the most adverse would be China responding negatively and introducing a small but powerful PLA Navy (PLAN) force at the site where OVL has deployed exploratory machinery and Indian personnel. The GoI would then have to decide whether they should back their words with a countervailing naval force or just back-down and lose credibility.
In such a scenario a token Indian Navy (IN) force (say a pair of guided-missile destroyers/frigates accompanied by a tanker) would have to deploy 3000 miles from the nearest naval base of Vishakhapatnam whereas the PLAN units could come from Hainan, just 250-300 miles away.

The duration and consequences of such a face-off would be unpredictable. Such a confrontation (much less a conflict) would be unsustainable, from a material viewpoint, for the IN, at the present stage of its growth trajectory, and detract it from its other commitments. It would also lack the strategic underpinning which the national security establishment must provide, after due consideration.

Navies have traditionally been viewed as diplomatic, as well as military tools. Through its multiple and increasingly institutionalized naval exercises with both regional and extra regional navies, and its hosting of multilateral initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Indian Navy clearly sees a comparative advantage for its service over the Army or Air Force as a diplomatic instrument for New Delhi. What kind of role do you envision for the Indian Navy in a troubled area such as the South China Sea? Can the Indian Navy provide some form of reassurance to smaller states in the region by acting as a form of benign external balancer? Or would this feed into China’s fears of containment?

While shunning the role of a “balancer” the IN should certainly reach out to SE Asia (including Taiwan) and establish a good professional and working relationship with navies of that sub-region. The IN-RSN relationship which has been nurtured over the past 15 years provides an excellent model. These maritime relationships should be reinforced by technology and hardware transfers wherever possible. While fostering such relationships India should make it clear that they are not aimed at altering the regional “balance of power”.

 India’s relations with some Southeast Asian States have traditionally been stronger than with others. Vietnam and Singapore, for example, are two nations, with whom India has enjoyed long-standing security ties. Vietnam, in particular, is increasingly concerned over China’s more assertive stance in the South China Sea, and appears to be implementing a vigorous strategy of sea denial in order to offset the Chinese Navy’s growing presence. Should India more actively assist smaller nations such as Vietnam in building up their military capabilities?

Certainly. Such relationships make imminent strategic sense, especially in the face of China’s carefully nurtured “special” four decade long relationship with our neighbour Pakistan. Moreover, these countries have been seeking India’s assistance and cooperation for decades, which has, so far, been denied due to our diffident policy stance, and excessive concerns about Chinese sensitivities. It would be a mutually beneficial relationship, since SE Asian countries seek reassurance in the face of renewed Chinese belligerence, while India needs friends, allies and trading partners in this region.

India has its own share of maritime disputes, most notably with Pakistan regarding the delayed resolution of the land boundary in Sir Creek off the Rann of Kutch and the delineation of its maritime extension. Do you think that if India moved towards resolving tensions in its own maritime backyard it would be able to better project itself as a responsible stakeholder and neutral arbiter in the South China Sea?

I agree. It is a poor reflection on India’s diplomacy as well as determination that we have been unable to resolve these maritime boundary disputes with two immediate neighbours for so long. Currently they seem to be in limbo. Regardless of the merits of the two cases, the lingering disputes sully our image and make us look recalcitrant. We may also be paying an economic cost because these deadlocks have prevented us (and our neighbours) from filing claims for an extended EEZ. Resolving maritime boundary disputes is a much less emotive issue than a similar exercise regarding land borders, and, with a huge EEZ, we can afford to be magnanimous to our neighbours. Indian diplomats need to realize the tremendous benefits that would accrue from an amicable and generous settlement with Pakistan as well as Bangladesh, in terms of “image”, good-will and perhaps ……even a quid pro quo elsewhere.

Finally, you also state that “India’s trade and energy interests in the Pacific are as vital as those professed by China in the Indian Ocean.” Do you envision the Indian Navy one day becoming a truly Indo-Pacific fleet with a leg in both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans? Or does India’s leadership remain too continentalist in its outlook to provide the Navy with the resources needed to accomplish such a transformation?

 This will have to be an incremental process. The IN needs to first attain the force-levels planned for security commitments limited to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR); say by 2025. Assuming that India’s trade, energy and geo-political interests beyond the Indian Ocean keep growing, it should then embark on a second phase of maritime capability acquisition which will enable the IN to undertake sustained operations beyond the IOR, including power projection. However, hardware acquisitions without a doctrinal/strategic underpinning would be quite meaningless.

In the latter context it is to be hoped that the intensity of domestic political activity would subside enough in the next two decades to allow the political leadership to apply itself to national security issues with the diligence and earnestness they deserve. They may then be able to perceive India’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and formulate a long-term vision in which maritime power finds its rightful place.