(Professor Srikanth Kondapalli is Chairman of the Centre for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (www.jnu.ac.in). I was in India last month doing some field work, and took the opportunity to sit down with him in his office to discuss, amongst other things, China's role at the NSG and recent reports in the Indian media of a rise in Chinese incursions across the LAC)China's role at the NSG has been creating quite a stir in the press. Although the PRC ultimately voted in India's favour, many Indian commentators declared that they were shocked with China's 'duplicitous' behaviour. The Indian National Security Adviser also expressed his 'disappointment'. Why do you think this is? What exactly went down in Vienna?
It is of course difficult to know exactly what happened, the precise contents of the discussions are still confidential. It would appear however that China played an obstructionist role at the meet, choosing to manifest its displeasure only at the 11th hour, thus threatening to delay the whole procedure. The behaviour of the Chinese has been described as 'duplicitous' because before the 11th hour, they had given no real indication, it would seem, of their opposition to the deal.
Why then did the Chinese choose to express their disapproval at such a late hour?
China was not at the forefront of criticisms during the negotiations. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria were the primary critics, arguing that India should join the NPT. Once External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee made the promise that India would not be allowed to conduct any more tests while remaining under the umbrella of the deal, tensions were diffused and the opposition died down. That was when the Chinese chose to manifest their displeasure.
In reality, though, the PRC has never been enthusiastic about the deal.
Indeed, it is obvious that for the Chinese, and especially for the hardliners in the establishment, the Indian Nuclear Deal is viewed as being adverse to their national interests.
It is my inclination that the PRC hoped that the deal would never get through the Lok Sabha (the Indian Parliament) and that the combined opposition of the Communists and the BJP would preemptively 'kill' the deal, making the task that much easier for them.
The UPA government managed to get the vote of confidence however, and that made things more complex. They then tried to jump onto the contesting countries' bandwagon during the NSG conference at Vienna, and that didn't work either. Some Indian newspapers, such as The Hindu, have reported that the UN delegates as well as those of the smaller opposing countries were discreetly approached by Chinese delegates.
What were China's arguments for obstructing the deal?
The Chinese now claim that they had no intention of obstructing the deal and that their role was a constructive one, as they were just seeking to ensure that the deal did not violate international law regarding civil nuclear technology and nuclear proliferation. The IAEA had already pointed out, however, that India has a remarkably clean proliferation record, especially when compared to countries such as Pakistan or even China. It also seems that the Chinese delegation were hoping, in vain, that some sort of a similar deal would be cut, as a consolation prize, for their Pakistani protégé.
What was India's immediate reaction when learning of China's opposition?
The Indian side was clearly unprepared for the Chinese 11th hour. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeatedly tried to call both Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister. Each time he was told that they were unavailable.
This, in my opinion, is what angered Indian officials the most. It clearly shows that the hotline isn't working, that there is still a huge trust deficit in-between both powers.
Of course, afterwards the Chinese claimed that Hu Jintao hadn't been able to respond because he was in Dushanbe, and Premier Wen Jiabao had been visiting earthquake relief sites. Nevertheless, it shows that there is a major problem.
What finally made the Chinese back down?
American intervention. President Bush personally called his Chinese counterpart and eyewitness accounts at Vienna report that at one stage, all the high-ranking Chinese officials withdrew, to only leave the lower members of the delegation. The high level Chinese delegates were engaged in talks with the Americans for approximately 2 to 3 hours. Once these discussions had ended, the Chinese suddenly informed the Indian side that there were no more objections.
What do you think the United States did or promised in order to assuage Chinese anxiety?
I doubt that we'll ever really know what went on behind those closed doors. It is my inclination, however that the Americans invoked the 2004 1,2,3 step deal with the PRC. As part of that deal, the United States guaranteed China membership in the NSG, as long as an American company, Westinghouse, got to construct nuclear plants in China in a multi-billion dollar deal.
China duly got membership in the NSG in December 2004, and the American delegation were probably reminding the Chinese that they still 'owe' the United States for this 'favour'.
Washington most probably also endeavoured to mollify Beijing's concerns of an Indo-American nexus forming itself against China.
Moving onto another issue: border incursions. Is it true that Chinese incursions have been multiplying over the past few months? Why do you think this is?
I think that these reports have been somewhat exaggerated by a sometimes sensationalistic press. I'm not denying that there are incursions: there are about 150 to 200 every year, but on both sides: Chinese and Indian.
Are these voluntary incursions?
Some are, some aren't.
The latter still happen from time to time, as both sides 'probe' their neighbour's territory on a regular basis,and engage in covert reconnaissance missions. Tensions have been largely de-escalated,however, thanks to the multiple CBMs signed over the last years. Periodically though dangerous situations will arise. During the Kargil War, for example, China furtively tried to take over the Daulat beg airbase in Ladakh (abandoned at the time) and in December 2000 a Daulat beg Oldi border patrol came eyeball-to-eyeball with Chinese soldiers. The situation was extremely volatile and could easily have turned into a bloody skirmish. The Indian Ministry of Defense gave de-escalation orders, and luckily there was no live firing. If anyone had taken the initiative in that particular situation, it could have degenerated very rapidly.
Have there been recent examples of such situations degenerating?
Yes, for example during the June 2003 visit of Vajpayee to China(the Indian BJP government's prime minister at the time) an Indian patrol that had strayed into the Chinese side was set upon by the Chinese army at Asafi La. It's hard to understand why the CBMs appear to work in some cases and not in others. The main concern is to prevent such transgressions, whether intentional or unintentional, from degenerating into what strategists call an LCO, a 'low conventional warfare'.
My thanks to Srikanth for graciously giving up some of his time.
If anyone is interested to find out more about the border issue, contact me, I will send you more information. In the meanwhile, here is a link to a transcript of a very interesting seminar on the subject, and in which Dr Kondapalli took part.
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