Interview of Navy Commander Gurpreet Khurana.

I interviewed the Commander, currently a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (http://idsa.in) when I was in Delhi in September.

Most historians would agree that India has traditionally been permeated by a continental mindset, having to deal with large terrestrial invasions, whether it be the Aryans, the Afghans or the Moghols. Even today India's defence budget remains relatively land-locked, despite the increase in the Navy's share. Yet India has increasingly chosen to invest in a blue-water navy. Do you believe that this symbolizes a reversal in Indian strategic thought? And if so what are the reasons underlying such an evolution?

I think that India has had a maritime strategic mindset since independence, it just remained dormant for many years. During WWII, the Indian Navy under British Command was a formidable fighting force. After the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947 and 1965, and the Sino-Indian War of 1962, however, the harsh reality of the insecurity of the Himalayas set in and the notion of developing a maritime power was put on the backburner. The focus was on defending the subcontinent from Chinese or Pakistani land incursions. Nehru did mention the importance of seapower, as did Indira Gandhi, but neither of them had a very outward looking orientation, even though the Navy underwent an expansion under Indira Gandhi.

I'd also add that until recently India's entire mindset was inward looking, and not only in the strategic realm. Until the economic reforms of 1991, India's markets were relatively closed to the world, stifled under the weight of the 'Licence Raj'. Traditionally naval powers are also economic and trading powers, countries that prosper by venturing overseas and that are animated by a sense of overture to the world. Before the end of the Cold War, India had no real strategic or economic imperative to focus on a powerful navy.

So the real reversal in India's strategic mindset occurred at the end of the Cold War?

Yes, the transformed geopolitical environment and India's economic liberalisation provided it with both the desire and the window of opportunity to expand its navy. As a result, the Navy budget has been steadily increasing over the past few years.

Do you think that this will remain the case?

I hope so, the Navy has been very good at making its case, and is undoubtedly the branch of the armed forces which receives the most attention in the press, whether it be during the rescue operations following the 2004 tsunami, or when Indian ships evacuated Indian citizens from Lebanon in 2006.

After the recent terrorist attacks, however, more funds may be channeled into the improvement of interior policing.


Would you say that the Chinese PLN (People's Liberation Navy) is now viewed by the Indian Navy as the number one threat in the region?

Definitely, and far more so than the Pakistani Navy, which is viewed more as a potential nuisance than a genuine threat. India is, of course, most concerned about China's 'string of pearls', as it considers it to be the outlining of a maritime containment policy.

In one of my articles, however, I point out that these Indian fears are somewhat overstated.

(http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a790947871~db=all~order=page)

The fact is that it is still somewhat unclear whether China's strengthening of its ties with IOR littorals are merely economic endeavours, as they themselves claim, or whether they are driven by strategic and military considerations. There is no tangible evidence that the ports and infrastructure that the PRC is building throughout the region are overtly military in nature.

Of course it's obvious that China, sooner or later, is going to consider the possibility of making these structures 'dual use' facilities, which can be used for both commercial and military purposes.

Gwadar, the deep-sea port in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Pakistan has the most dangerous potenial in this regard. The Chinese have invested an enormous amount of money in its construction, and they will naturally want some form of return, probably by stationing submarines. Similarly, Chinese admirals have been spotted being given guided tours of the Coco Islands by high-ranking members of the Myanamarese junta. This, in my view, definitely adds some credibility to the rumours of a Chinese SIGINT facility at that location.


There are rumours that China is acquiring a combat operational aircraft carrier. Does this mean that the Indian Navy will lose its comparative advantage in terms of strategic projection in the Indian Ocean region?

There are indeed rumours that the Varyag, a Soviet carrier that the PRC purchased from Ukraine, and that is currently being refurbished in China, will become an operational carrier in two to three years. In my view though, the Varyag will not take part in military operations and will be used as a training carrier.

China does have an Indigenous Carrier Project though, and Chinese military officials have stated in the past that they would like to deploy an aircraft carrier by 2015.

Carriers can only operate effectively in groups however, and need to be provided with escorts. Very few Chinese ships have adequate air defence systems (they tend to be equipped with Russian systems that are less reliable than the American or Israeli systems that their Indian counterparts are now increasingly equipped with), and a Chinese carrier deployed in the Indian Ocean would be a sitting duck for the Indian Air Force and Indian Naval Aviation.

The only vessels that China can deploy in the Indian Ocean are its underwater assets, but in order to sustain these forces in the area for a long period of time, China would have to maintain a permanent presence in the region in the form of ports of call and refuelling stations. (hence, some say, the 'String of Pearls')

For the time being though, China would not be able to launch an effective naval expedition in the IOR?

Not in the short to medium term, that's for sure. Which means, if one uses a naval strategic planning time framework, not for the next two to three decades.


Moving onto a different subject: the chronic unreliability of Russian arm provisions to India. Numerous disputes have given rise to some strain in Indo-Russian relations. Sureesh Mehta, the current chief of the Indian Navy recently said, after learning of the delay in the delivery of the Admiral Gorshkov, that India should reduce its dependence on Moscow for military equipment. Do you think that recent events will incite the Indian Navy to seek greater diversity from now on in its arm procurements?

There have indeed been a fair degree of problems in terms of delays, cost overruns, weapon malfunctions etc.. Diversification has long been a goal of the Indian Navy, as it prevents excessive dependence on a sole provider, and provides a way of playing the competition in order to get the most efficient weapon systems at the best possible rates.

Indo-Russian ties go back a long way however, and the Indian Navy is used to Russian military hardware, as they operated mostly Soviet equipment throughout the Cold War. There's a certain 'comfort factor' in the familiarity of the Russian weapon systems. Military relations in-between both nations are still strong; no other country would have agreed to lease India a nuclear submarine. Even though Russian weapons are often less reliable than their Israeli, European or American competitors, particularly in the field of anti-missile technology, Indo-Russian cooperation has also led to great successes in the past. The Brahmos supersonic cruise missile is a prime example.

Thank you, Gurpreet, for your time and expertise.

A naval superpower in the making.

The INS Viraat, India's 28,700 ton Centaur-Class Aircraft Carrier, launching a VTOL Sea Harrier jet fighter. The INS Viraat should remain in service until 2012.

India is one of the only countries in the region with a blue-water navy ('blue-water is a term used to describe navies capable of operating across 'deep waters' and therefore of projecting their power far from their coastline, in opposition to 'brown-water' navies, which are confined to the littoral and incapable of sustaining an expeditionary deployment) and is the only Asian Navy which currently deploys an aircraft carrier.

