The South China Sea in Japanese Naval Strategy: Interview of Tetsuo Kotani

I recently interviewed a Japanese naval strategist for the forthcoming issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor. As soon as the Monitor is officially released I'll provide the proper link.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and lecturer at Hosei University. His research focuses on the strategic implications of the forward deployment of U.S. aircraft carrier groups in Japan. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and maritime security. He is preparing his first book on maritime security.

In a previous article written for the Diplomat you drew a parallel in-between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War in the Sea of Okhotsk. Could you explain to our readers the reasoning behind this comparison? What role, in your mind, does nuclear submarine strategy play in China’s attitude towards the South China Sea? Do you see a legacy of Soviet naval thinking in China’s current strategy?

Maritime strategies for nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are inevitably different. Since China is a nuclear weapon state, one of the priorities for Chinese strategic thinkers is to possess a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent, namely strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To protect and command this insurance force, the Soviet Union needed to deploy it in home waters, or the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. For China, the South China Sea needs to be safe waters for the SSBNs. China seeks to establish sea control in the waters to deny US surveillance operations to detect Chinese submarines. The Impeccable incident in March 2009 was part of those efforts. It is not clear how much Chinese strategy reflects Soviet naval thinking, but the Soviet naval strategists understood the importance of freedom of navigation. This is why Moscow agreed with Washington on the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972. Moscow and Washington also closely worked together in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to maintain freedom of navigation in international waters such as strategic straits and exclusive economic zones. China needs to learn that SSBN operation requires freedom of navigation.

In your writings you draw attention to the gradual decline of American naval power and urge Japan to take on a more proactive attitude in ensuring the stability of its own maritime neighborhood . You also point out that the Japanese fleet presents certain key strengths- in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)- for example. In the future do you see a form of division of labor emerging in-between the US and certain of its key allies in the Asia-Pacific? Should Japan work towards taking on a more clearly defined role under the aegis of an AirSea Battle framework? And if so, what kind of mission could the JMSDF take on in a in the event of an open conflict in-between the United States and China over Taiwan, for instance?

The essence of Japan’s maritime strategy is to protect US Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific by providing sophisticated ISR and ASW capabilities so that this formidable force can enjoy freedom of action. US-Japan naval cooperation can be a model for division of labor between US and its key partners, namely ROK, Australia, and India. Japan is now taking measures to reinforce defense posture in the Ryukyu island chain and the concept of Air-Sea Battle provides the basis for it. Japanese naval thinkers are looking at the Tokyo-Guam-Taiwan (TGT) Triangle as key operational areas for Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). In a Taiwan contingency, JMSDF will conduct support operations, including ASW and ISR, in the TGT Triangle.

In June 2011, Tokyo and Washington revised their common strategic objectives and called for a deepening of cooperation with countries such as South Korea, Australia, and, most notably, India. What is your perception of the current state of Indo-Japanese naval cooperation? What can be done to further strengthen both nations’ maritime security ties? Do you see both countries playing a positive role as “external balancers” in a troubled region such as South China Sea?

Although they are natural partners, the relationship between JMSDF and Indian Navy are still in an early stage. The first bilateral exercise is expected within few months, while JMSDF have participated in Exercise Malabar several times. I don’t think the two navies share a common vision on concrete areas of cooperation. Of course, China’s naval expansion is a common concern but that is not the end of the list. Piracy, Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc.—the two navies need to discuss those issues as well to deepen their strategic relations. In the South China Sea, Japan and India are important users and players. Japan’s priority is to maintain freedom of navigation in the sea for both merchant and naval ships, and Tokyo proposed a East Asian Maritime Forum to discuss this issue. But there is some concern among Japanese maritime experts about Indian interpretation of freedom of navigation in EEZs, especially surveillance activities by foreign military. Some Indian maritime experts take the same interpretation as China and deny surveillance by foreign military in EEZs. Without coordinating this difference, it will be difficult for Japan and India to play a positive role in the South China Sea together.

I noted with interest that you have referred to China’s so-called “String of Pearls Strategy” in the Indian Ocean as “acting against the strategic interests of Tokyo” as well as those of India, by “pressing on both sides of the Malacca Straits”. Could you tell us a bit more about the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for Japan?

