The Indo-Pakistani silent war in Afghanistan.

On the 7th of July, a suicide bomber rammed a car crammed with explosives into the gates of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing 41 people, and injuring close to 150.
Amongst the victims of the blast were the Indian defence attaché, Brigadier RD Mehta, and a senior Indian External Affairs official, Counsellor V Rao.
Since the tragedy, investigations by both Indian and American intelligence agencies have traced the blasts back to Pakistan's notorious ISI, or Inter-services Intelligence Agency. This latest attack only seemed to compound the idea that Indo-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan has been gradually escalating in its intensity over the past few years.
Their competition is hardly a new phenomenon, as both countries have had conflicting strategic agendas in the region for decades.

Pakistani military strategists have traditionally viewed the establishment of strategic ties with Afghanistan as a way of obtaining 'strategic depth' in the event of an all-out war with India.The Taliban were aided and abetted by Pashtun field officers of the ISI in their rise to prominence over other warring factions in the 90s. Meanwhile, India attempted to dilute Pakistani influence in the region by bankrolling the Northern Alliance, led at the time by the charismatic Tadjik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.

While the fall of the Taliban in 2001 was a catastrophe in the eyes of many in the Pakistani intelligence community, it was perceived as a wonderful window of opportunity for their Indian counterparts to regain Delhi's lost footing in the region.
And indeed, immediately after the fall of the Taliban, India moved with lightning speed to reassert its influence in the region. Four consulates have been opened, in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad and Kandahar, and Afghanistan has become India's second biggest foreign aid commitment, with over 750 million dollars spent in aid over the past few years.

New Delhi has poured funds into education, food aid, and health services. The Power Grid Corporation of India is setting up power lines over the Hindu Kush, and Indian firms are active all over the country, whether it be in the building of more than 200km of roads, the erecting of bridges or the digging of wells. Several Indian NGOs are also engaged in humanitarian work throughout the country. Bollywood has become wildly popular in Afghan households, despite the strenuous efforts of some the more conservative mullahs to get the 'licentious Indian films' banned.
Bilateral trade has grown rapidly, and now accounts for more $225m.

This spurt of economic activity is not only part of an elaborate 'hearts and minds' campaign designed to wean the fragile country from Islamabad's influence. For both India and Pakistan, Afghanistan is a gateway to Central Asian oil and natural gas. Delhi, however, is constrained in its ambitions to expand trade with Kabul, as Pakistan continues to block the transit of Indian goods through its territory. Currently, most of Afghanistan's trade has to pass through the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi. In order to counter Islamabad's stranglehold on Afghan trade, Delhi has been erecting a port in Chabahar in Iran which would enable it to transport Indian goods to Afghanistan while completely bypassing Pakistan.


The latter, however, views the construction of Chabahar as India's latest attempt to encircle Pakistan in the region after the recent establishment of the Indian Air Force's base in Farkho; Tadjikistan, which is said to house MI-17 helicopter gunships. While India has not deployed troops as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, it has nevertheless expanded its military presence in the country, taking the decision in 2006 to send several hundred paramilitary troops, allegedly to protect Indian workers and contractors.

All this has resulted in Pakistan becoming increasingly jittery over what it perceives to be tantamount to an Indian takeover of its backyard. Over the past few years, Indian workers have been repeatedly abducted, and sometimes murdered; and grenades have been lobbed at the Indian consulates in Herat and Jalalabad. Although each time the Taliban were accused of the misdeeds, several members of the Indian security establishment harbour the suspicion that Adam Khan, the shadowy Kabul station head of the ISI, may be involved in the attacks.

On the other side, Pakistani officials have repeatedly accused Indian RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) agents of establishing training camps in southern Afghanistan and the Panjshir Valley for the rebels of the Baloch Liberation Army, who are waging a separatist insurgency in Pakistan's troubled Baluchistan province. The Indian consulates have also frequently been charged with circulating counterfeit Pakistani currency.
(See here the interview of Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain in May 2006: http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0116.htm)

One could hope that with the advent of a more democratic form of government in Pakistan, tensions in the region might somewhat subside, and that Afghanistan would no longer be the centrepiece in the Indo-Pakistani 'great game' in Central Asia. Unfortunately, it is my opinion that Pakistan's growing internal instability, when combined with the resurgence of the Taliban in the Pashtun dominated southern regions , leads to an adverse conclusion.


