( August 2007, Islamabad: Pakistani demonstrators burn a U.S. flag in protest, after remarks by Barack Obama, in which he said he might send ground forces to Pakistan's border regions to rout out terrorists )
While the election of Barack Obama has given birth to widespread enthusiasm in South Asia, as in the rest of the world, the promise of change it brings to the region has also caused a fair degree of anxiety in both India and Pakistan's foreign policy circles.
Indeed, while diplomats in both countries welcome the formidable energy and dynamism President-elect Obama will inject into the White House, they are also fearful of the upheavals it may trigger in the region.
This is particularly true in Pakistan, where relations with the United States over the past few months have been mercurial , to say the least.
As Professor Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University points out in one of his more recent Newsweek articles,"Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror has always been fitful at best".
(http://www.newsweek.com/id/159532)
Although Washington has provided the Pakistani military with more than 10 billion dollars of aid since 9/11, it has remained as Janus-faced as ever, occasionally handing over Al Qaeda operatives or launching military operations against militant strongholds in an attempt to placate its American 'ally', while its intelligence services continue to aid and abet the bulk of the Taliban, who use certain regions of Baluchistan and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as sanctuaries, in order to reconsolidate their strength and continue to wage their war of attrition against NATO forces in Afghanistan.
For a long time the Bush Administration turned a blind eye to this blatant double-dealing, making the bet, no doubt, that spasmodic cooperation was better than none at all. As American casualties in Afghanistan have soared, however (they now exceed for the first time those in Iraq), Washington's patience has waned. American field commanders have repeatedly expressed their frustration at fighting an impossible war against an armed guerilla force that melts across a porous border whenever coalition troops engage in hot pursuit.
For the past two to three years, under a 'don't tell don't ask policy' the US occasionally dispatched Predator drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, to take out Taliban leaders hiding in Waziristan or other militant infested border areas. In July 2008, however, President Bush signed secret orders authorising US Special Ops to launch raids across the Pakistani border. For the traditionally paranoid and fiercly nationalistPakistani military, the increase in unmanned air strikes was already hard enough to swallow, and the conduction of ground incursions by US Navy Seals now constitutes an unacceptable violation of the country's sovereignty.
Over the past few months, Pakistani military officials have repeatedly warned the US that any further violations of the country's territorial integrity will lead to a military response. On a few occasions, Pakistani troops have exchanged fire with their American counterparts across the Afghan border, and have even targeted American reconnaissance helicopters.
(http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/26/asia/26military.php)
Ties in-between both countries have therefore been under a lot of strain over the past few months, and the new administration will have to tread very carefully.
Pakistani officials, however, have been alarmed by some of Barack Obama's policy statements regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan during the campaign, when he repeatedly pledged to bring about a renewed focus on Afghanistan.
Indeed, while diplomats in both countries welcome the formidable energy and dynamism President-elect Obama will inject into the White House, they are also fearful of the upheavals it may trigger in the region.
This is particularly true in Pakistan, where relations with the United States over the past few months have been mercurial , to say the least.
As Professor Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University points out in one of his more recent Newsweek articles,"Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror has always been fitful at best".
(http://www.newsweek.com/id/159532)
Although Washington has provided the Pakistani military with more than 10 billion dollars of aid since 9/11, it has remained as Janus-faced as ever, occasionally handing over Al Qaeda operatives or launching military operations against militant strongholds in an attempt to placate its American 'ally', while its intelligence services continue to aid and abet the bulk of the Taliban, who use certain regions of Baluchistan and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as sanctuaries, in order to reconsolidate their strength and continue to wage their war of attrition against NATO forces in Afghanistan.
For a long time the Bush Administration turned a blind eye to this blatant double-dealing, making the bet, no doubt, that spasmodic cooperation was better than none at all. As American casualties in Afghanistan have soared, however (they now exceed for the first time those in Iraq), Washington's patience has waned. American field commanders have repeatedly expressed their frustration at fighting an impossible war against an armed guerilla force that melts across a porous border whenever coalition troops engage in hot pursuit.
For the past two to three years, under a 'don't tell don't ask policy' the US occasionally dispatched Predator drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, to take out Taliban leaders hiding in Waziristan or other militant infested border areas. In July 2008, however, President Bush signed secret orders authorising US Special Ops to launch raids across the Pakistani border. For the traditionally paranoid and fiercly nationalistPakistani military, the increase in unmanned air strikes was already hard enough to swallow, and the conduction of ground incursions by US Navy Seals now constitutes an unacceptable violation of the country's sovereignty.
Over the past few months, Pakistani military officials have repeatedly warned the US that any further violations of the country's territorial integrity will lead to a military response. On a few occasions, Pakistani troops have exchanged fire with their American counterparts across the Afghan border, and have even targeted American reconnaissance helicopters.
(http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/26/asia/26military.php)
Ties in-between both countries have therefore been under a lot of strain over the past few months, and the new administration will have to tread very carefully.
Pakistani officials, however, have been alarmed by some of Barack Obama's policy statements regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan during the campaign, when he repeatedly pledged to bring about a renewed focus on Afghanistan.
