Interview of Navy Commander Gurpreet Khurana.

I interviewed the Commander, currently a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (http://idsa.in) when I was in Delhi in September.

Most historians would agree that India has traditionally been permeated by a continental mindset, having to deal with large terrestrial invasions, whether it be the Aryans, the Afghans or the Moghols. Even today India's defence budget remains relatively land-locked, despite the increase in the Navy's share. Yet India has increasingly chosen to invest in a blue-water navy. Do you believe that this symbolizes a reversal in Indian strategic thought? And if so what are the reasons underlying such an evolution?

I think that India has had a maritime strategic mindset since independence, it just remained dormant for many years. During WWII, the Indian Navy under British Command was a formidable fighting force. After the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947 and 1965, and the Sino-Indian War of 1962, however, the harsh reality of the insecurity of the Himalayas set in and the notion of developing a maritime power was put on the backburner. The focus was on defending the subcontinent from Chinese or Pakistani land incursions. Nehru did mention the importance of seapower, as did Indira Gandhi, but neither of them had a very outward looking orientation, even though the Navy underwent an expansion under Indira Gandhi.

I'd also add that until recently India's entire mindset was inward looking, and not only in the strategic realm. Until the economic reforms of 1991, India's markets were relatively closed to the world, stifled under the weight of the 'Licence Raj'. Traditionally naval powers are also economic and trading powers, countries that prosper by venturing overseas and that are animated by a sense of overture to the world. Before the end of the Cold War, India had no real strategic or economic imperative to focus on a powerful navy.

So the real reversal in India's strategic mindset occurred at the end of the Cold War?

Yes, the transformed geopolitical environment and India's economic liberalisation provided it with both the desire and the window of opportunity to expand its navy. As a result, the Navy budget has been steadily increasing over the past few years.

Do you think that this will remain the case?

I hope so, the Navy has been very good at making its case, and is undoubtedly the branch of the armed forces which receives the most attention in the press, whether it be during the rescue operations following the 2004 tsunami, or when Indian ships evacuated Indian citizens from Lebanon in 2006.

After the recent terrorist attacks, however, more funds may be channeled into the improvement of interior policing.


Would you say that the Chinese PLN (People's Liberation Navy) is now viewed by the Indian Navy as the number one threat in the region?

Definitely, and far more so than the Pakistani Navy, which is viewed more as a potential nuisance than a genuine threat. India is, of course, most concerned about China's 'string of pearls', as it considers it to be the outlining of a maritime containment policy.

In one of my articles, however, I point out that these Indian fears are somewhat overstated.

(http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a790947871~db=all~order=page)

The fact is that it is still somewhat unclear whether China's strengthening of its ties with IOR littorals are merely economic endeavours, as they themselves claim, or whether they are driven by strategic and military considerations. There is no tangible evidence that the ports and infrastructure that the PRC is building throughout the region are overtly military in nature.

Of course it's obvious that China, sooner or later, is going to consider the possibility of making these structures 'dual use' facilities, which can be used for both commercial and military purposes.

Gwadar, the deep-sea port in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Pakistan has the most dangerous potenial in this regard. The Chinese have invested an enormous amount of money in its construction, and they will naturally want some form of return, probably by stationing submarines. Similarly, Chinese admirals have been spotted being given guided tours of the Coco Islands by high-ranking members of the Myanamarese junta. This, in my view, definitely adds some credibility to the rumours of a Chinese SIGINT facility at that location.


There are rumours that China is acquiring a combat operational aircraft carrier. Does this mean that the Indian Navy will lose its comparative advantage in terms of strategic projection in the Indian Ocean region?

There are indeed rumours that the Varyag, a Soviet carrier that the PRC purchased from Ukraine, and that is currently being refurbished in China, will become an operational carrier in two to three years. In my view though, the Varyag will not take part in military operations and will be used as a training carrier.

China does have an Indigenous Carrier Project though, and Chinese military officials have stated in the past that they would like to deploy an aircraft carrier by 2015.

Carriers can only operate effectively in groups however, and need to be provided with escorts. Very few Chinese ships have adequate air defence systems (they tend to be equipped with Russian systems that are less reliable than the American or Israeli systems that their Indian counterparts are now increasingly equipped with), and a Chinese carrier deployed in the Indian Ocean would be a sitting duck for the Indian Air Force and Indian Naval Aviation.