To read more about the geopolitical ramifications of the overthrow of the Taliban regime, I strongly recommend the latest book by Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, "Descent into Chaos, the United States, and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia".
It's a very insightful, informative, and often rather gripping study of the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan.
http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Building-Afghanistan/dp/0670019704/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1225302861&sr=8-1

Interview of Dr Jabin Jacob.

Dr Jabin Jacob is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (www.ipcs.org), in Delhi. Last month, he was kind enough to answer a few of my questions on the border issue, India's handling of the Tibet issue before the Olympics, as well as on India's growing influence in Central Asia.

After the 13th round of talks held earlier this month, the border talks don't seem to be getting any closer to a final resolution. Do you think that this means that for the time being both sides favour the status quo?

China has had border disputes with nearly all of its neighbours over the years (Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Soviet Union). Its attitude towards solving these disputes has varied a great deal from country to country. In some cases, border tensions have led to armed conflict, such as against India in 1962, Vietnam in 1979, or with the Soviet Union in 1969.
China only really shows a flexible attitude towards resolving border disputes when it feels that it is in a position of strength and can get the better half of the deal. For example, the PRC took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s to resolve a lot of its territorial disputes in Central Asia .
China has solved its territorial dispute with Vietnam and more or less so with Myanmar.
When it comes to China's attitude in its dealings with India, it has changed over the years. Whereas the PRC used to want to solve the issue immediately, there has now been a change in position, Chinese officials saying that the issue is complicated and will be solved by the next generation.

Is it the mindset that prevails on the Indian side as well?

I believe so, yes. Talks and confidence building measures have a primary objective: to avoid border tensions flaring up and dragging both countries into a an armed conflict. In reality, the Indian government is content to leave this issue on the backburner while it concentrates on less contentious aspects of the Sino-Indian relationship such as trade. Both sides have been enhancing the military infrastructure along the border, although China definitely has the upper hand in this domain via its extensive militarization of Tibet.
All in all, there is no great hurry to settle the deal. If the Chinese can wait, the Indians think, so can we. It'll take a lot of time to settle, and in my view, will only be possible with a new generation that isn't marked by the trauma of 1962.

Tibet has always been a very delicate issue. Do you think that India handled it well in the run-up to the Olympics or was its attitude too submissive?

It's true that when the torch bearers came to India, the security was absolutely crazy. Flights were delayed, thousands of policemen were deployed, and the Chinese embassy had been surrounded by barbed wire for several months. You must understand, the Chinese were very angry over the recent demonstrations in London, Paris and San Francisco, and India wanted to make sure that everything ran smoothly, in a gesture of good will. Beijing was very grateful that no incidents took place.

Yes but weren't some of the security measures excessive?

They were draconian yes, but India couldn't allow Tibetan demonstrators to scale the walls of the Chinese embassy. All the Tibetan demonstrators that were arrested were subsequently released by the police. What's more, and this was not much reported, but India didn't clamp down on all Tibetan protests, far from it. There was a 'Tibet Olympics March' in New Delhi, in which more than 6000 people participated.
There is still a great deal of sympathy for the Tibetan cause in India, the government realises however what a sensitive issue it is for the Chinese, and does not want it to become a source of tension in the bilateral relationship.

Several reports indicate that there is a new generation of Tibetan activists in India, that are much more radical than their older predecessors and that believe that violence may be a just means of action. Doesn't the Indian government worry that this fringe of the Tibetan community might cause them a great deal of problems in their future dealings with China, especially when the Dalai Lama passes away?

Yes, I have also heard of this new fringe movement. But for the time being, that's what it is: just a fringe movement. As long as they don't start using Indian territory to stage attacks on Chinese soil they shouldn't really cause a major shift in the relationship.