A growing portion of India's defence budget is being allocated to the Indian Navy, which has become a symbol of the country's growing assertiveness in the Indian Ocean. India has ambitious plans for the modernization, and expansion of its Navy, which by 2020 will be comprised of approximately 140 vessels. Half of these will be assigned to the defense of the littoral, the other half will form an expeditionary force of frigates, destroyers and corvettes around two or three aircraft carrier groups. The ultimate goal of the Indian Naval planners is to be able to simultaneously project force via these carrier groups on both its eastern and western seaboards. Having two carriers constantly operational, however, requires a third carrier which would be kept in reserve, enabling it to rotate with one of the others when it goes under maintenance.

Plans also include a drastic upgrading or increase in the Indian Navy's submarine assets, fighter planes, amphibious assault ships, and helicopters specialised in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) or in the transport of auxiliary forces, such as the Indian Navy's MARCOS commandoes. (see upcoming article)

The Indian Navy currently has several major armament programmes underway. Here is a brief overview of the most important, the carrier and submarine programmes.

Aircraft Carriers:

Two more aircraft carriers are to join the Indian Navy, hopefully before 2015. The 26 year old ex-Admiral Gorshkov, a 47,750 ton Kiev-Class Carrier, purchased from Russia, was expected to join India's armada in 2008/2009, thus enabling the 49 year old Centaur-class Viraat to retire. Unfortunately after a series of delays; due to the loss of the original blue-prints, the alleged discovery that the ship required 2,400 km of recabling instead of 700 and subsequent Russian demands for another 1.2 billion USD; the delivery is not now expected until 2012. This frustrating turn of events has soured Indo-Russian relations, and forced the Indian Navy to spend hefty sums in order to extend the ageing Viraat's life for another few years and equip it with a new air surveillance radar.

India is also building a smaller, indigenous aircraft carrier, the 37,500 ton IAC, (Indigenous Aircraft Carrier), at Kochi, which has also been delayed until at least 2014, due, in part, to steel acquisition problems.

Conventional Submarine assets:

India's submarine force remains relatively small (about 16 boats) and will not undergo a significant increase in numbers over the next few years. Planners are hoping, however, to replace the ageing Sindhughosh class subs with six French, but locally built, Scorpene diesel-electric boats by 2017. Unfortunately it seems that here also delivery plans have been pushed back. India plans to fit both its conventional and nuclear powered submarines with the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, that it co-developed with Russia, and that is currently being adapted for underwater use.

Nuclear Submarine assets:

India's incapacity to build nuclear powered submarines, whether it be SSNs (nuclear-powered submarines with conventional weapon systems) or SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) has long been a source of frustration. Both SNAs and SSBNs would provide an enormous boost to the Indian Navy's strategic capabilities.

SSNs:

Even the most advanced diesel-electric submarines cannot remain more than a few days submerged at a time, whereas nuclear submarines can operate under the surface almost indefinitely. This makes an enormous difference, as submarines are valued above all for their ability to function undetected.

The Indian Navy signed an agreement with Russia in 2004 to lease the Akula-class SSN Nerpa, which is currently under construction, and should arrive in INdia in 2009. The SSN Nerpa will not only be used in military operations but also as a training vessel for the submariners who will operate India's indigenously built nuclear submarines, currently being assembled in Vishakhaptnam, the headquarters of India's Eastern Fleet.

The ATV, or Advanced Technological Vessel, is a 6,000 ton SSN with a 80 Mw nuclear reactor, and is believed to be closely modelled on the Soviet 670A series that the Indian Navy leased for three years from the USSR in the 1980s. The ATV has long been cloaked in secrecy(Indian officials denied its very existence until recently) and has been under development since at least 1974. It is scheduled to be operational in 2010, but many experts believe that its launching may be delayed.

SSBNs:

SSBNs are the missing link in India's quest for the 'nuclear triad of deterrence'.
The expression 'nuclear triad' refers to a nuclear arsenal composed of three different components, which supposedly provide the best form of deterrence:

• long-range strategic bombers
• land-based ballistic missiles
• ballistic missile submarines

Submarine launched ballistic missiles are considered the best form of deterrence in the triad, as they provide a better 'second-strike capability' as they are, by nature, the most difficult to locate and destroy in a preemptive strike.

India is currently finalising the Sagarika submarine-launched missile, that was successfully launched from an underwater pontoon off the coast of Vishakpatnam in February 2008. Although details surrounding the project as well as the test are somewhat obscure, reports indicate that the Sagarika missile has a range of approximately 750km, and that the IN plans to fit it to the ATV .

Other expansion/modernization plans:

India's acquisition of the USS Trenton and of its six modernised UH-3H SeaKing Helicopters made the headlines last year. With a displacement of 16,900 tons, the former US vessel, now renamed INS Jalashwa, is an amphibious assault ship which can host more than 1000 troops and 100 small vehicles. It comes equipped with landing craft, which will enable the Indian Navy to launch marines in covert ops, or conduct evacuation missions.
India is also procuring and constructing more advanced frigates and destroyers, which will be equipped with Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles and Israeli Barak-I missile defense systems.
Newly procured Mig 29k fighters and Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters will provide support to maritime operations, and India is also bolstering its maritime surveillance capabilites by acquiring more surveillance aircraft as well as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).

India is already one of the most powerful navies in the region. With these ambitious plans of expansion and modernization of its fleet, it could well become one of the foremost maritime powers in the world.

India's doctrinal shift in favour of sea power.

Indian Talwar-class frigate escorts a merchant vessel to safety after having destroyed a pirate 'mother ship'.

INDIA’S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:

Emerging India’s aspirations have been accompanied by a realisation of the numerous advantages procured from its strategic location in the heart of the Indian Ocean. Positioned in-between the Gulf of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, the Indian Ocean has become one of the major centres of maritime commerce, with on average over 200 merchant vessels transporting more than 10 million barrels of oil transiting through the Malacca Straits in one single day! The security of the Indian waters leading to the Straits therefore has a direct impact on the stability of international trade and confers upon India an important role, that of the guarantor of the safety of the SLOCs or ‘ Sea Lanes of Communication’. It also means that in the case of a major conflict with a country such as China , India could effectively implement an economic embargo on its regional rival, depriving it of its precious energy shipments.

The Republic of India has used this centrality to its advantage, by reinforcing its maritime presence in the region and asserting itself as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This was clearly established last week when the Indian Naval ships on patrol off the Gulf of Aden clashed twice with Somalian pirates, obliterating a 'mother ship' with one of its Talwar class frigates during its most recent encounter.