Indeed, throughout the campaign, Barack Obama criticized the Bush Administration time and time again for having taken its eye off the ball in the region; the real global epicentre of terrorism and instability, while concentrating vast amounts of troops, time and resources on a largely unnecessary conflict in Iraq.
He has promised to massively increase US troop presence in Afghanistan by dispatching two to three additional brigades. (a brigade is usually about 2000 troops), and to increase economic and financial aid to the population. The President-elect has also made it clear that his administration will have little tolerance for the ISI's double-crossing, and that continued American assistance to Pakistan will no longer be a foregone conclusion, but will depend on the extent of the Pakistani military and civilian authorities' cooperation in the war on terror.
More alarmingly to the Pakistanis, Barack Obama, in stark contrast to his former rival, Senator John McCain, has frequently advocated cross-border attacks into Pakistan, making the following remarks during a Presidential debate, for example;"If the United States has Al Qaeda, Bin Laden, top-level lieutenants in our sights(i.e on the Pakistani side of the border), and Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act, then we should take them out."
(Click here to see the entire transcript of the presidential debate over Washington's future Afghanistan and Pakistan policies: http://www.riazhaq.com/2008/09/mccain-and-obama-debate-pakistan-policy.html)
During the campaign, Obama was surrounded by an impressive team of more than 300 foreign policy experts. Foremost among his South Asia consultants was a certain Bruce Riedel, who is currently a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and served with the Central Intelligence Agency for 26 years. Interestingly enough, in interviews Bruce Riedel has urged the US to stop engaging in cross-border raids, arguing that they are counter-productive, and generate more anti-americanism in a "politically charged environment". So what is to be made of Obama's hawkish campaign statements? Were they genuine, or was their sole purpose to show that a Democrat could be as tough as his Republican critics when it comes to issues of national security? Was it the candidate or the future president talking? Only time will tell.
Meanwhile, the President-elect's foremost South Asia adviser has enumerated other major plans for future South Asia policy that have caused further disquietude, but this time in New Delhi and Kabul rather than in Islamabad.
In a rather fascinating interview, the same Bruce Riedel lays out his master plan for the stabilisation of Pakistan, which will, in turn, hopefully lead to greater stability in Afghanistan.
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/17191/riedel.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F4962%2Fbruce_o_riedel)
For Riedel, Pakistan's destructive policy of supporting Islamic terrorism in order to wage its proxy wars is born out of a fundamental feeling of insecurity vis à vis of its arch rival and regional nemesis, India. In his eyes, the new American administration must combine a new, firmer stance in its dealings with Pakistan, with a greater understanding of its diplomatic and security needs. In order to dispel the Pakistani leadership's chronic feeling of insecurity, the United States must help stabilise the country by helping it resolve its long lasting border disputes with both Afghanistan, on its western front, and with India, to its east, in Kashmir.
No government in Kabul, not even the Taliban, has ever recognized the Durand Line, which has separated the two countries since 1893, as legitimate. Bruce Riedel argues, with reason, that an officially demarcated border would make it easier to control, and that the future administration should apply pressure on the Afghan government to reach a settlement with Islamabad. It is unlikely, however, that the government in Kabul will take kindly to the idea.
Similarly, Riedel says that "We (the United States) ought to try to encourage a long-term settlement between India and Pakistan of the Kashmir dispute, based again on the principle that the existing line of control ought to become an international border with some special status reserved for Kashmiris. We can't expect Pakistan to behave like a normal state unless it has normal borders. And we can't expect Pakistan to behave the way we would like it to while it's obessed and fixated on its neighbour and the problem in Kashmir."
Officials in New Delhi, however, are not so keen on the idea of a renewed US interventionism in the Kashmir dispute. In 1971, India and Pakistan signed a Peace Treaty which states that the Kashmir dispute must be "resolved bilaterally" without any third power intervention. Many Indian analysts fear that American involvement could destabilise the fragile peace process and give rise to several negative consequences.
Raja Mohan, a leading Indian foreign policy expert, lists them in a recent article;
"If Obama's Kashmir thesis becomes the policy, many negative consequences might ensue. For one, an American diplomatic intervention in Kashmir will make it impossible for India to pursue the current serious back channel negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir, the first since 1962-63.
India and Pakistan have made progress in recent years, because their negotiations have taken place in a bilateral context. Third party involvement will rapidly shrink the domestic political space for India on Kashmir negotiations.
For another, the prospect that the U S might offer incentives on Kashmir is bound to encourage the Pakistan Army to harden its stance against the current peace process with India.
( to read the whole article, follow this link: http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Barack-Obamas-Kashmir-thesis/380615/)
All in all, it is altogether too early to emit any accurate predictions of the exact nature of the next American president's policy for the region. In any case, his task will be a difficult one, as few conflicts are as intractable and as complex,and yet as desperately in need of a resolution as those which reign in South Asia. One can but hope that the President-elect Obama, who has proven himself thus far to be a man of both good judgement and exceptional intelligence, will be up to the task.
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