Indian Talwar-class frigate escorts a merchant vessel to safety after having destroyed a pirate 'mother ship'.
INDIA’S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:
Emerging India’s aspirations have been accompanied by a realisation of the numerous advantages procured from its strategic location in the heart of the Indian Ocean. Positioned in-between the Gulf of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, the Indian Ocean has become one of the major centres of maritime commerce, with on average over 200 merchant vessels transporting more than 10 million barrels of oil transiting through the Malacca Straits in one single day! The security of the Indian waters leading to the Straits therefore has a direct impact on the stability of international trade and confers upon India an important role, that of the guarantor of the safety of the SLOCs or ‘ Sea Lanes of Communication’. It also means that in the case of a major conflict with a country such as China , India could effectively implement an economic embargo on its regional rival, depriving it of its precious energy shipments.
The Republic of India has used this centrality to its advantage, by reinforcing its maritime presence in the region and asserting itself as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This was clearly established last week when the Indian Naval ships on patrol off the Gulf of Aden clashed twice with Somalian pirates, obliterating a 'mother ship' with one of its Talwar class frigates during its most recent encounter.
See here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/africa/20pirate.html?_r=1&hp
THE EVOLUTIONS IN INDIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE:
It is sometimes said, generally while invoking ancient brahmanical interdictions, that Indian culture has been a largely continental one, confined to the subcontinental peninsula. This, of course, is a fallacy. The merchant fleets of the Cholas and Guptas sailed far and wide across the Indian Ocean, and the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, for example, was facilitated by waves of Indian settlers. It is true, however, that Indian strategists have only really begun to focus on maritime power since Independence. Although Kautilya devoted an entire chapter to naval power in his great classic, The Arthashastra; throughout history the great Indian Empires , whether it be the Moghols or the Mauryans, have invariably swept to power through land based, and not maritime, campaigns of conquest.
The advent of the great European sea powers, such as Portugal, Holland and Great Britain thus constituted a major rift in India’s military history. The Indian Ocean was no longer just a medium for trade or migration, but had become the primary theatre in the European hegemons’ power struggles in the region.
The British, who ruled India for over 150 years, left an indelible mark on Indian strategic thought. The precepts of Lord Curzon, the Vice Roy of India from 1899 to 1905, as well as the Victorian theories promoted by the ‘Forward School’ are still religiously read to this day.
In his essay “ The Place of India in the Empire”, published in 1909, Lord Curzon emphasized the subcontinent’s centrality in the Asian continent , and its subsequent potential for power projection in the region. Such potential will only be fulfilled, argued the Vice Roy, if India managed to maintain naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The members of the Forward School, for their part, were convinced of the necessity for India to expand its influence in the region, and to bar any of its foreign rivals (such as Tsarist Russia) from holding sway over any of the Raj’s buffer regions such as Central Asia.
These XIXth century British beliefs; in the geostrategic centrality of the Indian subcontinent and of the necessity for India to project its power in the Indian Ocean while repelling any foreign intrusions into its sphere of influence, have become almost canonical in India’s contemporary strategic community. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former BJP government thus theorized the concept of ‘ a zone of strategic interest for India’, going from ‘the horn of Africa to the waters of Australia’. This ambitious expansion of India’s strategic vision was confirmed in the 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine, which reasserted the idea of a vast zone of strategic import which extends from Africa to Australia and engulfs the Arabian Sea.
A NEW FORM OF MARITIME ASSERTIVENESS:
The Indian Navy has become a symbol of India's growing clout in the IOR or 'Indian Ocean Region' and its growing assertiveness, whether it be via military or humanitarian operations, is emblematic of Delhi's greater influence in world affairs.
The Indian Navy is increasingly involved in 'constabulary operations' , patrolling the coastlines of Indonesia and Malaysia Mozambique
In reality, India's fleet has become far more than a mere military force, and has morphed into a symbol of national prestige, as well as a major tool of military diplomacy.
In the wake of the December 2004 tsunami, for example, India’s government refused any form of foreign assistance, and rapidly deployed an armada of more than 32 ships, seven planes and 20 helicopters, which then conducted five different rescue and reconstruction missions, not only along the ravaged coastlines of India, but also in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.