See here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/africa/20pirate.html?_r=1&hp


THE EVOLUTIONS IN INDIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE:

It is sometimes said, generally while invoking ancient brahmanical interdictions, that Indian culture has been a largely continental one, confined to the subcontinental peninsula. This, of course, is a fallacy. The merchant fleets of the Cholas and Guptas sailed far and wide across the Indian Ocean, and the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, for example, was facilitated by waves of Indian settlers. It is true, however, that Indian strategists have only really begun to focus on maritime power since Independence. Although Kautilya devoted an entire chapter to naval power in his great classic, The Arthashastra; throughout history the great Indian Empires , whether it be the Moghols or the Mauryans, have invariably swept to power through land based, and not maritime, campaigns of conquest.

The advent of the great European sea powers, such as Portugal, Holland and Great Britain thus constituted a major rift in India’s military history. The Indian Ocean was no longer just a medium for trade or migration, but had become the primary theatre in the European hegemons’ power struggles in the region.

The British, who ruled India for over 150 years, left an indelible mark on Indian strategic thought. The precepts of Lord Curzon, the Vice Roy of India from 1899 to 1905, as well as the Victorian theories promoted by the ‘Forward School’ are still religiously read to this day.

In his essay “ The Place of India in the Empire”, published in 1909, Lord Curzon emphasized the subcontinent’s centrality in the Asian continent , and its subsequent potential for power projection in the region. Such potential will only be fulfilled, argued the Vice Roy, if India managed to maintain naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The members of the Forward School, for their part, were convinced of the necessity for India to expand its influence in the region, and to bar any of its foreign rivals (such as Tsarist Russia) from holding sway over any of the Raj’s buffer regions such as Central Asia.

These XIXth century British beliefs; in the geostrategic centrality of the Indian subcontinent and of the necessity for India to project its power in the Indian Ocean while repelling any foreign intrusions into its sphere of influence, have become almost canonical in India’s contemporary strategic community. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former BJP government thus theorized the concept of ‘ a zone of strategic interest for India’, going from ‘the horn of Africa to the waters of Australia’. This ambitious expansion of India’s strategic vision was confirmed in the 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine, which reasserted the idea of a vast zone of strategic import which extends from Africa to Australia and engulfs the Arabian Sea.

A NEW FORM OF MARITIME ASSERTIVENESS:

The Indian Navy has become a symbol of India's growing clout in the IOR or 'Indian Ocean Region' and its growing assertiveness, whether it be via military or humanitarian operations, is emblematic of Delhi's greater influence in world affairs.

The Indian Navy is increasingly involved in 'constabulary operations' , patrolling the coastlines of Indonesia and Malaysia. In accordance with the recent enlargement of its strategic vision, Indian vessels have been as far afield as Mozambique, engaging in search and destroy missions against local pirates.

In reality, India's fleet has become far more than a mere military force, and has morphed into a symbol of national prestige, as well as a major tool of military diplomacy.

In the wake of the December 2004 tsunami, for example, India’s government refused any form of foreign assistance, and rapidly deployed an armada of more than 32 ships, seven planes and 20 helicopters, which then conducted five different rescue and reconstruction missions, not only along the ravaged coastlines of India, but also in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.
Another example of Delhi's newly acquired taste for maritime power projection; its actions during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In the height of the conflict, the Indian Navy managed to successfully evacuate thousands of its citizens from the wartorn country, proving for the first time that India had the military where-with-all to protect its sizeable overseas population.

India’s navy has also become the poster boy of its military diplomacy, frequently participating in much publicized joint operations. An entire department, under the orders of a Vice-Admiral, and working in partnership with the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) has even been created with the objective of better coordinating and publicizing these joint operations.

President-elect Obama and South Asia.

( August 2007, Islamabad: Pakistani demonstrators burn a U.S. flag in protest, after remarks by Barack Obama, in which he said he might send ground forces to Pakistan's border regions to rout out terrorists )

While the election of Barack Obama has given birth to widespread enthusiasm in South Asia, as in the rest of the world, the promise of change it brings to the region has also caused a fair degree of anxiety in both India and Pakistan's foreign policy circles.
Indeed, while diplomats in both countries welcome the formidable energy and dynamism President-elect Obama will inject into the White House, they are also fearful of the upheavals it may trigger in the region.

This is particularly true in Pakistan, where relations with the United States over the past few months have been mercurial , to say the least.
As Professor Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University points out in one of his more recent Newsweek articles,"Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror has always been fitful at best".

(http://www.newsweek.com/id/159532)

Although Washington has provided the Pakistani military with more than 10 billion dollars of aid since 9/11, it has remained as Janus-faced as ever, occasionally handing over Al Qaeda operatives or launching military operations against militant strongholds in an attempt to placate its American 'ally', while its intelligence services continue to aid and abet the bulk of the Taliban, who use certain regions of Baluchistan and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as sanctuaries, in order to reconsolidate their strength and continue to wage their war of attrition against NATO forces in Afghanistan.

For a long time the Bush Administration turned a blind eye to this blatant double-dealing, making the bet, no doubt, that spasmodic cooperation was better than none at all. As American casualties in Afghanistan have soared, however (they now exceed for the first time those in Iraq), Washington's patience has waned. American field commanders have repeatedly expressed their frustration at fighting an impossible war against an armed guerilla force that melts across a porous border whenever coalition troops engage in hot pursuit.

For the past two to three years, under a 'don't tell don't ask policy' the US occasionally dispatched Predator drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, to take out Taliban leaders hiding in Waziristan or other militant infested border areas. In July 2008, however, President Bush signed secret orders authorising US Special Ops to launch raids across the Pakistani border. For the traditionally paranoid and fiercly nationalistPakistani military, the increase in unmanned air strikes was already hard enough to swallow, and the conduction of ground incursions by US Navy Seals now constitutes an unacceptable violation of the country's sovereignty.

Over the past few months, Pakistani military officials have repeatedly warned the US that any further violations of the country's territorial integrity will lead to a military response. On a few occasions, Pakistani troops have exchanged fire with their American counterparts across the Afghan border, and have even targeted American reconnaissance helicopters.

(http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/26/asia/26military.php)

Ties in-between both countries have therefore been under a lot of strain over the past few months, and the new administration will have to tread very carefully.

Pakistani officials, however, have been alarmed by some of Barack Obama's policy statements regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan during the campaign, when he repeatedly pledged to bring about a renewed focus on Afghanistan.

Indeed, throughout the campaign, Barack Obama criticized the Bush Administration time and time again for having taken its eye off the ball in the region; the real global epicentre of terrorism and instability, while concentrating vast amounts of troops, time and resources on a largely unnecessary conflict in Iraq.

He has promised to massively increase US troop presence in Afghanistan by dispatching two to three additional brigades. (a brigade is usually about 2000 troops), and to increase economic and financial aid to the population. The President-elect has also made it clear that his administration will have little tolerance for the ISI's double-crossing, and that continued American assistance to Pakistan will no longer be a foregone conclusion, but will depend on the extent of the Pakistani military and civilian authorities' cooperation in the war on terror.