First of all, the string of pearls is not Chinese strategy. It is not a reality but just a perception. China is building up commercial access points along its sea lanes but those points cannot be used as military bases. If it wants to be a naval power in the Indian Ocean, China first of all needs to respect freedom of navigation and to have reliable naval partners. Maintaining air power in the Indian Ocean region is another challenge for China. That said, however, perception is often more important than reality in real world. The Indian Ocean region is a critical area for Japan as the source of energy, and Japan could depend on the United States for security of energy transportation from the Indian Ocean. But the United States is too much busy with various global security concerns, and Japan is now considering how it can contribute more to the security in the region. Counter piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden is part of the efforts. The security in the Strait of Hormuz is an urgent challenge for Japan now.


Which countries in Southeast Asia do you see emerging as key security partners for Tokyo in the next ten to twenty years? And last but not least, does Japan need to come up with its own, distinct “South China Sea Strategy”?

All ASEAN members, both South China Sea claimants and non-claimants, are important players because ASEAN makes decision by consensus. Japan should not regard any ASEAN country as natural partner but should keep engaging with and reassuring ASEAN members so that China cannot increase its influence on those countries too much with its economic and military might. On the other hand, Japan is finding a way to contribute to capacity building of ASEAN maritime forces. Japan recently relaxed its arms export ban and now can provide arms to friendly countries so that they can increase capabilities for good order at sea. The South China Sea is a critical area for Japan, and I think Japan should announce a clear South China Sea strategy.



Interview of Professor Toshi Yoshihara

Last month, I interviewed  US Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara for the March issue of the Observer Research Foundation's South China Sea Monitor (link soon to be up). He discussed China's perceptions of India's naval power and presence in the South China sea.

Dr. Toshi Yoshihara is Professor of Strategy and John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.  He is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the war college.   He is co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2010), Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Routledge, 2009), and Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century: The Turn to Mahan (Routledge, 2008).  He is also co-editor of Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Praeger, 2008).  Dr. Yoshihara holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

You recently penned a highly informative study of Chinese scholarly writings pertaining to India’s role in the Indian Ocean[1]. One of your key conclusions is that the Chinese strategic community has an overwhelming tendency to view India’s naval ambitions in starkly realist terms, and as being permeated by a desire for regional hegemony. Why do you think this is?

The realists I document in my new study represent one of many schools of strategic thought in China.  What we are witnessing in China is the rise of an “intellectual-military complex” composed of academics, senior military officers, and policy analysts who openly debate Beijing’s long-term choices.  Within this complex is an outspoken group of realists and seapower advocates from topflight research and academic institutions across China.  While this semi-official community does not necessarily speak for Beijing, it is clearly vying for a place in the policy-making process.  These realists are grappling with an unprecedented historical phenomenon in maritime Asia: the entry of India and China into the same oceanic spaces at nearly the same time.  It is therefore not surprising that the realists forecast an emerging zero-sum competition in the Indian Ocean.     

2)       How do Chinese analysts view the maritime components of India’s Look East Policy? You notably quote some Chinese scholars as stating that India is increasingly seeking to make forays into the South China Sea as a “diversionary strategy”. Could you explain to our readers the reasoning behind such assertions?

Some Chinese analysts evince the belief that offense is the best form defense.  Chinese views of Indian’s Look East Policy thus conform to China’s strategic and operational traditions that emphasize offensive stratagems.  The logic goes like this: If India reaches into China’s own maritime backyard, Beijing would be compelled to divert its unwelcome attention from the Indian Ocean to a nautical theater much closer to home.  Indian advances in Southeast Asia would, in the words of one Chinese strategist, “generate a southward gravitational pull on China’s maritime strategy, thus preventing China, in its search for diversified strategy pathways, from entering the Indian Ocean.”  In essence, keeping China tied down in the South China Sea would keep China out of the Indian Ocean.    

3)       Indian Chief of Naval Staff Nirmal Verma has stated that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands form one the nation’s foremost “strategic outposts”.  Located at only 45 km from Mynamar’s Coco Islands, and 160 km from the Indonesian province of Aceh, the islands are closer to Southeast Asia than to the Indian mainland. How do Chinese analysts view India’s military presence in these islands?