The only vessels that China can deploy in the Indian Ocean are its underwater assets, but in order to sustain these forces in the area for a long period of time, China would have to maintain a permanent presence in the region in the form of ports of call and refuelling stations. (hence, some say, the 'String of Pearls')

For the time being though, China would not be able to launch an effective naval expedition in the IOR?

Not in the short to medium term, that's for sure. Which means, if one uses a naval strategic planning time framework, not for the next two to three decades.


Moving onto a different subject: the chronic unreliability of Russian arm provisions to India. Numerous disputes have given rise to some strain in Indo-Russian relations. Sureesh Mehta, the current chief of the Indian Navy recently said, after learning of the delay in the delivery of the Admiral Gorshkov, that India should reduce its dependence on Moscow for military equipment. Do you think that recent events will incite the Indian Navy to seek greater diversity from now on in its arm procurements?

There have indeed been a fair degree of problems in terms of delays, cost overruns, weapon malfunctions etc.. Diversification has long been a goal of the Indian Navy, as it prevents excessive dependence on a sole provider, and provides a way of playing the competition in order to get the most efficient weapon systems at the best possible rates.

Indo-Russian ties go back a long way however, and the Indian Navy is used to Russian military hardware, as they operated mostly Soviet equipment throughout the Cold War. There's a certain 'comfort factor' in the familiarity of the Russian weapon systems. Military relations in-between both nations are still strong; no other country would have agreed to lease India a nuclear submarine. Even though Russian weapons are often less reliable than their Israeli, European or American competitors, particularly in the field of anti-missile technology, Indo-Russian cooperation has also led to great successes in the past. The Brahmos supersonic cruise missile is a prime example.

Thank you, Gurpreet, for your time and expertise.

A naval superpower in the making.

The INS Viraat, India's 28,700 ton Centaur-Class Aircraft Carrier, launching a VTOL Sea Harrier jet fighter. The INS Viraat should remain in service until 2012.

India is one of the only countries in the region with a blue-water navy ('blue-water is a term used to describe navies capable of operating across 'deep waters' and therefore of projecting their power far from their coastline, in opposition to 'brown-water' navies, which are confined to the littoral and incapable of sustaining an expeditionary deployment) and is the only Asian Navy which currently deploys an aircraft carrier.

A growing portion of India's defence budget is being allocated to the Indian Navy, which has become a symbol of the country's growing assertiveness in the Indian Ocean. India has ambitious plans for the modernization, and expansion of its Navy, which by 2020 will be comprised of approximately 140 vessels. Half of these will be assigned to the defense of the littoral, the other half will form an expeditionary force of frigates, destroyers and corvettes around two or three aircraft carrier groups. The ultimate goal of the Indian Naval planners is to be able to simultaneously project force via these carrier groups on both its eastern and western seaboards. Having two carriers constantly operational, however, requires a third carrier which would be kept in reserve, enabling it to rotate with one of the others when it goes under maintenance.

Plans also include a drastic upgrading or increase in the Indian Navy's submarine assets, fighter planes, amphibious assault ships, and helicopters specialised in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) or in the transport of auxiliary forces, such as the Indian Navy's MARCOS commandoes. (see upcoming article)

The Indian Navy currently has several major armament programmes underway. Here is a brief overview of the most important, the carrier and submarine programmes.

Aircraft Carriers:

Two more aircraft carriers are to join the Indian Navy, hopefully before 2015. The 26 year old ex-Admiral Gorshkov, a 47,750 ton Kiev-Class Carrier, purchased from Russia, was expected to join India's armada in 2008/2009, thus enabling the 49 year old Centaur-class Viraat to retire. Unfortunately after a series of delays; due to the loss of the original blue-prints, the alleged discovery that the ship required 2,400 km of recabling instead of 700 and subsequent Russian demands for another 1.2 billion USD; the delivery is not now expected until 2012. This frustrating turn of events has soured Indo-Russian relations, and forced the Indian Navy to spend hefty sums in order to extend the ageing Viraat's life for another few years and equip it with a new air surveillance radar.

