China at the NSG: A 'duplicity' which was to be expected.
The Indo-US Nuclear Deal has been receiving a lot of attention in the press recently. First of all, what exactly does this deal consist of?
As I mentioned in my previous entry, India and the United States have been enjoying a new proximity over the past few years.In 2004, the Bush Administration declared India “a major non-NATO ally”; and in June 2005 both countries signed a framework defence agreement , announcing their intentions to follow a 10 year programme of increased defence cooperation. The recently confirmed Indo-US nuclear deal is the other main indicator of the warmth of Indo-US ties. Until recently, the ROI had been excluded from civilian nuclear trade by the United States and other states because it refuses to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. America is making a major departure from this tradition and making an exception to all the existing regulations by offering to equip India with civilian nuclear fuel and technology, provided that it agrees to certain safeguards on its civilian nuclear programme and does not use the fuel for military purposes. To benefit from this deal, India had to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency which particular safeguards will be applied to its civilian nuclear facilities and obtain a special exemption from the 45 nation NSG.
After a hairline victory in the Indian parliament and many hours of debate at the NSG, India finally entered the nuclear mainstream in September 2008. India now reaps all the advantages enjoyed by the five ‘official’ nuclear powers (France, Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United States) despite not having signed the NPT or Test-Ban Treaty. The Indo-US nuclear agreement is definitely a landmark agreement in the history of nuclear diplomacy; rarely has a country been offered so much for so little in return. Not only is this a major gain for India in the field of nuclear energy and technology, it also provides it with a significant symbolic edge over its troublesome nuclear-armed neighbour Pakistan, which has retained its nuclear pariah status.
China, of course, has been watching the Indo-US rapprochement with a sizeable dose of misgivings, and before the debate at the NSG, Indian diplomats scuttled to and forth from Beijing, ensuring that the PRC would not play an obstructionist role at the meet. Much of what happened during the negotiations remains clouded in confidentiality, and is based on hearsay and off the record declarations by Indian negotiators. It would seem however that the Chinese delegation, through the threat of procedural delays and the discreet lobbying of the countries initially not sympathetic to the deal (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, the Netherlands and Ireland) made a last-ditch attempt to scupper, or at least stall the deal. The Chinese delegation also apparently made strenuous efforts to obtain some sort of a similar deal for their Pakistani allies. This only occurred during the last few hours, and apparently took India by surprise. After intense pressure was applied on the Chinese by the Bush Administration, the deal finally went through.In the days following the discussions the Indian press was full of accusations of Chinese 'duplicity'.
The Indian National Security Adviser MK Narayanan even went so far as to express his 'disappointment' over China's attitude (see video at 05:33), unusually strong vocabulary for an Indian official, who tend to show more timidity than bravado in their dealings with the PRC.
These accusations of duplicity are based on the belief that the Chinese promised that they would not block the deal.
In reality, however, China's attitude towards the deal has been ambiguous from the get-go. Realising that formally opposing the deal would constitute a 'casus belli', the Chinese government has been expressing its reservations via its official media. The People’s Daily, for example, has regularly accused America of breaking the rules and blatantly following double standards, and issued dire warnings on the future consequences of setting such a precedent. Claiming that the Indo-US nuclear deal would lead to a dangerous ‘domino effect’, China has also frequently threatened the US with a response in kind by further enhancing their nuclear cooperation with countries such as Pakistan. These were indirect signs of China's hostility to the deal. Doctor Jabin Jacob, a China specialist at IPCS, a think tank in New Delhi, has written a thoughtful article analysing the consequences of the Chinese attitude at the NSG. (I interviewed him last month, the transcript will be posted over the weekend)
As he points out, the "key event is not the Chinese 'betrayal' but of remembering what was achieved. The point remains that the Chinese did not scuttle the deal-something that was within their power to do." Interestingly, he attributes the reversals in China's attitude during the debates at Vienna in part to "the pulls and pressures within the Chinese establishment".Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party is hardly a monolithic structure and has its hawks as well as its doves. The Chinese Armed Forces, Doctor Jacob reminds us, wield a considerable influence over Chinese diplomacy. The attempt to stall the deal could have been a form of concession to the hawks in China's strategic community; after all the PRC couldn't have been seen to completely bend over in the face of American and Indian demands.
In the next entries, which will consist of interview transcripts, the whole NSG melodrama will be discussed in greater depth.
Border Talks end in Stalemate.
After each round of border talks, Chinese and Indian diplomats always seem to try to outdo each other when it comes to falsely optimistic claims of progress.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/09/25/stories/2008092559110100.htm
The truth however is less inspiring. Indeed, discussions have been taking place on a regular basis for years, and little, if anything, has been achieved. From the 17th to the 19th of September, the Indian and Chinese delegations met for their 13th round of talks on the border dispute, once again agreeing to continue the dialogue, and once again neither reporting any sign of tangible progress nor providing any indication that both sides have narrowed their differences. In an interesting report entitled "India China border: A Reality Check", retired General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff and now associated with the Observer Research Foundation, in New Delhi, calls for greater pragmatism when analysing the border issue.
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=14724&mmacmaid=14725
He reminds us that there is still "no accepted delineation or even agreed perception of the LAC", and that the Chinese recognition of Sikkim remains tacit and not official. Although the comfort-level in Sino-Indian relations has grown, the constant Chinese upgrading of its military infrastructure along the border, and the "negligible progress" in the border dispute indicate the prevalence of abiding tensions in the relationship. Such a state of affairs should incite Indian External Affairs officials to less haste and greater caution in their declarations.
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