More alarmingly to the Pakistanis, Barack Obama, in stark contrast to his former rival, Senator John McCain, has frequently advocated cross-border attacks into Pakistan, making the following remarks during a Presidential debate, for example;"If the United States has Al Qaeda, Bin Laden, top-level lieutenants in our sights(i.e on the Pakistani side of the border), and Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act, then we should take them out."

(Click here to see the entire transcript of the presidential debate over Washington's future Afghanistan and Pakistan policies: http://www.riazhaq.com/2008/09/mccain-and-obama-debate-pakistan-policy.html)

During the campaign, Obama was surrounded by an impressive team of more than 300 foreign policy experts. Foremost among his South Asia consultants was a certain Bruce Riedel, who is currently a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and served with the Central Intelligence Agency for 26 years. Interestingly enough, in interviews Bruce Riedel has urged the US to stop engaging in cross-border raids, arguing that they are counter-productive, and generate more anti-americanism in a "politically charged environment". So what is to be made of Obama's hawkish campaign statements? Were they genuine, or was their sole purpose to show that a Democrat could be as tough as his Republican critics when it comes to issues of national security? Was it the candidate or the future president talking? Only time will tell.

Meanwhile, the President-elect's foremost South Asia adviser has enumerated other major plans for future South Asia policy that have caused further disquietude, but this time in New Delhi and Kabul rather than in Islamabad.
In a rather fascinating interview, the same Bruce Riedel lays out his master plan for the stabilisation of Pakistan, which will, in turn, hopefully lead to greater stability in Afghanistan.

(http://www.cfr.org/publication/17191/riedel.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F4962%2Fbruce_o_riedel)

For Riedel, Pakistan's destructive policy of supporting Islamic terrorism in order to wage its proxy wars is born out of a fundamental feeling of insecurity vis à vis of its arch rival and regional nemesis, India. In his eyes, the new American administration must combine a new, firmer stance in its dealings with Pakistan, with a greater understanding of its diplomatic and security needs. In order to dispel the Pakistani leadership's chronic feeling of insecurity, the United States must help stabilise the country by helping it resolve its long lasting border disputes with both Afghanistan, on its western front, and with India, to its east, in Kashmir.

No government in Kabul, not even the Taliban, has ever recognized the Durand Line, which has separated the two countries since 1893, as legitimate. Bruce Riedel argues, with reason, that an officially demarcated border would make it easier to control, and that the future administration should apply pressure on the Afghan government to reach a settlement with Islamabad. It is unlikely, however, that the government in Kabul will take kindly to the idea.

Similarly, Riedel says that "We (the United States) ought to try to encourage a long-term settlement between India and Pakistan of the Kashmir dispute, based again on the principle that the existing line of control ought to become an international border with some special status reserved for Kashmiris. We can't expect Pakistan to behave like a normal state unless it has normal borders. And we can't expect Pakistan to behave the way we would like it to while it's obessed and fixated on its neighbour and the problem in Kashmir."

Officials in New Delhi, however, are not so keen on the idea of a renewed US interventionism in the Kashmir dispute. In 1971, India and Pakistan signed a Peace Treaty which states that the Kashmir dispute must be "resolved bilaterally" without any third power intervention. Many Indian analysts fear that American involvement could destabilise the fragile peace process and give rise to several negative consequences.

Raja Mohan, a leading Indian foreign policy expert, lists them in a recent article;

"If Obama's Kashmir thesis becomes the policy, many negative consequences might ensue. For one, an American diplomatic intervention in Kashmir will make it impossible for India to pursue the current serious back channel negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir, the first since 1962-63.

India and Pakistan have made progress in recent years, because their negotiations have taken place in a bilateral context. Third party involvement will rapidly shrink the domestic political space for India on Kashmir negotiations.

For another, the prospect that the U S might offer incentives on Kashmir is bound to encourage the Pakistan Army to harden its stance against the current peace process with India.

Finally, the sense that an Obama Administration will put Jammu & Kashmir on the front burner would give a fresh boost to militancy in Kashmir and complicate the current sensitive electoral process there. Kashmiri separatist lobbies in Washington have already embraced Obama’s remarks. "

( to read the whole article, follow this link: http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Barack-Obamas-Kashmir-thesis/380615/)

All in all, it is altogether too early to emit any accurate predictions of the exact nature of the next American president's policy for the region. In any case, his task will be a difficult one, as few conflicts are as intractable and as complex,and yet as desperately in need of a resolution as those which reign in South Asia. One can but hope that the President-elect Obama, who has proven himself thus far to be a man of both good judgement and exceptional intelligence, will be up to the task.

The Indo-Pakistani silent war in Afghanistan.

On the 7th of July, a suicide bomber rammed a car crammed with explosives into the gates of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing 41 people, and injuring close to 150.
Amongst the victims of the blast were the Indian defence attaché, Brigadier RD Mehta, and a senior Indian External Affairs official, Counsellor V Rao.
Since the tragedy, investigations by both Indian and American intelligence agencies have traced the blasts back to Pakistan's notorious ISI, or Inter-services Intelligence Agency. This latest attack only seemed to compound the idea that Indo-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan has been gradually escalating in its intensity over the past few years.
Their competition is hardly a new phenomenon, as both countries have had conflicting strategic agendas in the region for decades.

Pakistani military strategists have traditionally viewed the establishment of strategic ties with Afghanistan as a way of obtaining 'strategic depth' in the event of an all-out war with India.The Taliban were aided and abetted by Pashtun field officers of the ISI in their rise to prominence over other warring factions in the 90s. Meanwhile, India attempted to dilute Pakistani influence in the region by bankrolling the Northern Alliance, led at the time by the charismatic Tadjik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.

While the fall of the Taliban in 2001 was a catastrophe in the eyes of many in the Pakistani intelligence community, it was perceived as a wonderful window of opportunity for their Indian counterparts to regain Delhi's lost footing in the region.
And indeed, immediately after the fall of the Taliban, India moved with lightning speed to reassert its influence in the region. Four consulates have been opened, in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad and Kandahar, and Afghanistan has become India's second biggest foreign aid commitment, with over 750 million dollars spent in aid over the past few years.

New Delhi has poured funds into education, food aid, and health services. The Power Grid Corporation of India is setting up power lines over the Hindu Kush, and Indian firms are active all over the country, whether it be in the building of more than 200km of roads, the erecting of bridges or the digging of wells. Several Indian NGOs are also engaged in humanitarian work throughout the country. Bollywood has become wildly popular in Afghan households, despite the strenuous efforts of some the more conservative mullahs to get the 'licentious Indian films' banned.
Bilateral trade has grown rapidly, and now accounts for more $225m.