Intriguingly, Chinese strategists have transposed the Sinocentric concept of the “first island chain”—an archipelago that stretches from the Japanese islands to Indonesia—to the Indian Ocean.  The Chinese perceive the first island chain, home to major U.S. military bases in the western Pacific, as the geographical expression of a sustained American effort to balk Beijing’s maritime ambitions.  They similarly describe the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as an “iron chain” with which India could close off Chinese access to the Indian Ocean.  Sitting astride the sea lanes west of the Malacca Strait, the islands enclose the Andaman Sea as menacingly as the first island chain bounds China’s “near seas.”  This parallel is thus persuasive to many Chinese strategists.  To some, India’s military command in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands could be used to monitor China’s seaborne traffic and, in wartime, to interdict Chinese naval and commercial vessels.  Others even see it as the future staging area for projecting Indian naval power into the South China Sea.   

4)       China’s strategic pessimism appears to be echoed to a certain degree within India’s own chattering classes, with much talk over a hypothetical Chinese “string of pearls” being woven in India’s own maritime backyard. Both rising powers see nefarious designs behind their alter ego’s naval modernization and deployments. Is this a form of complex mirror imaging, or can it be attributed to a simple lack of mutual understanding?  Or, to the contrary, does it adequately reflect an emerging zero-sum game? In your opinion, what does this augur for the future stability of Maritime Asia?

My short answer to your questions about the sources of Chinese and Indian threat perceptions would be “all of the above.”  However, I think it would be a mistake to think that enhanced bilateral engagements and greater mutual understanding would “cure” China’s starkly realist outlook.  Beijing’s sense of energy insecurity, epitomized by the so-called “Malacca dilemma,” is real enough.  My reading of the Chinese literature also suggests that China takes India’s great power ambitions very seriously.  To the Chinese, venerable strategic traditions—evidenced by the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar—will continue to underwrite India’s long-term aspirations.  In my view, the potential interactions between two ambitious great powers that possess proprietary attitudes about their respective nautical spheres of influence are more likely to generate competitive rather than cooperative dynamics in maritime Asia. 

---

[1] The article, entitled “Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective”, will be published in a forthcoming issue of the journal Strategic Analysis.

AirSea Battle's Indo-Pacific Future: India, the US, and the Binding Power of the Anti-Access Threat.

I recently wrote this short opinion piece for the Observer Research Foundation, a private think-tank in Delhi.

Abstract:

Shared values do not always lead to common interests. Shared threats, however, have a way of cementing partnerships beyond rhetorical flourishes. This article argues that both India and the United States face a growing anti-access challenge. By working together to mitigate A2/AD threats, they may come to a better mutual understanding on major security issues in Asia.

Shared values do not always lead to common interests. This harsh truism has been brutally hammered home to all those in Washington, both Republican and Democrat, who have trumpeted the virtues of the Indo-US Strategic Partnership over the past decade. From a “natural alliance based on shared values”, the Indo-Us partnership seems to have slipped into a succession of frustrations and misunderstandings. Refusing to support US-led sanctions against a rapidly nuclearizing Iran and seemingly reluctant to provide any kind of moral leadership at the United Nations Security Council; India has demonstrated that while it may reap the benefits of a democratic system at home, it still tends to behave in the amoralistic tradition of a realist power abroad.

This revelation should not be viewed as a major setback to Indo-US ties, but rather as the perfect opportunity for a shift in tone. Grandiloquent verbiage on shared democratic values has provided a solid ideological bedrock for the Indo-US partnership. In order to cement ties, however, nothing is more effective than the crude language of shared threats. Over past years, successive US administrations have engaged India on issues such as nuclear proliferation, Islamic terrorism, and the uncertainties linked to China’s rise. Looking ahead, one cannot help but notice that both nations’ armed forces, and in particular their navies, face remarkably similar future challenges.   