The other day I was reading an article on India's growing presence in Central Asia, either via its rising cultural influence (Bollywood is very popular in the region) or through its expanding ties with countries such as Tajikistan, where it has built an air base not far from the capital, Dushanbe, and stationed helicopters. India, however is still only an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whereas China is one of the founding members. How far is India behind China when it comes to exerting influence in the region?

Central Asia is one of the most strategically salient regions in today's world. India, China,Pakistan, Iran Russia and the United States are all vying for influence in the area. Unfortunately India is still very far behind China. As you mentioned, India is not part of the SCO and only really has close ties with Tadjikistan, one of the smallest and poorest countries in the region, whereas Beijing shares a great proximity with Ouzbekistan, the richest and most populous state.

Why do you think India has particularly close ties with Tadjikistan? Is it, perhaps, due to its traditionally close ties to the Tadjik ethnic minority in Afghanistan?

Yes, I think that that is definitely a factor. India discreetly supported Colonel Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance, and almost a mythical figure amongst Tadjiks in the region, whether it be in Tadjikistan or Afghanistan. Both Delhi and Dushanbe backed his struggle against the Taliban, who were assisted in their endeavours by ISI, Pakistan's notorious intelligence agency. This is all part of a complex regional security environment.
India's growing ties with Tadjikistan are a good thing, but India needs to fish in deeper water s and develop a proper 'Look West' policy in the region.

My thanks to Jabin for granting me this interview. Next week, I will be moving onto a new topic, discussing the Indian Navy's expansion with one of its Commanders.

Interview of Dr Srikanth Kondapalli.

(Professor Srikanth Kondapalli is Chairman of the Centre for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (www.jnu.ac.in). I was in India last month doing some field work, and took the opportunity to sit down with him in his office to discuss, amongst other things, China's role at the NSG and recent reports in the Indian media of a rise in Chinese incursions across the LAC)

China's role at the NSG has been creating quite a stir in the press. Although the PRC ultimately voted in India's favour, many Indian commentators declared that they were shocked with China's 'duplicitous' behaviour. The Indian National Security Adviser also expressed his 'disappointment'. Why do you think this is? What exactly went down in Vienna?

It is of course difficult to know exactly what happened, the precise contents of the discussions are still confidential. It would appear however that China played an obstructionist role at the meet, choosing to manifest its displeasure only at the 11th hour, thus threatening to delay the whole procedure. The behaviour of the Chinese has been described as 'duplicitous' because before the 11th hour, they had given no real indication, it would seem, of their opposition to the deal.

Why then did the Chinese choose to express their disapproval at such a late hour?

China was not at the forefront of criticisms during the negotiations. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria were the primary critics, arguing that India should join the NPT. Once External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee made the promise that India would not be allowed to conduct any more tests while remaining under the umbrella of the deal, tensions were diffused and the opposition died down. That was when the Chinese chose to manifest their displeasure.

In reality, though, the PRC has never been enthusiastic about the deal.

Indeed, it is obvious that for the Chinese, and especially for the hardliners in the establishment, the Indian Nuclear Deal is viewed as being adverse to their national interests.

It is my inclination that the PRC hoped that the deal would never get through the Lok Sabha (the Indian Parliament) and that the combined opposition of the Communists and the BJP would preemptively 'kill' the deal, making the task that much easier for them.

The UPA government managed to get the vote of confidence however, and that made things more complex. They then tried to jump onto the contesting countries' bandwagon during the NSG conference at Vienna, and that didn't work either. Some Indian newspapers, such as The Hindu, have reported that the UN delegates as well as those of the smaller opposing countries were discreetly approached by Chinese delegates.

What were China's arguments for obstructing the deal?

The Chinese now claim that they had no intention of obstructing the deal and that their role was a constructive one, as they were just seeking to ensure that the deal did not violate international law regarding civil nuclear technology and nuclear proliferation. The IAEA had already pointed out, however, that India has a remarkably clean proliferation record, especially when compared to countries such as Pakistan or even China. It also seems that the Chinese delegation were hoping, in vain, that some sort of a similar deal would be cut, as a consolation prize, for their Pakistani protégé.