India is also building a smaller, indigenous aircraft carrier, the 37,500 ton IAC, (Indigenous Aircraft Carrier), at Kochi, which has also been delayed until at least 2014, due, in part, to steel acquisition problems.

Conventional Submarine assets:

India's submarine force remains relatively small (about 16 boats) and will not undergo a significant increase in numbers over the next few years. Planners are hoping, however, to replace the ageing Sindhughosh class subs with six French, but locally built, Scorpene diesel-electric boats by 2017. Unfortunately it seems that here also delivery plans have been pushed back. India plans to fit both its conventional and nuclear powered submarines with the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, that it co-developed with Russia, and that is currently being adapted for underwater use.

Nuclear Submarine assets:

India's incapacity to build nuclear powered submarines, whether it be SSNs (nuclear-powered submarines with conventional weapon systems) or SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) has long been a source of frustration. Both SNAs and SSBNs would provide an enormous boost to the Indian Navy's strategic capabilities.

SSNs:

Even the most advanced diesel-electric submarines cannot remain more than a few days submerged at a time, whereas nuclear submarines can operate under the surface almost indefinitely. This makes an enormous difference, as submarines are valued above all for their ability to function undetected.

The Indian Navy signed an agreement with Russia in 2004 to lease the Akula-class SSN Nerpa, which is currently under construction, and should arrive in INdia in 2009. The SSN Nerpa will not only be used in military operations but also as a training vessel for the submariners who will operate India's indigenously built nuclear submarines, currently being assembled in Vishakhaptnam, the headquarters of India's Eastern Fleet.

The ATV, or Advanced Technological Vessel, is a 6,000 ton SSN with a 80 Mw nuclear reactor, and is believed to be closely modelled on the Soviet 670A series that the Indian Navy leased for three years from the USSR in the 1980s. The ATV has long been cloaked in secrecy(Indian officials denied its very existence until recently) and has been under development since at least 1974. It is scheduled to be operational in 2010, but many experts believe that its launching may be delayed.

SSBNs:

SSBNs are the missing link in India's quest for the 'nuclear triad of deterrence'.
The expression 'nuclear triad' refers to a nuclear arsenal composed of three different components, which supposedly provide the best form of deterrence:

• long-range strategic bombers
• land-based ballistic missiles
• ballistic missile submarines

Submarine launched ballistic missiles are considered the best form of deterrence in the triad, as they provide a better 'second-strike capability' as they are, by nature, the most difficult to locate and destroy in a preemptive strike.

India is currently finalising the Sagarika submarine-launched missile, that was successfully launched from an underwater pontoon off the coast of Vishakpatnam in February 2008. Although details surrounding the project as well as the test are somewhat obscure, reports indicate that the Sagarika missile has a range of approximately 750km, and that the IN plans to fit it to the ATV .

Other expansion/modernization plans:

India's acquisition of the USS Trenton and of its six modernised UH-3H SeaKing Helicopters made the headlines last year. With a displacement of 16,900 tons, the former US vessel, now renamed INS Jalashwa, is an amphibious assault ship which can host more than 1000 troops and 100 small vehicles. It comes equipped with landing craft, which will enable the Indian Navy to launch marines in covert ops, or conduct evacuation missions.
India is also procuring and constructing more advanced frigates and destroyers, which will be equipped with Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles and Israeli Barak-I missile defense systems.
Newly procured Mig 29k fighters and Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters will provide support to maritime operations, and India is also bolstering its maritime surveillance capabilites by acquiring more surveillance aircraft as well as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).

India is already one of the most powerful navies in the region. With these ambitious plans of expansion and modernization of its fleet, it could well become one of the foremost maritime powers in the world.

India's doctrinal shift in favour of sea power.

Indian Talwar-class frigate escorts a merchant vessel to safety after having destroyed a pirate 'mother ship'.