Indeed, both nations operate blue-water, carrier-centric navies  whose continued ability to project power risks being negated in the face of potential adversaries’ growing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. In the Western Pacific, Beijing is pursuing an aggressively missile-centric strategy, which seeks to vault the PLA’s precision-strike capability from land to sea. The Chinese have developed an anti-ship variant of the DF-21 ballistic missile, which has reportedly reached initial operating capability, and have invested en masse in the acquisition of diesel-electric submarines optimized for missions of sea denial. The threat to American surface vessels is compounded by China’s growing investment in high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles, and continued interest in offensive mine warfare. Lightly defended American forward bases in Japan could find themselves suddenly annihilated under a barrage of China’s numerous conventionally armed ballistic missiles, and US carrier groups could become wasting assets, as their growing vulnerability  gradually renders them operationally irrelevant.

India, for its part, faces strikingly similar threats, albeit on a much smaller scale. Pakistan, since independence, has opted for a strategy of offensive sea denial, heavily dependent on the use of submarines and anti-ship missiles, in order to offset its neighbor’s conventional naval advantage. This asymmetric strategy is currently being pursued through the induction of small, stealthy fast-attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles, and via an ever growing inventory of land-based, Chinese-made, high speed cruise missiles. The Pakistani Navy also hopes to add six more submarines equipped with Air Independent Propulsion and submarine-launched cruise missiles to its fleet. Meanwhile, the growing range and sophistication of China’s anti-access systems risks impacting negatively on the maritime balance of power in the Indian Ocean. If deployed by Second Artillery Brigades stationed in the western reaches of the Tibetan plateau, or from the hills of Yunnan, China’s DF 21D could encompass most of India’s maritime backyard under its extended threat envelop. Judging by the Pentagon’s latest report on Chinese military power, Chinese missile strike range already covers large swathes of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. In the future, this capability could be harnessed by Beijing in order to provide a protective umbrella to its vessels operating in the Indian Ocean, or to shield its Pakistani ally’s assets during an Indo-Pakistani conflict. Employed in a more offensive manner, it could be used to sink Indian destroyers or aircraft carriers, or to target India’s coastal infrastructure.

In the face of this shared threat, how can Delhi and Washington cooperate more effectively? For the time being, the 2006 Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation focuses largely on non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, conventional and non-conventional arms proliferation and smuggling.“Hard” maritime challenges, however, such as shared anti-access threats, also need to be placed at the heart of the US-India maritime cooperative agenda. This can be accomplished in various ways.

•        First of all, by jointly working towards an AirSea Battle Concept "with Indian characteristics".

For the past few years, the DOD has been laboring to mitigate the anti-access threat through the crafting of a transformational new concept: AirSea Battle. The latter calls for greater jointness in-between the US Air Force and Navy, and hinges upon the reprioritization of long-range weapon programs such as the new-generation stealth bomber and the X-47B long-range carrier-borne attack drone. Indian naval and airpower strategists could learn a great deal through participating in AirSea Battle wargames with their US counterparts. Indeed, the Indian Navy and Air Force have been historically averse to pursue any kind of meaningful operational synergy. While both services have initiated joint training under the aegis of the TROPEX exercises annually held in the Bay of Bengal, they still prefer to coordinate -rather than to genuinely fuse- their combat exercises. The Indian Air Force and Naval Aviation are provided with distinct, pre-designated “air corridors” in which to operate and respond to the instructions of their own service-specific commanders. Institutionalized joint Navy/Air Force exercises in-between the US and India could go a long way towards helping Indian mindsets change, and eventually give birth to true interoperability. In 2010, US PACOM and the Indian IDS (Integrated Defense Staff) conducted their first joint tabletop exercise, entitled JEI (Joint Exercise India), in Alaska.  This is a promising first step towards bilateral multiservice cooperation, and should be leveraged in order to begin planning for joint US-India AirSea Battle Exercises in the Indian Ocean.

•    Second, both countries should draw on the conclusions of their joint threat assessment.