What was India's immediate reaction when learning of China's opposition?

The Indian side was clearly unprepared for the Chinese 11th hour. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeatedly tried to call both Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister. Each time he was told that they were unavailable.

This, in my opinion, is what angered Indian officials the most. It clearly shows that the hotline isn't working, that there is still a huge trust deficit in-between both powers.

Of course, afterwards the Chinese claimed that Hu Jintao hadn't been able to respond because he was in Dushanbe, and Premier Wen Jiabao had been visiting earthquake relief sites. Nevertheless, it shows that there is a major problem.

What finally made the Chinese back down?

American intervention. President Bush personally called his Chinese counterpart and eyewitness accounts at Vienna report that at one stage, all the high-ranking Chinese officials withdrew, to only leave the lower members of the delegation. The high level Chinese delegates were engaged in talks with the Americans for approximately 2 to 3 hours. Once these discussions had ended, the Chinese suddenly informed the Indian side that there were no more objections.

What do you think the United States did or promised in order to assuage Chinese anxiety?

I doubt that we'll ever really know what went on behind those closed doors. It is my inclination, however that the Americans invoked the 2004 1,2,3 step deal with the PRC. As part of that deal, the United States guaranteed China membership in the NSG, as long as an American company, Westinghouse, got to construct nuclear plants in China in a multi-billion dollar deal.

China duly got membership in the NSG in December 2004, and the American delegation were probably reminding the Chinese that they still 'owe' the United States for this 'favour'.

Washington most probably also endeavoured to mollify Beijing's concerns of an Indo-American nexus forming itself against China.

Moving onto another issue: border incursions. Is it true that Chinese incursions have been multiplying over the past few months? Why do you think this is?

I think that these reports have been somewhat exaggerated by a sometimes sensationalistic press. I'm not denying that there are incursions: there are about 150 to 200 every year, but on both sides: Chinese and Indian.

Are these voluntary incursions?

Some are, some aren't.

On the Indian side, there are approximately 300 to 400 different patrols, which is not that much, considering the extent of the border. This is incredibly harsh terrain, most areas are from 3000 to 5000 metres above sea level, with temperatures sometimes ranging from -30 to -40 degrees centigrade. The terrain is mountainous, largely undefined and the patrols aren't equipped with GPS or anything like that. Often they don't really know where they are, and occasionally stumble into Chinese territory. The same happens on the Chinese side. These are involuntary incursions. They are of course very different from intentional military incursions, both in their motivations and potentially dangerous consequences.

The latter still happen from time to time, as both sides 'probe' their neighbour's territory on a regular basis,and engage in covert reconnaissance missions. Tensions have been largely de-escalated,however, thanks to the multiple CBMs signed over the last years. Periodically though dangerous situations will arise. During the Kargil War, for example, China furtively tried to take over the Daulat beg airbase in Ladakh (abandoned at the time) and in December 2000 a Daulat beg Oldi border patrol came eyeball-to-eyeball with Chinese soldiers. The situation was extremely volatile and could easily have turned into a bloody skirmish. The Indian Ministry of Defense gave de-escalation orders, and luckily there was no live firing. If anyone had taken the initiative in that particular situation, it could have degenerated very rapidly.

Have there been recent examples of such situations degenerating?

Yes, for example during the June 2003 visit of Vajpayee to China(the Indian BJP government's prime minister at the time) an Indian patrol that had strayed into the Chinese side was set upon by the Chinese army at Asafi La. It's hard to understand why the CBMs appear to work in some cases and not in others. The main concern is to prevent such transgressions, whether intentional or unintentional, from degenerating into what strategists call an LCO, a 'low conventional warfare'.

My thanks to Srikanth for graciously giving up some of his time.

If anyone is interested to find out more about the border issue, contact me, I will send you more information. In the meanwhile, here is a link to a transcript of a very interesting seminar on the subject, and in which Dr Kondapalli took part.

http://www.ipcs.org/India_seminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2184

'Duplicity' and a stalemate in the border talks.