INDIA’S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:

Emerging India’s aspirations have been accompanied by a realisation of the numerous advantages procured from its strategic location in the heart of the Indian Ocean. Positioned in-between the Gulf of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, the Indian Ocean has become one of the major centres of maritime commerce, with on average over 200 merchant vessels transporting more than 10 million barrels of oil transiting through the Malacca Straits in one single day! The security of the Indian waters leading to the Straits therefore has a direct impact on the stability of international trade and confers upon India an important role, that of the guarantor of the safety of the SLOCs or ‘ Sea Lanes of Communication’. It also means that in the case of a major conflict with a country such as China , India could effectively implement an economic embargo on its regional rival, depriving it of its precious energy shipments.

The Republic of India has used this centrality to its advantage, by reinforcing its maritime presence in the region and asserting itself as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This was clearly established last week when the Indian Naval ships on patrol off the Gulf of Aden clashed twice with Somalian pirates, obliterating a 'mother ship' with one of its Talwar class frigates during its most recent encounter.

See here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/africa/20pirate.html?_r=1&hp


THE EVOLUTIONS IN INDIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE:

It is sometimes said, generally while invoking ancient brahmanical interdictions, that Indian culture has been a largely continental one, confined to the subcontinental peninsula. This, of course, is a fallacy. The merchant fleets of the Cholas and Guptas sailed far and wide across the Indian Ocean, and the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, for example, was facilitated by waves of Indian settlers. It is true, however, that Indian strategists have only really begun to focus on maritime power since Independence. Although Kautilya devoted an entire chapter to naval power in his great classic, The Arthashastra; throughout history the great Indian Empires , whether it be the Moghols or the Mauryans, have invariably swept to power through land based, and not maritime, campaigns of conquest.

The advent of the great European sea powers, such as Portugal, Holland and Great Britain thus constituted a major rift in India’s military history. The Indian Ocean was no longer just a medium for trade or migration, but had become the primary theatre in the European hegemons’ power struggles in the region.

The British, who ruled India for over 150 years, left an indelible mark on Indian strategic thought. The precepts of Lord Curzon, the Vice Roy of India from 1899 to 1905, as well as the Victorian theories promoted by the ‘Forward School’ are still religiously read to this day.

In his essay “ The Place of India in the Empire”, published in 1909, Lord Curzon emphasized the subcontinent’s centrality in the Asian continent , and its subsequent potential for power projection in the region. Such potential will only be fulfilled, argued the Vice Roy, if India managed to maintain naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The members of the Forward School, for their part, were convinced of the necessity for India to expand its influence in the region, and to bar any of its foreign rivals (such as Tsarist Russia) from holding sway over any of the Raj’s buffer regions such as Central Asia.

These XIXth century British beliefs; in the geostrategic centrality of the Indian subcontinent and of the necessity for India to project its power in the Indian Ocean while repelling any foreign intrusions into its sphere of influence, have become almost canonical in India’s contemporary strategic community. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former BJP government thus theorized the concept of ‘ a zone of strategic interest for India’, going from ‘the horn of Africa to the waters of Australia’. This ambitious expansion of India’s strategic vision was confirmed in the 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine, which reasserted the idea of a vast zone of strategic import which extends from Africa to Australia and engulfs the Arabian Sea.

A NEW FORM OF MARITIME ASSERTIVENESS:

The Indian Navy has become a symbol of India's growing clout in the IOR or 'Indian Ocean Region' and its growing assertiveness, whether it be via military or humanitarian operations, is emblematic of Delhi's greater influence in world affairs.

The Indian Navy is increasingly involved in 'constabulary operations' , patrolling the coastlines of Indonesia and Malaysia. In accordance with the recent enlargement of its strategic vision, Indian vessels have been as far afield as Mozambique, engaging in search and destroy missions against local pirates.

In reality, India's fleet has become far more than a mere military force, and has morphed into a symbol of national prestige, as well as a major tool of military diplomacy.

In the wake of the December 2004 tsunami, for example, India’s government refused any form of foreign assistance, and rapidly deployed an armada of more than 32 ships, seven planes and 20 helicopters, which then conducted five different rescue and reconstruction missions, not only along the ravaged coastlines of India, but also in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.
Another example of Delhi's newly acquired taste for maritime power projection; its actions during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In the height of the conflict, the Indian Navy managed to successfully evacuate thousands of its citizens from the wartorn country, proving for the first time that India had the military where-with-all to protect its sizeable overseas population.