Defense transfers and sales, by focusing on certain of India’s clearly identified vulnerabilities, would be more targeted and, therefore more successful. The Indian Navy, for example, presents certain  critical weaknesses in terms of modern anti-submarine warfare, and has yet to invest significantly in point-defense systems for its surface fleet.  In the future, it may also wish to opt for US-made long-range carrier drones in order to penetrate highly contested environments with greater ease and minimal loss of life. The Indian Air Force, after having more fully interiorized the logic unraveled by AirSea Battle, may come to privilege strike range over strike density, and aspire to acquire American long-range stealth bombers. With time, these key areas could grow to form the structural pillars of Indo-US defense cooperation. This could prove very lucrative for US defense firms, which would find themselves in the privileged position of almost exclusively catering to India’s growing AirSea Battle needs. New Delhi, for its part, could benefit from state-of-the-art US technology, as well as from the enhanced tactical expertise it would glean from joint warfighting exercises of unprecedented magnitude and complexity.

•   Finally, an Indian military more capable of countering anti-access challenges would not only display a greater degree of interoperability with US armed forces, but also a heightened appreciation for American security concerns in Asia. 

 In the unhappy event of a Sino-US conflict breaking out in the Western Pacific, India could be eventually called upon to provide a stabilizing, flanking presence west of the Malacca Straits, ensuring the safety of sea-lanes of communications while American naval strength is concentrated elsewhere.

It is through such initiatives, which focus on shared concerns and perceived threats, that the Indo-US strategic partnership will reveal its true potential. Until then, the ritualized repetition of the importance of shared values may only lead to false hopes, and thus to perpetual disappointment.

LSE India Report: The Military Dimensions of India's Rise.

The London School of Economic's IDEAS Center recently released their latest report, entitled India: The Next Superpower? The report has been receiving a fair amount of attention in the Indian and international press.
I contributed the section exploring the uneven nature of India's military modernization, which you can read, along with the rest of the report, by following this link:


http://eshop.lse.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?modid=1&prodid=605&deptid=169&compid=1&prodvarid=0&catid=14

Interview of Former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash

 This blog has been in dire need of an update for some time now. I have been pretty busy over the past few months, working as a Visiting Fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, while laboring on my dissertation and several co-related publication projects.

Over the next few weeks I will be attempting to breathe new life into this blog with various bits and bobs.

First of all, here is an interview  which I recently conducted for the Observer Research Foundation's monthly South China Sea Monitor.

http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/southchina/attachments/fissue_1328857322394.pdf 


Admiral Arun Prakash, the former head of the Indian Navy, gives his take on India's role in the South China Sea.

Admiral Arun Prakash served as India’s 20th Chief of Naval Staff and also held the post of Chairman of the Chief of Staffs Committee; retiring in 2006. Previously, he has served as the Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation and currently is a member of the National Security Advisory Board. He now lives in Goa, and has been writing and speaking on issues of strategic and maritime interest.

Shortly after the Financial Times reported an alleged incident involving an encounter in-between Indian and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea (the circumstances of which remain somewhat murky) http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/09/20/india-looking-east/  you penned an article warning the Indian Government and Navy of the dangers of strategic overreach, stating, for example, that “a distant location like the South China is hardly an ideal setting to demonstrate India’s maritime or other strengths”.

 http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-india-must-pause-before-venturing-into-choppy-waters/20110926.htm

Could you go into greater depth and tell our readers what precise risks you were alluding to?

An assertive stance of the kind conveyed by the External Affairs Minister following the alleged South China Sea encounter (whose veracity remained doubtful) is uncharacteristic of Indian policy-making so far. To my mind, such a posture, although overdue and welcome, needs to be underpinned by a carefully thought-through diplomatic/military strategy which takes into account various, “what-if” scenarios which could arise as a consequence of India’s actions. Of these the most adverse would be China responding negatively and introducing a small but powerful PLA Navy (PLAN) force at the site where OVL has deployed exploratory machinery and Indian personnel. The GoI would then have to decide whether they should back their words with a countervailing naval force or just back-down and lose credibility.
In such a scenario a token Indian Navy (IN) force (say a pair of guided-missile destroyers/frigates accompanied by a tanker) would have to deploy 3000 miles from the nearest naval base of Vishakhapatnam whereas the PLAN units could come from Hainan, just 250-300 miles away.

The duration and consequences of such a face-off would be unpredictable. Such a confrontation (much less a conflict) would be unsustainable, from a material viewpoint, for the IN, at the present stage of its growth trajectory, and detract it from its other commitments. It would also lack the strategic underpinning which the national security establishment must provide, after due consideration.