China at the NSG: A 'duplicity' which was to be expected.

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal has been receiving a lot of attention in the press recently. First of all, what exactly does this deal consist of?

As I mentioned in my previous entry, India and the United States have been enjoying a new proximity over the past few years.In 2004, the Bush Administration declared India “a major non-NATO ally”; and in June 2005 both countries signed a framework defence agreement , announcing their intentions to follow a 10 year programme of increased defence cooperation. The recently confirmed Indo-US nuclear deal is the other main indicator of the warmth of Indo-US ties. Until recently, the ROI had been excluded from civilian nuclear trade by the United States and other states because it refuses to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. America is making a major departure from this tradition and making an exception to all the existing regulations by offering to equip India with civilian nuclear fuel and technology, provided that it agrees to certain safeguards on its civilian nuclear programme and does not use the fuel for military purposes. To benefit from this deal, India had to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency which particular safeguards will be applied to its civilian nuclear facilities and obtain a special exemption from the 45 nation NSG.

After a hairline victory in the Indian parliament and many hours of debate at the NSG, India finally entered the nuclear mainstream in September 2008. India now reaps all the advantages enjoyed by the five ‘official’ nuclear powers (France, Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United States) despite not having signed the NPT or Test-Ban Treaty. The Indo-US nuclear agreement is definitely a landmark agreement in the history of nuclear diplomacy; rarely has a country been offered so much for so little in return. Not only is this a major gain for India in the field of nuclear energy and technology, it also provides it with a significant symbolic edge over its troublesome nuclear-armed neighbour Pakistan, which has retained its nuclear pariah status.

China, of course, has been watching the Indo-US rapprochement with a sizeable dose of misgivings, and before the debate at the NSG, Indian diplomats scuttled to and forth from Beijing, ensuring that the PRC would not play an obstructionist role at the meet. Much of what happened during the negotiations remains clouded in confidentiality, and is based on hearsay and off the record declarations by Indian negotiators. It would seem however that the Chinese delegation, through the threat of procedural delays and the discreet lobbying of the countries initially not sympathetic to the deal (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, the Netherlands and Ireland) made a last-ditch attempt to scupper, or at least stall the deal. The Chinese delegation also apparently made strenuous efforts to obtain some sort of a similar deal for their Pakistani allies. This only occurred during the last few hours, and apparently took India by surprise. After intense pressure was applied on the Chinese by the Bush Administration, the deal finally went through.In the days following the discussions the Indian press was full of accusations of Chinese 'duplicity'.

The Indian National Security Adviser MK Narayanan even went so far as to express his 'disappointment' over China's attitude (see video at 05:33), unusually strong vocabulary for an Indian official, who tend to show more timidity than bravado in their dealings with the PRC.

http://broadband.indiatimes.com/videoshow/3453267.cms

These accusations of duplicity are based on the belief that the Chinese promised that they would not block the deal.

In reality, however, China's attitude towards the deal has been ambiguous from the get-go. Realising that formally opposing the deal would constitute a 'casus belli', the Chinese government has been expressing its reservations via its official media. The People’s Daily, for example, has regularly accused America of breaking the rules and blatantly following double standards, and issued dire warnings on the future consequences of setting such a precedent. Claiming that the Indo-US nuclear deal would lead to a dangerous ‘domino effect’, China has also frequently threatened the US with a response in kind by further enhancing their nuclear cooperation with countries such as Pakistan. These were indirect signs of China's hostility to the deal. Doctor Jabin Jacob, a China specialist at IPCS, a think tank in New Delhi, has written a thoughtful article analysing the consequences of the Chinese attitude at the NSG. (I interviewed him last month, the transcript will be posted over the weekend)

http://www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2688&issue=1009&status=article&keyArticle=1009&mod=b