This spurt of economic activity is not only part of an elaborate 'hearts and minds' campaign designed to wean the fragile country from Islamabad's influence. For both India and Pakistan, Afghanistan is a gateway to Central Asian oil and natural gas. Delhi, however, is constrained in its ambitions to expand trade with Kabul, as Pakistan continues to block the transit of Indian goods through its territory. Currently, most of Afghanistan's trade has to pass through the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi. In order to counter Islamabad's stranglehold on Afghan trade, Delhi has been erecting a port in Chabahar in Iran which would enable it to transport Indian goods to Afghanistan while completely bypassing Pakistan.


The latter, however, views the construction of Chabahar as India's latest attempt to encircle Pakistan in the region after the recent establishment of the Indian Air Force's base in Farkho; Tadjikistan, which is said to house MI-17 helicopter gunships. While India has not deployed troops as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, it has nevertheless expanded its military presence in the country, taking the decision in 2006 to send several hundred paramilitary troops, allegedly to protect Indian workers and contractors.

All this has resulted in Pakistan becoming increasingly jittery over what it perceives to be tantamount to an Indian takeover of its backyard. Over the past few years, Indian workers have been repeatedly abducted, and sometimes murdered; and grenades have been lobbed at the Indian consulates in Herat and Jalalabad. Although each time the Taliban were accused of the misdeeds, several members of the Indian security establishment harbour the suspicion that Adam Khan, the shadowy Kabul station head of the ISI, may be involved in the attacks.

On the other side, Pakistani officials have repeatedly accused Indian RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) agents of establishing training camps in southern Afghanistan and the Panjshir Valley for the rebels of the Baloch Liberation Army, who are waging a separatist insurgency in Pakistan's troubled Baluchistan province. The Indian consulates have also frequently been charged with circulating counterfeit Pakistani currency.
(See here the interview of Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain in May 2006: http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0116.htm)

One could hope that with the advent of a more democratic form of government in Pakistan, tensions in the region might somewhat subside, and that Afghanistan would no longer be the centrepiece in the Indo-Pakistani 'great game' in Central Asia. Unfortunately, it is my opinion that Pakistan's growing internal instability, when combined with the resurgence of the Taliban in the Pashtun dominated southern regions , leads to an adverse conclusion.


To read more about the geopolitical ramifications of the overthrow of the Taliban regime, I strongly recommend the latest book by Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, "Descent into Chaos, the United States, and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia".
It's a very insightful, informative, and often rather gripping study of the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan.
http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Building-Afghanistan/dp/0670019704/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1225302861&sr=8-1

Interview of Dr Jabin Jacob.

Dr Jabin Jacob is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (www.ipcs.org), in Delhi. Last month, he was kind enough to answer a few of my questions on the border issue, India's handling of the Tibet issue before the Olympics, as well as on India's growing influence in Central Asia.

After the 13th round of talks held earlier this month, the border talks don't seem to be getting any closer to a final resolution. Do you think that this means that for the time being both sides favour the status quo?

China has had border disputes with nearly all of its neighbours over the years (Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Soviet Union). Its attitude towards solving these disputes has varied a great deal from country to country. In some cases, border tensions have led to armed conflict, such as against India in 1962, Vietnam in 1979, or with the Soviet Union in 1969.
China only really shows a flexible attitude towards resolving border disputes when it feels that it is in a position of strength and can get the better half of the deal. For example, the PRC took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s to resolve a lot of its territorial disputes in Central Asia .
China has solved its territorial dispute with Vietnam and more or less so with Myanmar.
When it comes to China's attitude in its dealings with India, it has changed over the years. Whereas the PRC used to want to solve the issue immediately, there has now been a change in position, Chinese officials saying that the issue is complicated and will be solved by the next generation.

Is it the mindset that prevails on the Indian side as well?

I believe so, yes. Talks and confidence building measures have a primary objective: to avoid border tensions flaring up and dragging both countries into a an armed conflict. In reality, the Indian government is content to leave this issue on the backburner while it concentrates on less contentious aspects of the Sino-Indian relationship such as trade. Both sides have been enhancing the military infrastructure along the border, although China definitely has the upper hand in this domain via its extensive militarization of Tibet.
All in all, there is no great hurry to settle the deal. If the Chinese can wait, the Indians think, so can we. It'll take a lot of time to settle, and in my view, will only be possible with a new generation that isn't marked by the trauma of 1962.

Tibet has always been a very delicate issue. Do you think that India handled it well in the run-up to the Olympics or was its attitude too submissive?

It's true that when the torch bearers came to India, the security was absolutely crazy. Flights were delayed, thousands of policemen were deployed, and the Chinese embassy had been surrounded by barbed wire for several months. You must understand, the Chinese were very angry over the recent demonstrations in London, Paris and San Francisco, and India wanted to make sure that everything ran smoothly, in a gesture of good will. Beijing was very grateful that no incidents took place.

Yes but weren't some of the security measures excessive?

They were draconian yes, but India couldn't allow Tibetan demonstrators to scale the walls of the Chinese embassy. All the Tibetan demonstrators that were arrested were subsequently released by the police. What's more, and this was not much reported, but India didn't clamp down on all Tibetan protests, far from it. There was a 'Tibet Olympics March' in New Delhi, in which more than 6000 people participated.
There is still a great deal of sympathy for the Tibetan cause in India, the government realises however what a sensitive issue it is for the Chinese, and does not want it to become a source of tension in the bilateral relationship.

Several reports indicate that there is a new generation of Tibetan activists in India, that are much more radical than their older predecessors and that believe that violence may be a just means of action. Doesn't the Indian government worry that this fringe of the Tibetan community might cause them a great deal of problems in their future dealings with China, especially when the Dalai Lama passes away?

Yes, I have also heard of this new fringe movement. But for the time being, that's what it is: just a fringe movement. As long as they don't start using Indian territory to stage attacks on Chinese soil they shouldn't really cause a major shift in the relationship.


The other day I was reading an article on India's growing presence in Central Asia, either via its rising cultural influence (Bollywood is very popular in the region) or through its expanding ties with countries such as Tajikistan, where it has built an air base not far from the capital, Dushanbe, and stationed helicopters. India, however is still only an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whereas China is one of the founding members. How far is India behind China when it comes to exerting influence in the region?

Central Asia is one of the most strategically salient regions in today's world. India, China,Pakistan, Iran Russia and the United States are all vying for influence in the area. Unfortunately India is still very far behind China. As you mentioned, India is not part of the SCO and only really has close ties with Tadjikistan, one of the smallest and poorest countries in the region, whereas Beijing shares a great proximity with Ouzbekistan, the richest and most populous state.