Navies have traditionally been viewed as diplomatic, as well as military tools. Through its multiple and increasingly institutionalized naval exercises with both regional and extra regional navies, and its hosting of multilateral initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Indian Navy clearly sees a comparative advantage for its service over the Army or Air Force as a diplomatic instrument for New Delhi. What kind of role do you envision for the Indian Navy in a troubled area such as the South China Sea? Can the Indian Navy provide some form of reassurance to smaller states in the region by acting as a form of benign external balancer? Or would this feed into China’s fears of containment?

While shunning the role of a “balancer” the IN should certainly reach out to SE Asia (including Taiwan) and establish a good professional and working relationship with navies of that sub-region. The IN-RSN relationship which has been nurtured over the past 15 years provides an excellent model. These maritime relationships should be reinforced by technology and hardware transfers wherever possible. While fostering such relationships India should make it clear that they are not aimed at altering the regional “balance of power”.

 India’s relations with some Southeast Asian States have traditionally been stronger than with others. Vietnam and Singapore, for example, are two nations, with whom India has enjoyed long-standing security ties. Vietnam, in particular, is increasingly concerned over China’s more assertive stance in the South China Sea, and appears to be implementing a vigorous strategy of sea denial in order to offset the Chinese Navy’s growing presence. Should India more actively assist smaller nations such as Vietnam in building up their military capabilities?

Certainly. Such relationships make imminent strategic sense, especially in the face of China’s carefully nurtured “special” four decade long relationship with our neighbour Pakistan. Moreover, these countries have been seeking India’s assistance and cooperation for decades, which has, so far, been denied due to our diffident policy stance, and excessive concerns about Chinese sensitivities. It would be a mutually beneficial relationship, since SE Asian countries seek reassurance in the face of renewed Chinese belligerence, while India needs friends, allies and trading partners in this region.

India has its own share of maritime disputes, most notably with Pakistan regarding the delayed resolution of the land boundary in Sir Creek off the Rann of Kutch and the delineation of its maritime extension. Do you think that if India moved towards resolving tensions in its own maritime backyard it would be able to better project itself as a responsible stakeholder and neutral arbiter in the South China Sea?

I agree. It is a poor reflection on India’s diplomacy as well as determination that we have been unable to resolve these maritime boundary disputes with two immediate neighbours for so long. Currently they seem to be in limbo. Regardless of the merits of the two cases, the lingering disputes sully our image and make us look recalcitrant. We may also be paying an economic cost because these deadlocks have prevented us (and our neighbours) from filing claims for an extended EEZ. Resolving maritime boundary disputes is a much less emotive issue than a similar exercise regarding land borders, and, with a huge EEZ, we can afford to be magnanimous to our neighbours. Indian diplomats need to realize the tremendous benefits that would accrue from an amicable and generous settlement with Pakistan as well as Bangladesh, in terms of “image”, good-will and perhaps ……even a quid pro quo elsewhere.

Finally, you also state that “India’s trade and energy interests in the Pacific are as vital as those professed by China in the Indian Ocean.” Do you envision the Indian Navy one day becoming a truly Indo-Pacific fleet with a leg in both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans? Or does India’s leadership remain too continentalist in its outlook to provide the Navy with the resources needed to accomplish such a transformation?

 This will have to be an incremental process. The IN needs to first attain the force-levels planned for security commitments limited to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR); say by 2025. Assuming that India’s trade, energy and geo-political interests beyond the Indian Ocean keep growing, it should then embark on a second phase of maritime capability acquisition which will enable the IN to undertake sustained operations beyond the IOR, including power projection. However, hardware acquisitions without a doctrinal/strategic underpinning would be quite meaningless.

In the latter context it is to be hoped that the intensity of domestic political activity would subside enough in the next two decades to allow the political leadership to apply itself to national security issues with the diligence and earnestness they deserve. They may then be able to perceive India’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and formulate a long-term vision in which maritime power finds its rightful place.

Troubled Waters: Vietnam, China and the South China Sea.