India’s navy has also become the poster boy of its military diplomacy, frequently participating in much publicized joint operations. An entire department, under the orders of a Vice-Admiral, and working in partnership with the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) has even been created with the objective of better coordinating and publicizing these joint operations.

President-elect Obama and South Asia.

( August 2007, Islamabad: Pakistani demonstrators burn a U.S. flag in protest, after remarks by Barack Obama, in which he said he might send ground forces to Pakistan's border regions to rout out terrorists )

While the election of Barack Obama has given birth to widespread enthusiasm in South Asia, as in the rest of the world, the promise of change it brings to the region has also caused a fair degree of anxiety in both India and Pakistan's foreign policy circles.
Indeed, while diplomats in both countries welcome the formidable energy and dynamism President-elect Obama will inject into the White House, they are also fearful of the upheavals it may trigger in the region.

This is particularly true in Pakistan, where relations with the United States over the past few months have been mercurial , to say the least.
As Professor Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University points out in one of his more recent Newsweek articles,"Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror has always been fitful at best".

(http://www.newsweek.com/id/159532)

Although Washington has provided the Pakistani military with more than 10 billion dollars of aid since 9/11, it has remained as Janus-faced as ever, occasionally handing over Al Qaeda operatives or launching military operations against militant strongholds in an attempt to placate its American 'ally', while its intelligence services continue to aid and abet the bulk of the Taliban, who use certain regions of Baluchistan and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as sanctuaries, in order to reconsolidate their strength and continue to wage their war of attrition against NATO forces in Afghanistan.

For a long time the Bush Administration turned a blind eye to this blatant double-dealing, making the bet, no doubt, that spasmodic cooperation was better than none at all. As American casualties in Afghanistan have soared, however (they now exceed for the first time those in Iraq), Washington's patience has waned. American field commanders have repeatedly expressed their frustration at fighting an impossible war against an armed guerilla force that melts across a porous border whenever coalition troops engage in hot pursuit.

For the past two to three years, under a 'don't tell don't ask policy' the US occasionally dispatched Predator drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, to take out Taliban leaders hiding in Waziristan or other militant infested border areas. In July 2008, however, President Bush signed secret orders authorising US Special Ops to launch raids across the Pakistani border. For the traditionally paranoid and fiercly nationalistPakistani military, the increase in unmanned air strikes was already hard enough to swallow, and the conduction of ground incursions by US Navy Seals now constitutes an unacceptable violation of the country's sovereignty.

Over the past few months, Pakistani military officials have repeatedly warned the US that any further violations of the country's territorial integrity will lead to a military response. On a few occasions, Pakistani troops have exchanged fire with their American counterparts across the Afghan border, and have even targeted American reconnaissance helicopters.

(http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/26/asia/26military.php)

Ties in-between both countries have therefore been under a lot of strain over the past few months, and the new administration will have to tread very carefully.

Pakistani officials, however, have been alarmed by some of Barack Obama's policy statements regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan during the campaign, when he repeatedly pledged to bring about a renewed focus on Afghanistan.

Indeed, throughout the campaign, Barack Obama criticized the Bush Administration time and time again for having taken its eye off the ball in the region; the real global epicentre of terrorism and instability, while concentrating vast amounts of troops, time and resources on a largely unnecessary conflict in Iraq.

He has promised to massively increase US troop presence in Afghanistan by dispatching two to three additional brigades. (a brigade is usually about 2000 troops), and to increase economic and financial aid to the population. The President-elect has also made it clear that his administration will have little tolerance for the ISI's double-crossing, and that continued American assistance to Pakistan will no longer be a foregone conclusion, but will depend on the extent of the Pakistani military and civilian authorities' cooperation in the war on terror.

More alarmingly to the Pakistanis, Barack Obama, in stark contrast to his former rival, Senator John McCain, has frequently advocated cross-border attacks into Pakistan, making the following remarks during a Presidential debate, for example;"If the United States has Al Qaeda, Bin Laden, top-level lieutenants in our sights(i.e on the Pakistani side of the border), and Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act, then we should take them out."