Why do you think India has particularly close ties with Tadjikistan? Is it, perhaps, due to its traditionally close ties to the Tadjik ethnic minority in Afghanistan?

Yes, I think that that is definitely a factor. India discreetly supported Colonel Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance, and almost a mythical figure amongst Tadjiks in the region, whether it be in Tadjikistan or Afghanistan. Both Delhi and Dushanbe backed his struggle against the Taliban, who were assisted in their endeavours by ISI, Pakistan's notorious intelligence agency. This is all part of a complex regional security environment.
India's growing ties with Tadjikistan are a good thing, but India needs to fish in deeper water s and develop a proper 'Look West' policy in the region.

My thanks to Jabin for granting me this interview. Next week, I will be moving onto a new topic, discussing the Indian Navy's expansion with one of its Commanders.

Interview of Dr Srikanth Kondapalli.

(Professor Srikanth Kondapalli is Chairman of the Centre for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (www.jnu.ac.in). I was in India last month doing some field work, and took the opportunity to sit down with him in his office to discuss, amongst other things, China's role at the NSG and recent reports in the Indian media of a rise in Chinese incursions across the LAC)

China's role at the NSG has been creating quite a stir in the press. Although the PRC ultimately voted in India's favour, many Indian commentators declared that they were shocked with China's 'duplicitous' behaviour. The Indian National Security Adviser also expressed his 'disappointment'. Why do you think this is? What exactly went down in Vienna?

It is of course difficult to know exactly what happened, the precise contents of the discussions are still confidential. It would appear however that China played an obstructionist role at the meet, choosing to manifest its displeasure only at the 11th hour, thus threatening to delay the whole procedure. The behaviour of the Chinese has been described as 'duplicitous' because before the 11th hour, they had given no real indication, it would seem, of their opposition to the deal.

Why then did the Chinese choose to express their disapproval at such a late hour?

China was not at the forefront of criticisms during the negotiations. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria were the primary critics, arguing that India should join the NPT. Once External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee made the promise that India would not be allowed to conduct any more tests while remaining under the umbrella of the deal, tensions were diffused and the opposition died down. That was when the Chinese chose to manifest their displeasure.

In reality, though, the PRC has never been enthusiastic about the deal.

Indeed, it is obvious that for the Chinese, and especially for the hardliners in the establishment, the Indian Nuclear Deal is viewed as being adverse to their national interests.

It is my inclination that the PRC hoped that the deal would never get through the Lok Sabha (the Indian Parliament) and that the combined opposition of the Communists and the BJP would preemptively 'kill' the deal, making the task that much easier for them.

The UPA government managed to get the vote of confidence however, and that made things more complex. They then tried to jump onto the contesting countries' bandwagon during the NSG conference at Vienna, and that didn't work either. Some Indian newspapers, such as The Hindu, have reported that the UN delegates as well as those of the smaller opposing countries were discreetly approached by Chinese delegates.

What were China's arguments for obstructing the deal?

The Chinese now claim that they had no intention of obstructing the deal and that their role was a constructive one, as they were just seeking to ensure that the deal did not violate international law regarding civil nuclear technology and nuclear proliferation. The IAEA had already pointed out, however, that India has a remarkably clean proliferation record, especially when compared to countries such as Pakistan or even China. It also seems that the Chinese delegation were hoping, in vain, that some sort of a similar deal would be cut, as a consolation prize, for their Pakistani protégé.

What was India's immediate reaction when learning of China's opposition?

The Indian side was clearly unprepared for the Chinese 11th hour. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeatedly tried to call both Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister. Each time he was told that they were unavailable.

This, in my opinion, is what angered Indian officials the most. It clearly shows that the hotline isn't working, that there is still a huge trust deficit in-between both powers.

Of course, afterwards the Chinese claimed that Hu Jintao hadn't been able to respond because he was in Dushanbe, and Premier Wen Jiabao had been visiting earthquake relief sites. Nevertheless, it shows that there is a major problem.

What finally made the Chinese back down?

American intervention. President Bush personally called his Chinese counterpart and eyewitness accounts at Vienna report that at one stage, all the high-ranking Chinese officials withdrew, to only leave the lower members of the delegation. The high level Chinese delegates were engaged in talks with the Americans for approximately 2 to 3 hours. Once these discussions had ended, the Chinese suddenly informed the Indian side that there were no more objections.

What do you think the United States did or promised in order to assuage Chinese anxiety?

I doubt that we'll ever really know what went on behind those closed doors. It is my inclination, however that the Americans invoked the 2004 1,2,3 step deal with the PRC. As part of that deal, the United States guaranteed China membership in the NSG, as long as an American company, Westinghouse, got to construct nuclear plants in China in a multi-billion dollar deal.

China duly got membership in the NSG in December 2004, and the American delegation were probably reminding the Chinese that they still 'owe' the United States for this 'favour'.

Washington most probably also endeavoured to mollify Beijing's concerns of an Indo-American nexus forming itself against China.

Moving onto another issue: border incursions. Is it true that Chinese incursions have been multiplying over the past few months? Why do you think this is?

I think that these reports have been somewhat exaggerated by a sometimes sensationalistic press. I'm not denying that there are incursions: there are about 150 to 200 every year, but on both sides: Chinese and Indian.

Are these voluntary incursions?

Some are, some aren't.

On the Indian side, there are approximately 300 to 400 different patrols, which is not that much, considering the extent of the border. This is incredibly harsh terrain, most areas are from 3000 to 5000 metres above sea level, with temperatures sometimes ranging from -30 to -40 degrees centigrade. The terrain is mountainous, largely undefined and the patrols aren't equipped with GPS or anything like that. Often they don't really know where they are, and occasionally stumble into Chinese territory. The same happens on the Chinese side. These are involuntary incursions. They are of course very different from intentional military incursions, both in their motivations and potentially dangerous consequences.

The latter still happen from time to time, as both sides 'probe' their neighbour's territory on a regular basis,and engage in covert reconnaissance missions. Tensions have been largely de-escalated,however, thanks to the multiple CBMs signed over the last years. Periodically though dangerous situations will arise. During the Kargil War, for example, China furtively tried to take over the Daulat beg airbase in Ladakh (abandoned at the time) and in December 2000 a Daulat beg Oldi border patrol came eyeball-to-eyeball with Chinese soldiers. The situation was extremely volatile and could easily have turned into a bloody skirmish. The Indian Ministry of Defense gave de-escalation orders, and luckily there was no live firing. If anyone had taken the initiative in that particular situation, it could have degenerated very rapidly.