As he points out, the "key event is not the Chinese 'betrayal' but of remembering what was achieved. The point remains that the Chinese did not scuttle the deal-something that was within their power to do." Interestingly, he attributes the reversals in China's attitude during the debates at Vienna in part to "the pulls and pressures within the Chinese establishment".Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party is hardly a monolithic structure and has its hawks as well as its doves. The Chinese Armed Forces, Doctor Jacob reminds us, wield a considerable influence over Chinese diplomacy. The attempt to stall the deal could have been a form of concession to the hawks in China's strategic community; after all the PRC couldn't have been seen to completely bend over in the face of American and Indian demands.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/NSG_Cong_agrees_to_forgive_China/articleshow/3468941.cms , India's official attitude now seems to be to 'forgive and forget' but the bad memory of those tension ridden last hours will surely have a negative impact on its future perception of China.

In the next entries, which will consist of interview transcripts, the whole NSG melodrama will be discussed in greater depth.

Border Talks end in Stalemate.

After each round of border talks, Chinese and Indian diplomats always seem to try to outdo each other when it comes to falsely optimistic claims of progress.

http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/09/25/stories/2008092559110100.htm

The truth however is less inspiring. Indeed, discussions have been taking place on a regular basis for years, and little, if anything, has been achieved. From the 17th to the 19th of September, the Indian and Chinese delegations met for their 13th round of talks on the border dispute, once again agreeing to continue the dialogue, and once again neither reporting any sign of tangible progress nor providing any indication that both sides have narrowed their differences. In an interesting report entitled "India China border: A Reality Check", retired General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff and now associated with the Observer Research Foundation, in New Delhi, calls for greater pragmatism when analysing the border issue.

http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=14724&mmacmaid=14725

He reminds us that there is still "no accepted delineation or even agreed perception of the LAC", and that the Chinese recognition of Sikkim remains tacit and not official. Although the comfort-level in Sino-Indian relations has grown, the constant Chinese upgrading of its military infrastructure along the border, and the "negligible progress" in the border dispute indicate the prevalence of abiding tensions in the relationship. Such a state of affairs should incite Indian External Affairs officials to less haste and greater caution in their declarations.

India and China: A (very brief) backgrounder.

Main issues of contention:

The border issue:

Both countries share the longest disputed frontier in the world (more than 2100 miles), which stretches from Northern Kashmir, to the Northeastern Province of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1962, rising tensions on both sides of the border led to a lightning Chinese assault, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for India, and the Chinese occupation of 16,500 square miles of territory previously owned by its transhimalayan neighbour. India also accuses Pakistan of having illegally ceded a slice of disputed Kashmiri territory, in Aksai Chin, to the PRC in 1963. China, for its part, after having more or less relinquished its claim over Sikkim, periodically declares that the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to the historical 'Greater Tibet', and therefore falls under its jurisdiction.

China's 'all-weather' friendship with Pakistan:

China has been Pakistan's staunchest ally over the years, bolstering its conventional military capabilites, as well as actively assisting it in the establishment of its nuclear weapons programme from the late 80s onwards, building all three of Pakistan's first three nuclear power plants and providing it with ready to launch M-9, M-11 and Dong Feng 21 ballistic missiles.

India's growing proximity to the US:

During the Cold War, New Delhi's relations with Washington were frequently marked by a fair degree of acrimony, largely due to the evolving strategic environment. To summarise at the risk of simplifying an incredibly complex period of diplomatic history, the United States viewed India as little more than the Soviet Union's regional surrogate, and New Delhi strongly disapproved of Washington's proximity to its CENTO ally, Pakistan, and of its growing ties with the PRC after Kissinger's furtive visit to Beijing in 1971.

Times have changed, however, since the end of the Cold War, and India’s emergence as major regional power has given it a lot more strategic significance than before. India’s blue-water navy, nuclear capabilities, powerful armed forces, high rate of economic growth and huge economic potential are all factors that make India loom a lot larger on America’s radar screen. India is also a vibrant and multiethnic parliamentary democracy and, as such, is far more attractive to the current American administration than other forms of authoritarian regimes in Asia. Containing China is just one aspect of the budding strategic partnership in-between the world’s largest and oldest democracy. Indeed, the US views India as a vital partner in the upholding of maritime security in vitally important sea lanes, and as an ally in the war on terror with a sizeable degree of experience in counterterrorism and often convergent threat perceptions, both being the target of Islamist terrorist cells.