 A recent series of spats in-between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea (or East Sea as it is called in Vietnam) has attracted a fair degree of international media coverage. Over the past weeks, I was interviewed by various Vietnamese media outlets at different stages of the crisis.

 Here you will find the link to a recent article, published by Thanh Nien Weekly, which discusses the announcement by both parties to attempt to resolve their outstanding territorial disputes in a less confrontational manner. I weigh in, along with veteran Vietnam watcher Carlyle Thayer from the Australian Defense Force Academy, and Ian Storey from ISAS in Singapore.
http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20110702161309.aspx

And an interview for BBC World, which appeared on the Vietnamese website a few weeks ago:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2011/05/110530_viet_china_spat.shtml

I have provided below an English translation of the interview:

Understanding China's Intentions:


Vietnamese media has now been flooded for several days with information related to the threatening actions of Chinese ships towards Vietnam seismic survey vessels operating in the East Sea.In the morning of 26/05, three Chinese ships harassed and sabotaged a PetroVietnam survey vessel.
The location of the incident is said to be deep inside Vietnamese waters, only 120 nautical miles off Lanh Phu Yen province. BBC sat down for a short interview with a specialist on regional maritime security, Iskander Rehman, to discuss the implications behind this latest incident.

BBC: 

How should one view this latest incident?

Iskander Rehman:  
 

The recent incident fits into a broader pattern of Chinese behavior in the South and East China Seas, which has increasingly revolved around the use of coercive diplomacy and aggressive military signaling in order to assert Beijing’s territorial claims. This has led to tense situations not only with Vietnamese ships, but also with US, Japanese, and , more recently, Filipino vessels.

China’s approach to its maritime territorial disputes has not only become more assertive, but also more multi-layered. Indeed, Micro-level naval sparring is just one of the techniques employed by Beijing to enforce its claims over the rocky outcrops that straddle the resource-rich sea lanes of the South China Sea. Other forms of aggressive military signaling, such as mass joint exercises and increased naval patrols off the disputed Paracels and Spratly islands, have been increasingly apparent over the past few years. These provocative actions have been accompanied by what Chinese strategists refer to as “legal warfare”, with Chinese government spokesmen openly contesting in legalistic terms some of the more universally accepted features of the law of the sea. 

BBC:

It has been stated that there is a growing concern in China over the burgeoning US-Vietnam rapprochement. Do you think that last week's incident and the seeming hardening of China's position can also be viewed as a response to this?

Iskander Rehman:

Maybe. The recent Sino-Vietnamese naval spat cannot be entirely divorced from the changing geopolitical landscape in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, with its history of potent nationalism and staunch defiance towards the Middle Kingdom, has always been viewed by China as the unruly upstart of Southeast Asia. Although both states have resolved their land border dispute, tensions remain high on both sides over the disputed Paracel and Spratly islands. These tensions have led to small-scale naval clashes in the past, in 1974 and 1988, and it is unfortunately not outlandish to consider that such small-scale skirmishes might reoccur in the short to medium future.

Chinese officials have been rattled by the burgeoning strategic partnership in-between Washington and Hanoi, and have not taken kindly to the staging of joint US-Vietnamese naval exercises in the South China Sea. Beijing may therefore also be adopting  a more hardline position vis-à-vis Vietnam in response to its growing proximity with the US-either as a form of punishment, or as form of not-so-subtle warning of the potential costs of such a rapprochement.

BBC: 

What kind of long-term trends or strategic calculations do you see emerging from China in light of the growing frequency of such incidents?

Iskander Rehman: 

As China’s economic and military clout grows, so too do its power projection aspirations. For Beijing’s increasingly vocal strategic community, control over the area circumscribed by “the first island chain”, (a natural boundary formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan's archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo); and over the offshore gas and oil deposits, strategic waterways, and straits it encompasses is considered an absolute prerequisite for the PLAN’s gradual transition from “off-shore defense” to “far-seas operations”, and , in so doing, from regional influence to global reach.

There has also been speculation in certain quarters that the PLAN wishes to establish a ring of defended maritime watch towers or bastions near Hainan in order to ensure the protection of its “second-strike” nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet newly based at Sanya. Absolute control over the strategically placed Paracels and Spratly islands would facilitate this defensive configuration.