Have there been recent examples of such situations degenerating?

Yes, for example during the June 2003 visit of Vajpayee to China(the Indian BJP government's prime minister at the time) an Indian patrol that had strayed into the Chinese side was set upon by the Chinese army at Asafi La. It's hard to understand why the CBMs appear to work in some cases and not in others. The main concern is to prevent such transgressions, whether intentional or unintentional, from degenerating into what strategists call an LCO, a 'low conventional warfare'.

My thanks to Srikanth for graciously giving up some of his time.

If anyone is interested to find out more about the border issue, contact me, I will send you more information. In the meanwhile, here is a link to a transcript of a very interesting seminar on the subject, and in which Dr Kondapalli took part.

http://www.ipcs.org/India_seminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2184

'Duplicity' and a stalemate in the border talks.

China at the NSG: A 'duplicity' which was to be expected.

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal has been receiving a lot of attention in the press recently. First of all, what exactly does this deal consist of?

As I mentioned in my previous entry, India and the United States have been enjoying a new proximity over the past few years.In 2004, the Bush Administration declared India “a major non-NATO ally”; and in June 2005 both countries signed a framework defence agreement , announcing their intentions to follow a 10 year programme of increased defence cooperation. The recently confirmed Indo-US nuclear deal is the other main indicator of the warmth of Indo-US ties. Until recently, the ROI had been excluded from civilian nuclear trade by the United States and other states because it refuses to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. America is making a major departure from this tradition and making an exception to all the existing regulations by offering to equip India with civilian nuclear fuel and technology, provided that it agrees to certain safeguards on its civilian nuclear programme and does not use the fuel for military purposes. To benefit from this deal, India had to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency which particular safeguards will be applied to its civilian nuclear facilities and obtain a special exemption from the 45 nation NSG.

After a hairline victory in the Indian parliament and many hours of debate at the NSG, India finally entered the nuclear mainstream in September 2008. India now reaps all the advantages enjoyed by the five ‘official’ nuclear powers (France, Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United States) despite not having signed the NPT or Test-Ban Treaty. The Indo-US nuclear agreement is definitely a landmark agreement in the history of nuclear diplomacy; rarely has a country been offered so much for so little in return. Not only is this a major gain for India in the field of nuclear energy and technology, it also provides it with a significant symbolic edge over its troublesome nuclear-armed neighbour Pakistan, which has retained its nuclear pariah status.

China, of course, has been watching the Indo-US rapprochement with a sizeable dose of misgivings, and before the debate at the NSG, Indian diplomats scuttled to and forth from Beijing, ensuring that the PRC would not play an obstructionist role at the meet. Much of what happened during the negotiations remains clouded in confidentiality, and is based on hearsay and off the record declarations by Indian negotiators. It would seem however that the Chinese delegation, through the threat of procedural delays and the discreet lobbying of the countries initially not sympathetic to the deal (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, the Netherlands and Ireland) made a last-ditch attempt to scupper, or at least stall the deal. The Chinese delegation also apparently made strenuous efforts to obtain some sort of a similar deal for their Pakistani allies. This only occurred during the last few hours, and apparently took India by surprise. After intense pressure was applied on the Chinese by the Bush Administration, the deal finally went through.In the days following the discussions the Indian press was full of accusations of Chinese 'duplicity'.

The Indian National Security Adviser MK Narayanan even went so far as to express his 'disappointment' over China's attitude (see video at 05:33), unusually strong vocabulary for an Indian official, who tend to show more timidity than bravado in their dealings with the PRC.

http://broadband.indiatimes.com/videoshow/3453267.cms

These accusations of duplicity are based on the belief that the Chinese promised that they would not block the deal.

In reality, however, China's attitude towards the deal has been ambiguous from the get-go. Realising that formally opposing the deal would constitute a 'casus belli', the Chinese government has been expressing its reservations via its official media. The People’s Daily, for example, has regularly accused America of breaking the rules and blatantly following double standards, and issued dire warnings on the future consequences of setting such a precedent. Claiming that the Indo-US nuclear deal would lead to a dangerous ‘domino effect’, China has also frequently threatened the US with a response in kind by further enhancing their nuclear cooperation with countries such as Pakistan. These were indirect signs of China's hostility to the deal. Doctor Jabin Jacob, a China specialist at IPCS, a think tank in New Delhi, has written a thoughtful article analysing the consequences of the Chinese attitude at the NSG. (I interviewed him last month, the transcript will be posted over the weekend)

http://www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2688&issue=1009&status=article&keyArticle=1009&mod=b

As he points out, the "key event is not the Chinese 'betrayal' but of remembering what was achieved. The point remains that the Chinese did not scuttle the deal-something that was within their power to do." Interestingly, he attributes the reversals in China's attitude during the debates at Vienna in part to "the pulls and pressures within the Chinese establishment".Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party is hardly a monolithic structure and has its hawks as well as its doves. The Chinese Armed Forces, Doctor Jacob reminds us, wield a considerable influence over Chinese diplomacy. The attempt to stall the deal could have been a form of concession to the hawks in China's strategic community; after all the PRC couldn't have been seen to completely bend over in the face of American and Indian demands.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/NSG_Cong_agrees_to_forgive_China/articleshow/3468941.cms , India's official attitude now seems to be to 'forgive and forget' but the bad memory of those tension ridden last hours will surely have a negative impact on its future perception of China.

In the next entries, which will consist of interview transcripts, the whole NSG melodrama will be discussed in greater depth.

Border Talks end in Stalemate.

After each round of border talks, Chinese and Indian diplomats always seem to try to outdo each other when it comes to falsely optimistic claims of progress.

http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/09/25/stories/2008092559110100.htm

The truth however is less inspiring. Indeed, discussions have been taking place on a regular basis for years, and little, if anything, has been achieved. From the 17th to the 19th of September, the Indian and Chinese delegations met for their 13th round of talks on the border dispute, once again agreeing to continue the dialogue, and once again neither reporting any sign of tangible progress nor providing any indication that both sides have narrowed their differences. In an interesting report entitled "India China border: A Reality Check", retired General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff and now associated with the Observer Research Foundation, in New Delhi, calls for greater pragmatism when analysing the border issue.

http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=14724&mmacmaid=14725

He reminds us that there is still "no accepted delineation or even agreed perception of the LAC", and that the Chinese recognition of Sikkim remains tacit and not official. Although the comfort-level in Sino-Indian relations has grown, the constant Chinese upgrading of its military infrastructure along the border, and the "negligible progress" in the border dispute indicate the prevalence of abiding tensions in the relationship. Such a state of affairs should incite Indian External Affairs officials to less haste and greater caution in their declarations.