(Click here to see the entire transcript of the presidential debate over Washington's future Afghanistan and Pakistan policies: http://www.riazhaq.com/2008/09/mccain-and-obama-debate-pakistan-policy.html)

During the campaign, Obama was surrounded by an impressive team of more than 300 foreign policy experts. Foremost among his South Asia consultants was a certain Bruce Riedel, who is currently a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and served with the Central Intelligence Agency for 26 years. Interestingly enough, in interviews Bruce Riedel has urged the US to stop engaging in cross-border raids, arguing that they are counter-productive, and generate more anti-americanism in a "politically charged environment". So what is to be made of Obama's hawkish campaign statements? Were they genuine, or was their sole purpose to show that a Democrat could be as tough as his Republican critics when it comes to issues of national security? Was it the candidate or the future president talking? Only time will tell.

Meanwhile, the President-elect's foremost South Asia adviser has enumerated other major plans for future South Asia policy that have caused further disquietude, but this time in New Delhi and Kabul rather than in Islamabad.
In a rather fascinating interview, the same Bruce Riedel lays out his master plan for the stabilisation of Pakistan, which will, in turn, hopefully lead to greater stability in Afghanistan.

(http://www.cfr.org/publication/17191/riedel.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F4962%2Fbruce_o_riedel)

For Riedel, Pakistan's destructive policy of supporting Islamic terrorism in order to wage its proxy wars is born out of a fundamental feeling of insecurity vis à vis of its arch rival and regional nemesis, India. In his eyes, the new American administration must combine a new, firmer stance in its dealings with Pakistan, with a greater understanding of its diplomatic and security needs. In order to dispel the Pakistani leadership's chronic feeling of insecurity, the United States must help stabilise the country by helping it resolve its long lasting border disputes with both Afghanistan, on its western front, and with India, to its east, in Kashmir.

No government in Kabul, not even the Taliban, has ever recognized the Durand Line, which has separated the two countries since 1893, as legitimate. Bruce Riedel argues, with reason, that an officially demarcated border would make it easier to control, and that the future administration should apply pressure on the Afghan government to reach a settlement with Islamabad. It is unlikely, however, that the government in Kabul will take kindly to the idea.

Similarly, Riedel says that "We (the United States) ought to try to encourage a long-term settlement between India and Pakistan of the Kashmir dispute, based again on the principle that the existing line of control ought to become an international border with some special status reserved for Kashmiris. We can't expect Pakistan to behave like a normal state unless it has normal borders. And we can't expect Pakistan to behave the way we would like it to while it's obessed and fixated on its neighbour and the problem in Kashmir."

Officials in New Delhi, however, are not so keen on the idea of a renewed US interventionism in the Kashmir dispute. In 1971, India and Pakistan signed a Peace Treaty which states that the Kashmir dispute must be "resolved bilaterally" without any third power intervention. Many Indian analysts fear that American involvement could destabilise the fragile peace process and give rise to several negative consequences.

Raja Mohan, a leading Indian foreign policy expert, lists them in a recent article;

"If Obama's Kashmir thesis becomes the policy, many negative consequences might ensue. For one, an American diplomatic intervention in Kashmir will make it impossible for India to pursue the current serious back channel negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir, the first since 1962-63.

India and Pakistan have made progress in recent years, because their negotiations have taken place in a bilateral context. Third party involvement will rapidly shrink the domestic political space for India on Kashmir negotiations.

For another, the prospect that the U S might offer incentives on Kashmir is bound to encourage the Pakistan Army to harden its stance against the current peace process with India.

Finally, the sense that an Obama Administration will put Jammu & Kashmir on the front burner would give a fresh boost to militancy in Kashmir and complicate the current sensitive electoral process there. Kashmiri separatist lobbies in Washington have already embraced Obama’s remarks. "

( to read the whole article, follow this link: http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Barack-Obamas-Kashmir-thesis/380615/)

All in all, it is altogether too early to emit any accurate predictions of the exact nature of the next American president's policy for the region. In any case, his task will be a difficult one, as few conflicts are as intractable and as complex,and yet as desperately in need of a resolution as those which reign in South Asia. One can but hope that the President-elect Obama, who has proven himself thus far to be a man of both good judgement and exceptional intelligence, will be up to the task.