The 'String of Pearls':

Pentagon analysts have famously dubbed China’s ‘string of pearls strategy’, its plan to acquire several strategically placed ports of call, naval bases and listening posts in friendly countries in order to protect the billions of dollars worth of trade that pass through strategically salient sea lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits. For the Chinese military, who live in fear that in the event of a major conflict with the US, a naval blockade would suffice to cut off nearly all of China’s energy supplies overnight; the Chinese Navy’s deployment in areas such as the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea is a question of future survival and as such, entirely legitimate in nature. To the Indian strategic community, however, the 'string of pearls' is a 'constricting noose', threatening to contain and encircle India in its own backyard. I will bring this all up again, and in far greater detail when I do some blog entries on the Navy sometime later on in the month.

Signs of normalisation:

Surging trade:

Bilateral trade has been surging forward at a breakneck speed over the past few years, attaining 29 billion USD in the first six few months of 2008, which represents an increase of more than 69% over the figures at the same period last year. China has now overtaken the US to become India's number one trading partner.

Mutual Concessions:

India frequently reiterates China's sovereignty over Tibet, which is another extremely sensitive issue in Sino-Indian relations, as India harbours the Tibetan government in exile at Dharamsala; and China, for its part, has tacitly recognized India's claims over Sikkim. China has also attempted to appear more neutral in its official declarations during Indo-Pakistani conflicts, (such as during the Kargil War in 1999), even though behind the scenes it continues to bolster Pakistan's military apparatus.

The multiplication of bilateral visits:

A sustained level of high-ranking bilateral visits has ensured a certain new 'comfort level' in Sino-Indian dealings. At each meeting, a plethora of MOUs( Memorandums of Understanding), CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) and other agreeements are signed, on issues as varied as the sharing of hydrological data to the mutual reduction of troops along certain areas of the LAC (the line of actual control, i.e, the informal border).

This , of course, is an extremely succint summary of the state of both countries' relations, if anyone's interested in more detail, just send me an e-mail and I'll send you more info.

Sino-Indian Relations: Reading Suggestions

Background reading:

"Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century", by John W.Garver, 2001.

http://www.amazon.com/Protracted-Contest-Sino-Indian-Rivalry-Twentieth/dp/0295980745/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562357&sr=8-1

This book is the seminal work on Sino-Indian relations, analysing in depth the evolutions in Sino-Indian relations from India's independence to the end of the 90s. Undoubtedly the best historical analysis on the subject at present.

"The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know", Francine R.Frankel and Harry Harding (Ed.), 2004.

http://www.amazon.com/India-China-Relationship-United-States-Needs/dp/0231132379/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562556&sr=1-1

This a most interesting and useful volume, combining the contributions of ten different renowned area experts, with people such as Susan Shirk, Sumit Ganguly, Ashley Tellis, etc.. Many different aspects of the relationship are discussed such as the border issue (by Sumit Ganguly), China's perceptions of India (Susan Shirk), the Indian strategic community's vision of China (Steven Hoffman). James Clad's analysis of convergent Chinese and Indian perspectives on the Global Order shows that the rapport is more multifaceted than one may at first believe, and Harry Harding's section on the implications for the United States is a useful reminder of the fact that relations in-between these two Asian giants are of far more than simply regional significance.

"China and India, Cooperation or Conflict?", Waheguru Pal Singh Sindhu and Jing-Dong Yuan, 2003.

http://www.amazon.com/China-India-Cooperation-Conflict-International/dp/1588261697/ref=pd_sim_b_5

This book concentrates on eight different issues: Tibet and Sikkim, mutual threat perceptions, nuclear nonproliferation,trade, terrorism, both countries's relationship with the United States and Pakistan and the impact of internal politics on the relationship. It is very informative and concise, often giving very precise information when it comes to military or technical matters.

"Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India", Jairam Ramesh, 2005.

http://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Chindia-Reflections-China/dp/8187943955/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562420&sr=1-2

This is a rather contemplative work, written by a senior Congress politician, Jairam Ramesh, who is presently Minister of State for Commerce and Power in the UPA government. The book is written by a self-avowed 'Nehruphile', who while remaining realistic, does not view the inevitability of conflict and confrontation between both countries as a foregone conclusion. It contains a short compilation of essays on issues as various as trade, the growing threat of HIV in both countries, and both countries' regional disparities. It's brevity means that it cannot really be viewed as a reference book, but it's a leisurely read and provides some interesting new perspectives.

Sino-Indian Relations.

The emergence of both India and China as figureheads of a new world order has been the object of much discussion and speculation in the Western media. Both countries evoke, simultaneously, feelings of fascination and concern. Fascination when it comes to their spectacular economic achievements (although in this area, China has a 15 year head start over India), rich cultural heritage and growing diplomatic assertiveness; and concern when confronted with their teeming populations (combined both countries account for more than 40% of humanity), rising military expenditures and supposed tendency to 'steal Western jobs' via outsourcing.

Sino-Indian relations have, as a result, received a fair deal of attention in the press. Sadly, most reports either summarily lump them together as the two rising Asian powers, or depict them as locked in a deadly struggle for regional dominance. While, in my opinion, the Sino-Indian relationship's defining characterisic is regional rivalry, there also signs of improvement in their interactions, which has become less overtly conflictual over the past few years.. The leadership in both countries has been striving over the past two decades to normalise the Sino-Indian relationship, through the development of trade, the multiplication of bilateral talks and the public downplaying of contentious issues.

As China’s spectacular rise in military expenditure and increasing diplomatic clout kindles ever more apprehension , it has become common wisdom to pit it against its Indian neighbour, in the hope that the latter’s democratic nature will compel it to act as a bulwark against its authoritarian neighbour’s regional expansion. The complexity of Sino-Indian relations, however, shows that foreign policy is never a zero-sum game. India’s attitude towards China is neither inherently friendly, nor intrinsically hostile. Instead it is the fascinating result of a complex blend of historical resentment, desire for cooperation, realist balance of power calculations, and a natural wariness regarding the inexorable spread of Chinese influence in Asia

The next few blog entries will include some background info with reading suggestions, a commentary on recent developments in Sino-Indian relations with links to articles and reports, as well as two interviews with two renowned Indian China specialists. Over the following weeks, I'll also discuss the Indian Navy and Indo-Iranian relations.

Greetings and welcome to all. My name is Iskander Rehman, and I'm a PHD student studying Indian foreign and security policy at the School of Political Sciences in Paris. Now to me, of course, that sounds exciting, but I've noticed that for most people, especially here in the Western World ,the words 'Indian geopolitics' may seem, at best, mildly intriguing in an exotic sort of way, at worst somewhat yawn-inspiring and, all in all, rather secondary in importance.

Yet the rise of both India and China is one of the major upheavals of our time, which has been compared by some to the rise of the United States and Germany at the beginning of the XXth century. We are currently experiencing a period of transition, and the world we leave to our children or grandchildren will be one where the strategic epicentre no longer lies to the west, but to the east. Whereas today India remains a major regional power , its economic and military capabilities, which have been growing exponentially over the past 15 years, ensure its emergence as one of the leading players in world affairs over the next few decades. Despite all of this, it seems difficult for the layman to find rapid and easily comprehensible information on India's external affairs which doesn't fall into the unfathomable and oft turgid depths of academic expertise.

This blog is a humble attempt to remedy this lack of accessibility, by, I hope, rendering the subject as engrossing and fascinating to you as it is to me. It will include interviews, debates, as well as links to interesting articles and books on various subjects. Please feel free to post comments and/or links on anything you feel is worth sharing. Please also bear with me when it comes to the formatting of the blog, as my computer skills are closer to those of an inebriated monkey than to those of a normal human being. I am hoping that this will change over time.