India and China: A (very brief) backgrounder.

Main issues of contention:

The border issue:

Both countries share the longest disputed frontier in the world (more than 2100 miles), which stretches from Northern Kashmir, to the Northeastern Province of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1962, rising tensions on both sides of the border led to a lightning Chinese assault, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for India, and the Chinese occupation of 16,500 square miles of territory previously owned by its transhimalayan neighbour. India also accuses Pakistan of having illegally ceded a slice of disputed Kashmiri territory, in Aksai Chin, to the PRC in 1963. China, for its part, after having more or less relinquished its claim over Sikkim, periodically declares that the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to the historical 'Greater Tibet', and therefore falls under its jurisdiction.

China's 'all-weather' friendship with Pakistan:

China has been Pakistan's staunchest ally over the years, bolstering its conventional military capabilites, as well as actively assisting it in the establishment of its nuclear weapons programme from the late 80s onwards, building all three of Pakistan's first three nuclear power plants and providing it with ready to launch M-9, M-11 and Dong Feng 21 ballistic missiles.

India's growing proximity to the US:

During the Cold War, New Delhi's relations with Washington were frequently marked by a fair degree of acrimony, largely due to the evolving strategic environment. To summarise at the risk of simplifying an incredibly complex period of diplomatic history, the United States viewed India as little more than the Soviet Union's regional surrogate, and New Delhi strongly disapproved of Washington's proximity to its CENTO ally, Pakistan, and of its growing ties with the PRC after Kissinger's furtive visit to Beijing in 1971.

Times have changed, however, since the end of the Cold War, and India’s emergence as major regional power has given it a lot more strategic significance than before. India’s blue-water navy, nuclear capabilities, powerful armed forces, high rate of economic growth and huge economic potential are all factors that make India loom a lot larger on America’s radar screen. India is also a vibrant and multiethnic parliamentary democracy and, as such, is far more attractive to the current American administration than other forms of authoritarian regimes in Asia. Containing China is just one aspect of the budding strategic partnership in-between the world’s largest and oldest democracy. Indeed, the US views India as a vital partner in the upholding of maritime security in vitally important sea lanes, and as an ally in the war on terror with a sizeable degree of experience in counterterrorism and often convergent threat perceptions, both being the target of Islamist terrorist cells.

The 'String of Pearls':

Pentagon analysts have famously dubbed China’s ‘string of pearls strategy’, its plan to acquire several strategically placed ports of call, naval bases and listening posts in friendly countries in order to protect the billions of dollars worth of trade that pass through strategically salient sea lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits. For the Chinese military, who live in fear that in the event of a major conflict with the US, a naval blockade would suffice to cut off nearly all of China’s energy supplies overnight; the Chinese Navy’s deployment in areas such as the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea is a question of future survival and as such, entirely legitimate in nature. To the Indian strategic community, however, the 'string of pearls' is a 'constricting noose', threatening to contain and encircle India in its own backyard. I will bring this all up again, and in far greater detail when I do some blog entries on the Navy sometime later on in the month.

Signs of normalisation:

Surging trade:

Bilateral trade has been surging forward at a breakneck speed over the past few years, attaining 29 billion USD in the first six few months of 2008, which represents an increase of more than 69% over the figures at the same period last year. China has now overtaken the US to become India's number one trading partner.

Mutual Concessions:

India frequently reiterates China's sovereignty over Tibet, which is another extremely sensitive issue in Sino-Indian relations, as India harbours the Tibetan government in exile at Dharamsala; and China, for its part, has tacitly recognized India's claims over Sikkim. China has also attempted to appear more neutral in its official declarations during Indo-Pakistani conflicts, (such as during the Kargil War in 1999), even though behind the scenes it continues to bolster Pakistan's military apparatus.

The multiplication of bilateral visits:

A sustained level of high-ranking bilateral visits has ensured a certain new 'comfort level' in Sino-Indian dealings. At each meeting, a plethora of MOUs( Memorandums of Understanding), CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) and other agreeements are signed, on issues as varied as the sharing of hydrological data to the mutual reduction of troops along certain areas of the LAC (the line of actual control, i.e, the informal border).

This , of course, is an extremely succint summary of the state of both countries' relations, if anyone's interested in more detail, just send me an e-mail and I'll send you more info.

Sino-Indian Relations: Reading Suggestions

Background reading:

"Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century", by John W.Garver, 2001.

http://www.amazon.com/Protracted-Contest-Sino-Indian-Rivalry-Twentieth/dp/0295980745/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562357&sr=8-1

This book is the seminal work on Sino-Indian relations, analysing in depth the evolutions in Sino-Indian relations from India's independence to the end of the 90s. Undoubtedly the best historical analysis on the subject at present.

"The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know", Francine R.Frankel and Harry Harding (Ed.), 2004.

http://www.amazon.com/India-China-Relationship-United-States-Needs/dp/0231132379/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562556&sr=1-1

This a most interesting and useful volume, combining the contributions of ten different renowned area experts, with people such as Susan Shirk, Sumit Ganguly, Ashley Tellis, etc.. Many different aspects of the relationship are discussed such as the border issue (by Sumit Ganguly), China's perceptions of India (Susan Shirk), the Indian strategic community's vision of China (Steven Hoffman). James Clad's analysis of convergent Chinese and Indian perspectives on the Global Order shows that the rapport is more multifaceted than one may at first believe, and Harry Harding's section on the implications for the United States is a useful reminder of the fact that relations in-between these two Asian giants are of far more than simply regional significance.

"China and India, Cooperation or Conflict?", Waheguru Pal Singh Sindhu and Jing-Dong Yuan, 2003.

http://www.amazon.com/China-India-Cooperation-Conflict-International/dp/1588261697/ref=pd_sim_b_5

This book concentrates on eight different issues: Tibet and Sikkim, mutual threat perceptions, nuclear nonproliferation,trade, terrorism, both countries's relationship with the United States and Pakistan and the impact of internal politics on the relationship. It is very informative and concise, often giving very precise information when it comes to military or technical matters.

"Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India", Jairam Ramesh, 2005.

http://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Chindia-Reflections-China/dp/8187943955/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1223562420&sr=1-2

This is a rather contemplative work, written by a senior Congress politician, Jairam Ramesh, who is presently Minister of State for Commerce and Power in the UPA government. The book is written by a self-avowed 'Nehruphile', who while remaining realistic, does not view the inevitability of conflict and confrontation between both countries as a foregone conclusion. It contains a short compilation of essays on issues as various as trade, the growing threat of HIV in both countries, and both countries' regional disparities. It's brevity means that it cannot really be viewed as a reference book, but it's a leisurely read and provides some interesting new perspectives.