Another example of Delhi's newly acquired taste for maritime power projection; its actions during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In the height of the conflict, the Indian Navy managed to successfully evacuate thousands of its citizens from the wartorn country, proving for the first time that India had the military where-with-all to protect its sizeable overseas population.
India
Emerging India’s aspirations have been accompanied by a realisation of the numerous advantages procured from its strategic location in the heart of the Indian Ocean. Positioned in-between the Gulf of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, the Indian Ocean has become one of the major centres of maritime commerce, with on average over 200 merchant vessels transporting more than 10 million barrels of oil transiting through the Malacca Straits in one single day! The security of the Indian waters leading to the Straits therefore has a direct impact on the stability of international trade and confers upon India an important role, that of the guarantor of the safety of the SLOCs or ‘ Sea Lanes of Communication’. It also means that in the case of a major conflict with a country such as China , India could effectively implement an economic embargo on its regional rival, depriving it of its precious energy shipments.
The Republic of India has used this centrality to its advantage, by reinforcing its maritime presence in the region and asserting itself as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This was clearly established last week when the Indian Naval ships on patrol off the Gulf of Aden clashed twice with Somalian pirates, obliterating a 'mother ship' with one of its Talwar class frigates during its most recent encounter.
See here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/africa/20pirate.html?_r=1&hp
THE EVOLUTIONS IN INDIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE:
It is sometimes said, generally while invoking ancient brahmanical interdictions, that Indian culture has been a largely continental one, confined to the subcontinental peninsula. This, of course, is a fallacy. The merchant fleets of the Cholas and Guptas sailed far and wide across the Indian Ocean, and the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, for example, was facilitated by waves of Indian settlers. It is true, however, that Indian strategists have only really begun to focus on maritime power since Independence. Although Kautilya devoted an entire chapter to naval power in his great classic, The Arthashastra; throughout history the great Indian Empires , whether it be the Moghols or the Mauryans, have invariably swept to power through land based, and not maritime, campaigns of conquest.
The advent of the great European sea powers, such as Portugal, Holland and Great Britain thus constituted a major rift in India’s military history. The Indian Ocean was no longer just a medium for trade or migration, but had become the primary theatre in the European hegemons’ power struggles in the region.
The British, who ruled India for over 150 years, left an indelible mark on Indian strategic thought. The precepts of Lord Curzon, the Vice Roy of India from 1899 to 1905, as well as the Victorian theories promoted by the ‘Forward School’ are still religiously read to this day.
In his essay “ The Place of India in the Empire”, published in 1909, Lord Curzon emphasized the subcontinent’s centrality in the Asian continent , and its subsequent potential for power projection in the region. Such potential will only be fulfilled, argued the Vice Roy, if India managed to maintain naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The members of the Forward School, for their part, were convinced of the necessity for India to expand its influence in the region, and to bar any of its foreign rivals (such as Tsarist Russia) from holding sway over any of the Raj’s buffer regions such as Central Asia.
These XIXth century British beliefs; in the geostrategic centrality of the Indian subcontinent and of the necessity for India to project its power in the Indian Ocean while repelling any foreign intrusions into its sphere of influence, have become almost canonical in India’s contemporary strategic community. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former BJP government thus theorized the concept of ‘ a zone of strategic interest for India’, going from ‘the horn of Africa to the waters of Australia’. This ambitious expansion of India’s strategic vision was confirmed in the 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine, which reasserted the idea of a vast zone of strategic import which extends from Africa to Australia and engulfs the Arabian Sea.
A NEW FORM OF MARITIME ASSERTIVENESS:
The Indian Navy has become a symbol of India's growing clout in the IOR or 'Indian Ocean Region' and its growing assertiveness, whether it be via military or humanitarian operations, is emblematic of Delhi's greater influence in world affairs.
In reality, India's fleet has become far more than a mere military force, and has morphed into a symbol of national prestige, as well as a major tool of military diplomacy.
In the wake of the December 2004 tsunami, for example, India’s government refused any form of foreign assistance, and rapidly deployed an armada of more than 32 ships, seven planes and 20 helicopters, which then conducted five different rescue and reconstruction missions, not only along the ravaged coastlines of India, but also in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.
Another example of Delhi's newly acquired taste for maritime power projection; its actions during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In the height of the conflict, the Indian Navy managed to successfully evacuate thousands of its citizens from the wartorn country, proving for the first time that India had the military where-with-all to protect its sizeable overseas population.
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